[동아廣場/로버트 켈리]自由韓國黨의 復活을 위한 正當 모델

東亞日報
入力 2019年 1月 26日 03時 00分

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家計負債·微細먼지·低出産等問題에 左派政黨은 다양한 解決策提示해
韓國黨도 이런 問題에 積極 나서야
트럼프式 포퓰리즘 政黨으로는 權威主義·不淨腐敗解決 못해

로버트 켈리 객원논설위원·부산대 정치학과 교수 — 로버트 켈리 客員論說委員·부산대 政治學과 敎授

지난 달 紙面을 통해 自由韓國黨이 存在的危機에 直面해 있다고 이야기했다. 美國政治學用語로 選擧失敗後 힘을 잃고 放浪하는 ‘在野’ 狀態에 있다. 그렇다면 自由韓國黨은 어떻게 재야 狀態에서 벗어날 수 있을까. 아래와 같은 懸案들에 對해 創意的인 發想이 必要하다.

첫째 懸案은 ‘헬朝鮮’. 많은 學生들이 ‘名聲’ 때문에 서울에 있는 學校에 가기를 願하며, 三星 같은 大企業에 入社하기를 希望한다. 하지만 經濟的인 理由로 學院授業이나 課外를 받지 못하는 學生들에게는 어려운 일이다. 韓國의 深刻한 階層化는 形便이 어려운 이들에게 큰 屈辱感을 주고 있다.

두 番째는 ‘家計負債의 急激한 增加’. 不動産市場의 投機的性格으로 賣買나 專月貰를 堪當하기 어려운 中下位階層과 庶民들은 큰 苦痛을 겪고 있다. 不動産과 더불어 過度하게 높은 消費者物價로 많은 이들이 負債를 짊어지고 있다.

세 番째는 ‘大氣質惡化’. 微細먼지 原因의 大部分이 中國 아닌 韓國에서 使用하는 石炭 및 液化天然가스(LNG) 때문에 發生하고 있다. 모두가 이러한 問題提起를 하고 있는 狀況임에도 大氣質은 갈수록 深刻해지고 있다.

네 番째는 ‘出生率下落.’ 韓國女性 한 名이 낳는 子女의 數가 1名未滿이다. 現代社會에서 出生率減少는 一般的인 現象이지만 韓國은 그 速度가 너무 빠르다. 豫算不足, 말 많은 出産奬勵政策, 關心 받지 못하는 多文化主義等政府의 對應은 미적지근하다.

이 같은 問題들에 對해 左派政黨들은 다양한 아이디어를 提示해왔다. 朴元淳 서울市長은 少數者와 庶民에 對한 支援을 이야기 해왔고, 文在寅大統領은 財閥改革과 不淨腐敗剔抉의 必要性에 對해 搜査的으로나마 認定해왔다.

在野에서 다시 일어서기 위해 韓國右派는 바로 이 地點에 注目해야 한다. 階層移動을 바라지만 經濟的事情이 如意치 않은 學生들을 어떤 方法으로 說得할 것인가. 家父長社會에서 힘들게 얻은 職場을 잃지 않으면서도 子女를 갖고 싶은 젊은 女性들에게 어떤 代案을 提示할 것인가. 參考하면 좋을 만한 네 가지 類型의 政黨을 紹介한다.

于先 ‘自由主義的親市場·親世界化正當’이다. 레이건 前大統領以後부터 트럼프 大統領以前까지의 美國 공화당이나 獨逸의 자유민주당이 이에 該當된다. 自由韓國黨은 政府主導發展이 韓國經濟를 옭아매지 않도록 傳統的自由主義를 志向하면서 낮은 稅率과 적은 規制를 主張해야 在野에서 復歸할 수 있다. 勿論有權者들은 社會安全網, 政府提供社會서비스 等을 選好하기에 이러한 類型은 폭넓은 共感을 이끌어내기 어렵다.

다음은 ‘宗敎에 基盤한 正當’이다. 西洋에서는 政治에 積極的인 基督敎人들이 200年間政黨을 構成해왔다. 韓國의 改新敎團體들도 政治에 큰 關心을 가진 保守有權者集團이다. 다만 韓國에는 佛敎等多樣한 信念이 共存해 자칫 宗敎的派閥을 심화시킬 수도 있다.

‘穩健한 基督敎民主主義政黨’도 있다. 유럽의 保守들은 파시즘이 民族主義를 沮害시킨 以後敎會를 中心으로 政黨을 構成했다. 이러한 基督敎民主主義는 一般的槪念의 愛國主義, 傳統酒의, 反共主義等으로 녹아들어갔다. 다만 이처럼 模糊하고 過去回歸的인 保守主義는 다음에 말할 새로운 ‘포퓰리즘 或은 트럼피즘(Trumpism) 모델’에 밀려나고 있다.

最近世界的인 右派의 ‘善防’은 포퓰리즘 政黨에서 이루어지고 있는데 트럼프 式으로 再編된 공화당이 가장 代表的이다. 自由韓國黨度 이러한 類型에 關心을 보여왔다. 洪準杓前自由韓國當代表는 지난 大選에서 自身을 ‘韓國版 트럼프’라고 弘報했다. 共通分母는 있다. 트럼프 大統領과 유럽의 포퓰리스트 指導者들은 民族主義, 重商主義, 外國人嫌惡, 自主權, 이슬람 嫌惡等을 强調한다. 韓國에서도 예멘人難民에 對한 極甚한 嫌惡反應으로 判斷하건대 트럼프式 포퓰리즘은 좋은 戰略이 될 수 있다.

그러나 否定的인 側面 또한 明確하다. 이들 大部分은 權威主義的이며 暴力的인 性向이 剛하다. 또 포퓰리즘 政策은 貿易障壁, 移民者減少, 量的緩和等과 같이 매우 近視眼的인 解決策이 될 可能性이 크다. 權威主義와 企業不淨腐敗를 剔抉하기 위해 努力하는 輸出依存國가 韓國에서 트럼프 式의 길을 걷는 것은 退步를 의미할 수 있다.

로버트켈리 客員論說委員·부산대 政治學과 敎授

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Models for the Liberty Korea Party‘s Rebirth

In this space last month, I argued that the Liberty Korea Party is facing an existential crisis. The LKP is now in what American political science calls the ’wilderness‘ ¤ where a party out of power wanders in exile for a few years to reconstruct itself after a major defeat in order to become competitive again. The question is: how the LKP will come back? Will a post-Park Geun-Hye LKP speak to South Korea’s current domestic priorities, and not its own internal obsessions?

The LKP‘s last occupant of the presidency was impeached for a staggering corruption scandal, which many party voters disturbingly continue to insist was actually a communist plot. The party then got trounced in the 2017 presidential elections, and then trounced again in the 2018 local elections. Its ideology of mccarthyite anticommunism and pro-chaebol statist developmentalism is tired and has little appeal to younger and female voters.

On a host of major issues facing South Korea, the South Korean right today has little to say or is simply reactionary. South Korea needs creative thinking on issues such as:

- ’Hell Chosun‘: I see this problem regularly among the students I have taught for more than a decade at Pusan National University. Many pine to attend a school in Seoul simply for prestige. Many wish to live, work, or attend school overseas. Everyone is obsessed with working for a chaebol, Samsung above all, again because of the prestige. Those whose families do not have the resources for hagwons and tutors suffer. South Korea’s intense stratification is brutal and far too humiliating for the less well-off.

- Skyrocketing household debt: A speculative real estate market here punishes the poor and lower middle class without the resources to rent or buy. Practically everyone is in debt now because of real estate and extraordinarily high consumer prices. Seeing Costcos in Korea flooded with Koreans all the time is revelatory about just how expensive South Korea is for consumers.

- Appalling air quality: The usual excuse is that the dust comes from China, but we know now that that is not true, that much of it is home-grown from the use of coal and LNG. Everyone talks about this, but the problem has gotten much worse in my time in South Korea.

- Crashing birth rate: South Koreans are not replacing themselves. Fertility is now below one live birth per female. South Korea will start to contract demographically in less than five years. Some contraction of birth rates under modernization is typical, but South Korea‘s contraction has been extreme. The government’s response has been tepid ¤ controversial, under-resourced natalist programs; tepid multiculturalism; and vague hopes for unification with higher fertility North Koreans.

This is just a partial list of concerns which strike me as the most important domestic issues here. But one might include other obvious concerns, such as: traffic and pedestrian safety, cleaner streets, corruption, family leave, pregnancy and labor market participation, relations with Japan, the world‘s highest rate of alcohol consumption, corporate governance reform, the treatment of minorities such as immigrants or homosexuals, and so on.

In short, South Korea faces some pretty serious domestic issues where a normal political party would make interesting or at least relevant policy proposals. And to the credit of the South Korean left, its parties have floated various ideas about these concerns over the years. Park Won-Soon, the mayor of Seoul, for example, has prioritized these sorts of lifestyle issues, including outreach to minorities and the less well-off. Moon Jae-In has at least rhetorically recognized the need to discipline the chaebol and reduce corruption.

Here is where the South Korean right needs return from its exile with something interesting to say. How would it win over the votes of my students with limited resources who want to find dignity and social mobility in a stratified society? How will it speak to young women who would like to have children without losing the jobs they fought so hard to achieve in a patriarchal society?

Looking at other democracies, I see four possible models for a conservative party:

1. A libertarian, pro-market, pro-globalization party. The best examples here are the post-Ronald Reagan/pre-Donald Trump Republican party in the United States, and the Free Democratic Party in Germany. The LKP would return from the wilderness as a classical liberal, low tax/low regulation party determined to free up the South Korean economy from heavy hand of South Korea’s state-led development.

Unfortunately, this model has limited appeal. Voters like the social safety net, the state‘s provision of services, and progressive taxation. The FDP has always been a minor party in Germany, and the American Republicans have often had to cover their pro-corporate agenda with more populist policy proposals.

2. A religious party. Politically active Christians in the West have organized themselves politically for two centuries, and certainly South Korea’s Protestant groups are both politically engaged and reliable conservative voters. But South Korea is religiously quite diverse, with many Buddhists and non-religious voters. There are probably not enough conservative religious voters for this strategy, and politicizing religion would increase sectarianism in South Korea, as Protestants, Catholics, and Buddhists sought to capture the party‘s agenda.

3. Tepid Christian democracy. European postwar conservatives organized themselves around the church after fascism had discredited nationalism. This Christian democratic strand dissolved into a general patriotism, traditionalism, and anticommunism. The current LKP is somewhat like this, although it is more akin to the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan than Christian democracy in Europe. However, this vague, backward-looking conservatism is losing out to the new populist/Trumpist model.

4. Populism/Trumpism. The excitement on the global right today is around populist parties, most obviously Trump’s remaking of the Republican party. But the Brexiteers, and the National Front in France, are also well-known models, while Brazil and the Philippines have ‘Trumpist’ presidents too.

The LKP has already flirted with this model. Hong Joon-Pyo, the LKP 2017 presidential candidate, marketed himself as the ‘Donald Trump of Korea.’ There is definitely some overlap. Trump and the European populists emphasize nationalism, mercantilism, xenophobia, sovereignty, hostility to Islam, and so on. All of this would have obvious appeal to South Korean conservative voters. The sharp xenophobic response to the 550 Muslim refugees on Jeju in 2018 suggests Trumpist populism might work here.

The downside is pretty obvious though. Trump, the Brexiteers, the National Front, and the other populists are either openly racist and obviously flirting with racism. Most have authoritarian and gangsterish instincts. All have disturbing relations with Russia. Populist policy solutions tend to be pretty short-sighted ¤ trade barriers, reduced immigration, looser money. For an export dependent economy like South Korea‘s, which fought hard to free itself from both authoritarianism and corporate corruption, the Trump path would represent a step backward.

These strike me as the four most obvious paths for an LKP reconstruction. None of them fit Korean circumstances exceptionally well, but if the LKP wants to start winning again, it needs to start thinking how it might address the many pressing issues discussed above.

#自由韓國黨 #포퓰리즘