Founding ideology of Turkey
Kemalism
(
Turkish
:
Kemalizm
, also archaically
Kamalizm
[1]
), also known as
Ataturkism
(
Turkish
:
Ataturkculuk, Ataturkcu du?unce
), or
the Six Arrows
(
Turkish
:
Altı Ok
), is the founding and official ideology of the
Republic of Turkey
based on the ideas and legacy of
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
.
[2]
Ataturk's Turkey was defined by sweeping political, social, cultural, and religious reforms designed to separate the Republican state from its
Ottoman
predecessor and embrace a
Western
-style lifestyle,
[3]
including the establishment of
secularism/laicism
, state support of the sciences,
gender equality
,
economic statism
and more. Most of those policies were first introduced to and implemented in Turkey during Ataturk's presidency through
his reforms
.
Origins
[
edit
]
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
's ideas are derived from
Enlightenment philosophers
, Europe's revolutionary history, and his own experience as a citizen, soldier, and revolutionary in the last days of the
Ottoman Empire
.
Various reforms to avoid the imminent
collapse of the Empire
, began chiefly in the 19th-century
Tanzimat
reforms.
[4]
The mid-century the
Young Ottomans
attempted to create the ideology of Ottoman nationalism, or
Ottomanism
, to quell the
rising ethnic nationalism
in the Empire and introduce limited democracy for the first time while maintaining Islamist influences. With their demise under Sultan
Abdul Hamid II
's absolutist reign, in the early 20th century the
Young Turks
picked up their legacy. Ataturk's formative years were spent in Hamidian
Salonica
. During his time in the army, he joined the
Committee of Union and Progress
, which was agitating for constitutionalism against Hamidian absolutism, and abandoned Ottoman nationalism in favor of
Turkish nationalism
, while adopting a secular political outlook (see
?ttihadism
).
Ataturk was not in a position to play a major role in the
Young Turk Revolution
of 1908, which reinstated the constitution, though he was a key player in the deposition of Abdul Hamid during the
31 March Incident
. During the
Second Constitutional Era
personal rivalries with
?smail Enver
and
Ahmed Cemal
meant that he was kept at arms-length from power: the
Central Committee of the CUP
. It also didn't help that Ataturk mostly disagreed with the policies of the radical Unionists. However this allowed him to observe the CUP's successes and shortcomings in implementing their programs. During
World War I
, his military career took off with his
defense of Gallipoli
, and by the war's end he was a
Pasha
in charge of three army commands on the
Syrian Front
.
Following the Ottoman Empire's defeat -and the CUP's self-liquidation- by the war's end, Ataturk lead a military campaign against the Allies' planned partition of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace known as the
Turkish War of Independence
. This conflict being simultaneously a revolution, by 1923 his counter government based in
Ankara
abolished the Ottoman monarchy
and proclaimed a
Republic
. In Ataturk's 15 years as president, many
sweeping reforms
were introduced that advanced a
secular
,
republican
, and
unitary
agenda for the Republic of Turkey.
[5]
His doctrine was implanted into the Constitution as
state ideology
in 1937.
[6]
Principles
[
edit
]
Ataturk refrained from being dogmatic and described his ideology to be based on science and reason.
[7]
There are six principles (
ilke
) of the ideology:
Republicanism
(
Turkish
:
cumhuriyetcilik
),
Populism
(
Turkish
:
halkcılık
),
Nationalism
(
Turkish
:
milliyetcilik
),
Laicism
(
Turkish
:
laiklik
),
Statism
(
Turkish
:
devletcilik
), and
Reformism
(
Turkish
:
inkılapcılık
). Together, they represent a kind of
Jacobinism
, defined by Ataturk himself as a method of employing political despotism to break down the social despotism prevalent among the traditionally-minded Turkish-Muslim population, caused by, he believed, the bigotry of the
ulema
.
[8]
Republicanism
[
edit
]
Republicanism
(
Turkish
:
cumhuriyetcilik
) in the Kemalist framework replaced the
monarchy
of the
Ottoman dynasty
with the
rule of law
,
popular sovereignty
and
civic virtue
, including an emphasis on liberty practiced by citizens. Kemalist republicanism defines a type of constitutional republic, in which representatives of the people are elected, and must govern in accordance with existing constitutional law limiting governmental power over citizens. The head of state and other officials are chosen by election rather than inheriting their positions, and their decisions are subject to judicial review. In defending the change from the Ottoman State, Kemalism asserts that all laws of the Republic of Turkey should be inspired by actual needs here on Earth as a basic tenet of national life.
[9]
Kemalism advocates a republican system as the best representative of the wishes of the people.
Among the many types of
republic
, the Kemalist republic is
representative
,
liberal
[10]
[11]
[12]
and
parliamentary
with a parliament chosen in general elections, a
president
as head of state elected by parliament and serving for a limited term, a
prime minister
appointed by the president, and other ministers appointed by parliament. The president does not have direct executive powers, but has limited veto powers, and the right to contest with referendum. The day-to-day operation of government is the responsibility of the Council of Ministers formed by the prime minister and the other ministers. There is a
separation of powers
between the executive (president and Council of Ministers), the legislative (Parliament) and the judiciary, in which no one branch of government has authority over another?although parliament is charged with the supervision of the Council of Ministers, which can be compelled to resign by a vote of no-confidence.
The Kemalist republic is a
unitary state
in which three
organs of state
govern the nation as a single unit, with one
constitutionally
created
legislature
. On some issues, the
political power
of
government
is transferred to lower levels, to local elected assemblies represented by mayors, but the
central government
retains the principal governing role.
Populism
[
edit
]
Populism
(
Turkish
:
halkcılık
) is defined as a social revolution aimed to transfer the political power to
citizenship
. Kemalist populism intends not only to establish
popular sovereignty
but also the transfer of the social-economic transformation
[
clarification needed
]
to realize a true populist state. However, Kemalists reject
class conflict
and
collectivism
.
[13]
Kemalist populism believes
national identity
is above all else. Kemalist populism envisions a sociality that emphasizes
class collaboration
and national unity like
solidarism
. Populism in Turkey is to create a unifying force that brings a sense of the Turkish state and the power of the people to bring in that new unity.
[14]
Kemalist populism is an extension of the Kemalist modernization movement, aiming to make Islam compatible with the modern nation-state. This included state supervision of religious schools and organizations. Mustafa Kemal himself said "everyone needs a place to learn religion and faith; that place is a
mektep
, not a
madrasa
.
" This was intended to combat the "corruption" of Islam by the
ulema
. Kemal believed that during the Ottoman period, the
ulema
had come to exploit the power of their office and manipulate religious practices to their own benefit. It was also feared that, were education not brought under state control, unsupervised
madrasa
s could exacerbate the rising problem of
tarikat
insularity that threatened to undermine the unity of the Turkish state.
[15]
Sovereignty
[
edit
]
Kemalist social theory (populism) does not accept any adjectives placed before the definition of a nation [a nation of ...] Sovereignty must belong solely to people without any term, condition, etc.:
?akimiyet bila ?aydu ?ar? Milletindir
Egemenlik kayıtsız ?artsız Milletindir
Sovereignty belongs to the nation unrestrictedly and unconditionally
[16]
?
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
Motto
[
edit
]
Populism was used against the political domination of sheikhs, tribal leaders, and the
Islamic political system
of the Ottoman Empire.
Ataturk's nationalism aimed to shift the political legitimacy from royal autocracy (by the
Ottoman dynasty
),
theocracy
(based in the
Ottoman caliphate
), and
feudalism
(tribal leaders) to the active participation of its citizenry, the Turks. Kemalist social theory wanted to establish the value of Turkish citizenship. A sense of pride associated with this citizenship would give the needed psychological spur for people to work harder and achieve a sense of unity and national identity. Active participation, or the "will of the people", was established with the republican regime and Turkishness replacing the other forms of affiliations that had been promoted in the Ottoman Empire (such as the allegiance to the different millets that eventually led to divisiveness in the empire). The motto "
Ne mutlu Turkum diyene
" (English: How happy is the one who calls themselves a Turk) was promoted against such mottoes as "long live the Sultan," "long live the Sheikh", or "long live the Caliph."
Laicism
[
edit
]
Laicism
(
Turkish
:
laiklik
) in Kemalist ideology aims to banish religious interference in government affairs, and vice versa. It differs from the passive Anglo-American concept of
secularism
,
[17]
but is similar to the concept of
laicite
in France.
The roots of Kemalist secularism lie in the reform efforts in the late Ottoman Empire, especially the
Tanzimat
period and the later
Second Constitutional Era
. The Ottoman Empire was an
Islamic state
in which the head of the Ottoman state held the position of the Caliph. The social system was organized according to various systems, including the religiously organized
Millet system
and
Shari'ah law
, allowing religious ideology to be incorporated into the Ottoman administrative, economic, and political system. In the Second Constitutional Era, the
Ottoman Parliament
pursued largely secular policies, although techniques of religious populism and attacks on other candidates' piety still occurred between
Ottoman political parties
during
elections
. These policies were stated as the reason for the
31 March Incident
by Islamists and absolute monarchists. The secular policies of the Ottoman parliament also factored in the
Arab Revolt
during World War I.
When secularism was implemented in the fledgling Turkish state, it was initiated by the abolition of the centuries-old
caliphate
in March 1924. The office of
Shaykh al-Isl?m
was replaced with the
Presidency of Religious Affairs
(
Turkish
:
Diyanet
). In 1926, the
mejelle
and shari'ah law codes were abandoned in favor of an adapted
Swiss Civil Code
and a penal code modeled on the German and Italian codes. Other religious practices were done away with, resulting in the dissolution of
Sufi
orders and the penalization of wearing a
fez
, which was viewed by Ataturk as a tie to the Ottoman past.
[3]
State and religion (laicite)
[
edit
]
Ataturk was profoundly influenced by the triumph of
laicite
in France.
[18]
Ataturk perceived the French model as the authentic form of secularism. Kemalism strove to control religion and transform it into a private affair rather than an institution interfering with politics, as well as scientific and social progress.
[18]
It is more than merely creating a separation between state and religion. Ataturk has been described as working as if he were
Leo the Isaurian
,
Martin Luther
, the
Baron d'Holbach
,
Ludwig Buchner
,
Emile Combes
, and
Jules Ferry
rolled into one in creating Kemalist secularism.
[18]
Kemalist secularism does not imply nor advocate
agnosticism
or
nihilism
; it means freedom of thought and independence of the institutions of the state from the dominance of religious thought and religious institutions. The Kemalist principle of laicism is not against moderate and apolitical religion, but against religious forces opposed to and fighting modernization and democracy.
According to the Kemalist perception, the Turkish state is to stand at an equal distance from every religion, neither promoting nor condemning any set of religious beliefs. Kemalists, however, have called for not only separation of church and state but also a call for the state control of the Turkish Muslim religious establishment
[
citation needed
]
. For some Kemalists
[
who?
]
, this means that the state must be at the helm of religious affairs, and all religious activities are under the supervision of the state. This, in turn, drew criticism from the religious conservatives. Religious conservatives were vocal in rejecting this idea, saying that to have a secular state, the state can't control the activities of religious institutions. Despite their protest, this policy was officially adopted by the
1961 constitution
.
[14]
Kemalist policies aimed to stamp out the religious element within society. After the end of the
Turkish War of Independence
, all education was under the control of the state in both secular and religious schools. It centralized the education system, with one curriculum in both religious and secular public schools, in the hope this would eliminate or lessen the appeal of religious schools. The laws were meant to abolish the
Sufi
religious schools or orders
(
tarikats
)
and their lodges
(
tekkes
)
. Titles like
sheikh
and
dervish
were abolished, and their activities were banned by the government. The day of rest was changed by the government from Friday to Sunday. But the restrictions on personal choice extended to both religious duty and naming. Turks had to adopt a surname and were not allowed to perform the
hajj
(pilgrimage to
Mecca
).
[14]
[15]
Politics and religion (secularism)
[
edit
]
The Kemalist form of
separation of state and religion
sought the reform of a complete set of institutions, interest groups (such as
political parties
, unions, and lobbies), the relationships between those institutions, and the political norms and rules that governed their functions (constitution, election law). The biggest change in this perspective was the abolishment of the
Ottoman caliphate
on March 3, 1924, followed by the removal of its political mechanisms. The article stating that "the established religion of Turkey is Islam" was removed from the constitution on April 10, 1928.
[19]
From a political perspective, Kemalism is anti-clerical, in that it seeks to prevent religious influence on the democratic process, which was a problem even in the largely secular politics of the
Second Constitutional Era
of the Ottoman Empire, when even non-religiously affiliated political parties like the
Committee of Union and Progress
and the
Freedom and Accord Party
feuded over matters such as the Islamic piety of their candidates in the
Ottoman elections of 1912
.
[20]
Thus, in the Kemalist political perspective, politicians cannot claim to be the protector of any religion or religious sect, and such claims constitute sufficient legal grounds for the permanent banning of political parties.
Insignia
[
edit
]
The Ottoman social system was based on religious affiliation. Religious insignia extended to every social function. Clothing identified citizens with their own particular religious grouping; headgear distinguished rank and profession.
Turbans
,
fezes
,
bonnets
, and head-dresses denoted the sex, rank, and profession ? both civil and military ? of the wearer. Religious insignia outside of worship areas became banned.
While Ataturk considered women's religious coverings as antithetical to progress and equality, he also recognized that headscarves were not such a danger to the separation of church and state to warrant an outright ban.
[21]
But the Constitution was amended in 1982, following the 1980 coup by the Kemalist-leaning military, to prohibit women's use of Islamic coverings such as the
hijab
at higher education institutions.
[22]
Joost Lagendijk
, a
member of the European Parliament
and chair of the Joint Parliamentary Committee with Turkey, has publicly criticized these
clothing restrictions
for Muslim women,
[23]
whereas the
European Court of Human Rights
has ruled in numerous cases that such restrictions in public buildings and educational institutions do not constitute a violation of human rights.
[24]
[25]
Reformism
[
edit
]
Reformism
(
Turkish
:
inkılapcılık
) is a principle which calls for the country to replace the traditional institutions and concepts with modern institutions and concepts. This principle advocated the need for fundamental social change through
reform
as a strategy to achieve a modern society. The core of the reform, in the Kemalist sense, was an accomplished fact.
[26]
In a Kemalist sense, there is no possibility of return to the old systems because they were deemed backward.
The principle of reformism went beyond the recognition of the reforms made during Ataturk's lifetime. Ataturk's reforms in the social and political spheres are accepted as irreversible. Ataturk never entertained the possibility of a pause or transition phase during the course of the progressive unfolding or implementation of the reform. The current understanding of this concept can be described as "active modification".
[26]
Turkey and its society, taking over institutions from Western Europe, must add Turkish traits and patterns to them and adapt them to Turkish culture, according to Kemalism.
[26]
The implementation of the Turkish traits and patterns of these reforms takes generations of cultural and social experience, which results in the collective memory of the Turkish nation.
[
citation needed
]
Nationalism
[
edit
]
Nationalism
(
Turkish
:
milliyetcilik
): The Kemalist revolution aimed to create a
nation state
from the remnants of the multi-religious and multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. Ataturk's nationalism originates from the
social contract
theories, especially from the
civic nationalist
principles advocated by
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
and his
Social Contract
. The Kemalist perception of social contract was facilitated by the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire
, which was perceived as a product of failure of the Ottoman "
Millet
" system and the ineffective
Ottomanism
policy. Ataturk's nationalism, after experiencing the Ottoman Empire's breakup, defined the social contract as its "highest ideal".
In the administration and defense of the Turkish Nation; national unity, national awareness and national culture are the highest ideals that we fix our eyes upon.
[27]
?
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
Kemalist ideology defines the "Turkish Nation" (
Turkish
:
Turk Ulusu
) as a nation of
Turkish people
who always love and seek to exalt their family, country and nation, who know their duties and responsibilities towards the democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law, founded on
human rights
, and on the tenets laid down in the preamble to the constitution of the Republic of Turkey.
[28]
Similar to its CUP predecessors, it can be said that Kemalism endorsed
social Darwinism
in some way by desiring the Turkish youth to be healthy and physically strong.
[29]
[30]
Criteria
[
edit
]
Ataturk defined the Turkish nation as the "people (
halk
) who established the Turkish republic". Further, "the natural and historical facts which effected the establishment (
teessus
) of the Turkish nation" were "(a) unity in political existence, (b) unity in language, (c) unity in homeland, (d) unity in race and origin (
men?e
), (e) to be historically related and (f) to be morally related".
[31]
Membership is usually gained through birth within the borders of the state and also the principle of
jus sanguinis
. The Kemalist notion of nationality is integrated into the
Article 66
of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. Every citizen is recognized as a Turk, regardless of ethnicity, belief, and gender, etc.
Turkish nationality law
states that he or she can be deprived of his/her nationality only through an act of treason.
[32]
Kemalists saw non-Muslims as only nominal citizens, and they have often been treated as
second-class citizens
in the Republic of Turkey.
[33]
[34]
The identity of
Kurds in Turkey
was
denied for decades
with Kurds described as "
Mountain Turks
".
[35]
[36]
Ataturk stated in 1930:
Within the political and social unity of today's Turkish nation, there are citizens and co-nationals who have been incited to think of themselves as
Kurds
,
Circassians
,
Laz
or
Bosnians
. But these erroneous appellations - the product of past periods of tyranny - have brought nothing but sorrow to individual members of the nation, with the exception of a few brainless reactionaries, who became the enemy's instruments.
[37]
In 2005, the
Article 301
of the Turkish Penal code made it a crime to insult Turkishness (
Turkish
:
Turkluk
), but under pressure of the EU, this was changed in 2008 to protect the "Turkish nation" instead of Turkish ethnicity in 2008, an 'imagined' nationhood of people living within the
National Pact
(
Turkish
:
Misak-ı Milli
) borders.
[38]
Turkism
[
edit
]
Kemalism focused on the nation-state's narrower interests, renouncing the concern for the "Outside Turks".
[39]
Pan-Turkism was an
ethnocentric
ideology [to unite all ethnically Turkic nations] while Kemalism is polycentric [united under a "common will"] in character.
[39]
Kemalism wants to have an equal footing among the mainstream world civilizations. Pan-Turkists have consistently emphasized the special attributes of the
Turkic peoples
, and wanted to unite all of the Turkic peoples. Kemalism wants an equal footing (based on respect) and does not aim to unite the people of Turkey with all the other Turkic nations. Most Kemalists were not interested in Pan-Turkism and from 1923 to 1950 (the single state period) reacted with particular firmness.
[39]
Further more, Ataturk opposed Pan-Turkism in his speech (
Nutuk
) as following:
Gathering various nations under a common and general title and establishing a strong state by keeping these various groups of elements under the same law and conditions is a bright and attractive political view; but it is deceptive. In fact, it is an impossible goal to unite all the Turks in the world into a state, without any borders. This is a truth that centuries and people who have lived for centuries brought about through very painful and bloody events.
It cannot be seen in history that panislamism and panturanism were successful and were practiced in the world. Though, the results of the ambitions for the establishment of a state, covering all humanity, regardless of race, are written in history.
[40]
However, Ataturk owned the idea of taking Turkicness as one of the identities of Turkish nation.
Turkish History Thesis
started under Ataturk's order and administration, which contained ethno-racial ideas based on Turkish origins coming from
Central Asia
. Also Ataturk era high school books contained education of
Orkhon alphabet
[41]
[
non-primary source needed
]
[
obsolete source
]
and a unit under the title of "Greater Turkic history and Civilization".
[42]
[
non-primary source needed
]
[
obsolete source
]
The book also gave detailed information about empires which are Turkic such as
Gokturks
or "claimed to be Turkic" such as
Scythians
,
Xiongnu
, and so on.
[43]
[
non-primary source needed
]
[
obsolete source
]
With the supports of newly founded Turkish Republic,
Pan-Turkist
organization known as "
Turkish Hearths
", re-established in Ataturk's era to get Turkists' support during the
revolutions
. Ataturk was frequently giving speeches on Turkish Hearths after important events occurred in Turkey.
[44]
Also reopening of Turkish magazine "
Turk Yurdu
" which was an organ of Turkish Hearts, was supported.
[45]
Later, in 1931, Turkish Hearts were closed by Ataturk after they lost their non-political stance, because of their Pan-Turkist views and movements; and with all of its premises, it merged to the ruling party
CHP
.
[46]
Kemalism had a narrower definition of language, which sought to remove (
purify
) the Persian, Arabic, Greek, Latin, etc. words from the Turkish language and replace them with either Turkic originated words or derive new words with Turkic roots.
Kemalism and the Hittites
[
edit
]
Kemalism gave an important place to
Hittites
and the Hittite symbolism to construct the Turkish identity and nationhood. Kemalist researchers, such as
Ahmet A?ao?lu
(who was an advisor to Ataturk and a politician who played an important role on creating
Turkey's constitution of 1924
), believed in that the nation has to portray Hittites as a world-domineering Turkish race with firm roots in Anatolia.
[47]
Modern genetic researches on Turkish samples show that
Anatolian Turks
are mixage of
Turkic tribes
and Anatolian natives, however, unlike
Kemalist thoughts
, these two admixtures are not originated from same ethnicity, race, or identity.
[48]
Statism
[
edit
]
Statism
(
Turkish
:
devletcilik
): Ataturk made clear in his statements and policies that Turkey's complete
modernization
was very much dependent on economic and technological development. The principle of Kemalist statism is generally interpreted to mean that the state was to regulate the country's general economic activities and engage in areas where private enterprises are not willing to do so. This was the result of post-independence war Turkey needing to redefine the relationship between societal and international capitalism. The war left Turkey in ruins, as the Ottoman Empire was focused on raw materials and was an
open market
in the international capitalist system. Post-war Turkey has been largely defined by its agricultural society, which includes many landlords and merchants. The control of people in the Turkish economy is quite evident from 1923 to the 1930s, but they still managed, through foreign joint investment, to establish a state economic enterprise. However, after the
Great Depression
, there was a shift to more inward-looking development strategies during an era generally referred to as "etatism". During this era, the state had an active involvement in both
capital accumulation
and investment as well as in taking the interest of private businesses into consideration. The state often stepped into economic areas that the private sector did not cover, either due to not being strong enough or having simply failed to do so. These were often infrastructure projects and power stations, but also iron and steel industries, while the masses shouldered the burden of capital accumulation.
[49]
Analysis
[
edit
]
Kemalism and Turkey's political parties
[
edit
]
The
Republican People's Party
(CHP) was established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on September 9, 1923, not long before the declaration of the Republic of Turkey on October 29. The Republican People's Party did not attempt to update or define the philosophical roots of its Kemalism between the 1940s and the 1960s.
Since the 1960s, it has been generally considered, the CHP has moved to a position that is more
left-of-center
; supporters of the party appear to have generally accepted the idea that structural changes brought forth by the government were necessary for modernization. Later, in the 1970s, due to a wider rejection and abandonment of Kemalism, in Turkish society, the CHP made more fundamental and left-leaning changes to its party platform, including programs that were labeled "
democratic left
".
By the early 21st century, most Kemalists (within or outside the CHP) still believed in the original six principles, whilst others criticized and explicitly sought to reduce the
statist
tendencies of Kemalism.
[50]
For instance, in 2016, the Turkish Justice Minister,
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt
, equated sone Kemalist policies with the
Italian fascism
of
Benito Mussolini
.
[51]
Use of "Kemalism" as a descriptive term of political discourse is often attributed to Bozkurt,
Ahmet Cevat Emre
and politician
Yakup Kadri Karaosmano?lu
.
[52]
The latter used the term on 28 June 1929 to refer to the
ideology
consisting of "the basic principles and values of the Turkish path to modernity."
[53]
Kemalism and Turkey's constitutional law
[
edit
]
The six principles were solidified on 5 February 1937, 14 years after establishment of the Republic of Turkey.
In the
1924 Constitutional Law
Article 2, Clause 1:
Turkey is republican, nationalist, attached to the people, interventionist, secular, and revolutionary.
Both the
military coup of 1960
and the
military coup of 1980
were followed by fundamental revisions of the Turkish Constitution. The texts of the new constitutions were approved by popular referendum in each case.
In the
1961 Constitutional Law
Article 1, Clause 1 states "The Turkish State is a Republic." Article 2, Clause 1:
The Turkish Republic is a nationalistic, democratic, secular and social state, governed by the rule of law, based on human rights and fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble.
In the
1982 Constitutional Law
Article 1, Clause 1 states "The Turkish State is a Republic." Article 2, Clause 1:
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.
Only the principles of
secularism
,
nationalism
and democracy were maintained in each change to the constitution. The 1961 Constitution more strongly emphasized human rights, the rule of law, and the welfare state than the original 1924 constitution, while the 1982 constitution focused on the peace of the community and national solidarity, but also explicitly referenced some of Ataturk's principles and included them as well.
External interpretations of Kemalism
[
edit
]
In the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey's domestic transformations and the evolution of the Kemalist system of ideological and political principles were closely observed in Germany, France, Britain, the US, and beyond, including several nations farther East. In recent years, scholarly interest in the transnational history of Kemalism has expanded. Some scholars have focused on the interwar period in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt to reveal how, as a practical tool, Kemalism was relocated as a global movement, whose influence is still felt today.
[54]
Some scholars have examined the impact of Ataturk's reforms and his image on the Jewish community in British-ruled Palestine before the establishment of Israel,
[55]
some went farther East?to Persia, Afghanistan, China, India,
[56]
and other parts of the Muslim world?to assess the influence wielded by Mustafa Kemal and his modernization project. These works explore perceptions of Kemalism that are mostly positive in their respective countries providing few critical insights into Kemalism's evolution and its reception as an ideological project.
The
Bolsheviks
regarded Kemalists as an ally against the Western imperialism led by
British Empire
but feared that the Greeks could establish a "Great Armenian-Byzantine state" in Anatolia, which would border Russia. The intolerance against communists in Turkey was overlooked by the Soviet leadership to unite against the common enemy.
[57]
: 64
The Germans of 1920s were similarly intrigued by Kemalism. That a member of the
Central Powers
fought a war of liberation impressed the German society.
[58]
: 269
The
Nazis
viewed Kemalist Turkey as a "postgenocidal paradise" worthy of emulation.
[59]
[60]
Nazis often stated that
Nazism
and Kemalism were very similar.
[61]
In 1933, Nazis openly admired Kemalist Turkey. Hitler described Mustafa Kemal as the "star in the darkness".
[63]
Historian
?ukru Hanio?lu
describes Kemalism as "scientifically sanctioned version of Turkish nationalism." It drew upon the
Enlightenement
ideas of the American and French revolutions, 19th century
positivism
and
republicanism
.
[64]
: 152
It is centered around Ataturk, who reigned as an
enlightened autocrat
and brought top-down changes to a backwater society, in the style of
Friedrich the Great
and
Catherine the Great
.
[64]
: 165
Although those who view Kemalism in a positive light link Kemalist secularism to
the Enlightenment
, Kemalism rejects certain Western emancipatory ideologies such as liberalism and socialism that derived from the Enlightenment.
[65]
See also
[
edit
]
References
[
edit
]
- ^
Kamalizm
(1936) by
Mehmet ?eref Aykut
- ^
Eric J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History. New York, J.B. Tauris & Co ltd. page 181
- ^
a
b
Cleveland, William L., and Martin P. Bunton.
A History of the Modern Middle East
. Boulder: Westview, 2013.
- ^
Cleveland, William L; Bunton, Martin (2009).
A History of the Modern Middle East
(4th ed.). Westview Press. p. 82.
- ^
Mango, Andrew
(2002).
Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey
.
The Overlook Press
. p. 164.
ISBN
978-1-58567-334-6
.
- ^
Webster, Donald Everett (1973).
The Turkey of Ataturk; Social Process in the Turkish Reformation
. New York: AMS Press. p. 245.
ISBN
978-0-404-56333-2
.
- ^
Turkish
:
"Ben, manevi miras olarak hicbir nass-ı katı, hicbir dogma, hicbir donmu? ve kalıpla?mı? kural bırakmıyorum. Benim manevi mirasım, ilim ve akıldır."
?smet Giritli, Kemalist Devrim ve ?deolojisi, ?stanbul, 1980
- ^
"Kemalism - Oxford Islamic Studies Online"
.
www.oxfordislamicstudies.com
. Archived from
the original
on June 15, 2010
. Retrieved
2019-05-01
.
- ^
Mustafa Kemal as quoted in "A World View of Criminal Justice (2005)" by Richard K. Vogler, p. 116
- ^
Soyak, Hasan Rıza.
Ataturk'ten Hatıralar
(in Turkish). p. 58.
- ^
?lhan, Atilla.
Hangi Ataturk
(in Turkish). p. 111.
- ^
Kili, Suna.
Turk Devrim Tarihi
(in Turkish). p. 240.
- ^
Medeni Bilgiler (Orgun Yayınları)
. Afet ?nan. 1930s. p. 212.
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a
b
c
Kili, Suna. “Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey.” International Political Science Review, vol. 1, no. 3, 1980, pp. 381?404. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1601123.
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a
b
CAKMAK, D?REN. “Pro-Islamic Public Education in Turkey: The Imam-Hatip Schools.” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 45, no. 5, 2009, pp. 825?846. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40647155.
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Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, Washington, D.C.
"Constitution and Foundations of the State System"
. T.C. Government. Archived from
the original
on January 15, 2007
. Retrieved
2008-02-20
.
{{
cite web
}}
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Kosebalaban, Hasan (12 April 2011).
Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization
. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 9.
ISBN
978-0-230-11869-0
.
- ^
a
b
c
Hanioglu, Sukru
(2011).
Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography
. Princeton University Press. p. 153.
- ^
"Ataturk ve Laiklik"
. Ataturk Ara?tırma Merkezi Dergisi, Issue: 24, Volume: VIII
. Retrieved
2017-07-28
.
- ^
Hasan Kayalı (1995)
"Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919"
International Journal of Middle East Studies
, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp 273?274. "The prominent leaders of the Entente [Freedom and Accord Party] were Turkish-speaking and no different from the Unionists as far as their basic attitudes toward Islam were concerned. Nevertheless, they sought to frustrate the CUP by encouraging non-Turkish groups to attack it for pursuing a policy of Turkification and by pointing out to the conservatives its alleged disregard for Islamic principles and values. The overall effect of this propaganda was to instill ethnic and sectarian-religious discord, which survived the Entente's defeat at the polls ... The Unionists proved to be less vulnerable to accusations of disregard for Islamic precepts and values. Some of the Entente members were known for their cosmopolitan attitudes and close relations with foreign interests. But this did not keep the Entente from accusing the CUP of violating Islamic principles and attempting to restrict the prerogatives of the sultan-caliph in its pamphlets. One such pamphlet,
Afiksoz
(Candid Words), appealed to the religious-national sentiments of Arabs and claimed that Zionist intrigue was responsible for the abandonment of
Libya
to the Italians. Such propaganda forced the CUP to seize the role of the champion of Islam. After all, the secular integrationist Ottomanism that it had preached was failing, and the latest manifestation of this failure was the Entente's appeal to segments of Christian communities. The Unionists used Islamic symbols effectively in their election propaganda in 1912. They accused the Entente of trying to separate the offices of the caliphate and the sultanate and thus weakening Islam and the Muslims. There seemed no end to the capital to be gained from the exploitation and manipulation of religious rhetoric. In Izmir, the Entente attacked the CUP's intention to amend Article 35 of the constitution by arguing that the Unionists were thus denouncing the "thirty" days of fasting and "five" daily prayers. This led the town's mufti to plead that "for the sake of Islam and the welfare of the country" religion not be used to achieve political objectives. As with the rhetoric on Turkification, Islam too remained in political discourse long after the elections were over."
- ^
Vojdik, Valorie K.
"Politics of the Headscarf in Turkey: Masculinities, Feminism, and the Construction of Collective Identities"
(PDF)
.
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
.
33
: 661?686. Archived from
the original
(PDF)
on 16 April 2012.
- ^
Tarhan, Gulce (2011).
"Roots of the Headscarf Debate: Laicism and Secularism in France and Turkey"
(PDF)
.
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(4): 1?32
. Retrieved
2014-10-04
.
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Lagendijk, Joost (2006-03-22).
Ba?ortusu yasa?ı savunulamaz
.
Sabah
.
- ^
ECHR Rules for Turkish Headscarf Ban
Archived
2009-06-04 at the
Wayback Machine
: The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in favor of Turkey's policy of banning headscarves at universities. (Today's Zaman, 30 June 2004)
- ^
ECHR Insists on Headscarf Ban
,
Journal of Turkish Weekly
, 2006-10-17
- ^
a
b
c
Hamilton, Peter (1995).
Emile Durkheim: Critical Assessments
. Routledge. p. 69.
ISBN
0-415-11046-7
.
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Forces, Republic Of Turkey Turkish Armed.
"Ataturks Principles"
. T.C. Government
. Retrieved
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[
permanent dead link
]
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Education, Republic Of Turkey Ministry Of National.
"Turkish National Education System"
. T.C. Government. Archived from
the original
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Ter-Matevosyan, Vahram (2019).
Turkey, Kemalism and the Soviet Union: Problems of Modernization, Ideology and Interpretation
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ISBN
978-3-319-97403-3
.
Both the Young Turks and the Kemalists had an elitist conception of society; they saw themselves as the nation's "social physicians," the only ones capable of enlightening the "masses."78 Other definitions and fashionable currents of thought that defined different facets of fascism?biological materialism, positivism, social Darwinism, and the quest for magic formulas?were also incorporated by both regimes in Turkey.7
- ^
Zurcher, Erik-Jan (2013).
"Ottoman sources of Kemalist thought"
.
Late Ottoman Society
. Routledge. pp. 36?49.
doi
:
10.4324/9780203481387-10
.
ISBN
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.
- ^
Derya Bayir (2013).
Minorities and Nationalism in Turkish Law
. p. 110.
- ^
Citizenship is defined in the
1982 constitution, Article 66
. (amended on October 17, 2001).
- ^
Da?ı, ?hsan (1 January 2012).
"Why Turkey Needs a Post-Kemalist Order"
.
Insight Turkey
(in Turkish).
Non-Muslims, whose citizenship was only nominal in the eyes of the Kemalists, faced
pogroms
. This relationship of the Kemalist regime with the people of different ethnicity, religion, and life-style positioned the state with its loyal Kemalist elite as a hegemonic power vis-a-vis the society.
- ^
?cduygu, Ahmet; Tokta?, ?ule; Soner, B. Ali (1 February 2008). "The politics of population in a nation-building process: emigration of non-Muslims from Turkey".
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31
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:
10.1080/01419870701491937
.
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.
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Ataman, M. (1 October 2002). "Ozal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Policy in the 1980s".
Middle Eastern Studies
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38
(4): 123?142.
doi
:
10.1080/714004493
.
S2CID
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.
- ^
Moustakis, Fotios; Chaudhuri, Rudra (28 November 2005).
"Turkish-Kurdish Relations and the European Union: An Unprecedented Shift in the Kemalist Paradigm?"
.
Mediterranean Quarterly
.
16
(4): 77?89.
doi
:
10.1215/10474552-16-4-77
.
ISSN
1527-1935
.
S2CID
153382746
.
- ^
Andrew Mango
,
Ataturk and the Kurds
, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.35, No.4, 1999, 20
- ^
Finkel, Caroline (2006).
Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire
. New York: Basic Books. pp. 549?550.
ISBN
0-465-02396-7
.
- ^
a
b
c
Landau, Jacob M.
(1995).
Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation
. Indiana University Press. p. 275.
ISBN
0-253-20960-9
.
Page 186-187
- ^
Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal.
Nutuk
(in Turkish). Kaynak Yayınları. pp. 336?337.
- ^
Ataturk era high school history book, volume 1
. Republic Of Turkey. 1931. pp. 79?80.
- ^
Ataturk era high school history book, volume 1
. Republic of Turkey. 1931. pp. 25?53.
- ^
Ataturk era high school history book, volume 1
. Republic of Turkey. 1931.
- ^
Akcicek, Eren (2008).
Ataturk'un Turk Ocakları'nı Ziyaretleri ve Yaptı?ı Konu?malar
(in Turkish). Ankara, Turkey: Turkish Hearths Ankara Branch.
- ^
Georgeon, Francois (1980).
Aux origines du nationalisme Turc
. Paris: Editions A.D.P.F. p. 44.
ISBN
2865380084
.
- ^
Merdim, Emine (2011-07-13).
"Turk Ocakları Merkez Binası'ndan Ankara Devlet Resim ve Heykel Muzesi'ne"
.
Arkitera
(in Turkish)
. Retrieved
2021-06-21
.
- ^
Erimtan, Can (2008).
"Hittites, Ottomans and Turks: A?ao?lu Ahmed Bey and the Kemalist Construction of Turkish Nationhood in Anatolia"
.
Anatolian Studies
.
58
: 158.
doi
:
10.1017/S0066154600008711
.
JSTOR
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.
S2CID
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.
- ^
"The genetic structure of the Turkish population - Ethnicity Prediction"
.
- ^
Aydın, Zulkuf (2005).
The Political Economy of Turkey
. Pluto Press. pp. 25?56.
doi
:
10.2307/j.ctt18dzt8j
.
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?rem, Nazım. “Undercurrents of European Modernity and the Foundations of Modern Turkish Conservatism: Bergsonism in Retrospect.” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, 2004, pp. 79?112. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4289929
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Kieser, Hans-Lukas
(2016-01-19).
"Dersim Massacre, 1937-1938 | Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network"
.
dersim-massacre-1937-1938.html
. Retrieved
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.
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permanent dead link
]
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Ter-Matevosyan, Vahram (2019).
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. Springer. p. 48.
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.
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Nazım ?rem (2002). "Turkish conservative modernism: Birth of a nationalist quest for cultural renewal".
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34
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"Kemalism: Transnational Politics in the Post Ottoman World.", eds. N. Clayer, F. Giomi, E. Szurek. London. I.B. Tauris. 2018.
- ^
Jacob Landau. "A Note on Kemalizm in the Hebrew Press of
Palestine." 2018. Middle Eastern Studies 54 (4): 723?728
- ^
Amin Saikal. "Kemalism: Its Influences on Iran and Afghanistan." 1982. International Journal of Turkish Studies 2 (2): 25?32
- ^
Gokay, Bulent (1997).
A Clash of Empires: Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918-1923
. Tauris Academic Studies.
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Asker, Ahmet (2011-12-01).
"Nazi Almanyası'ndan Kemalist Turkiye'ye bakı?lar"
.
Ataturk Yolu Dergisi
(in Turkish).
13
(50): 261?516.
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10.1501/Tite_0000000359
.
ISSN
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.
- ^
Avedian, Vahagn (20 November 2018) [2016]. "Justifying genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler, by Stefan Ihrig, Cambridge, MA, Harvard, 460 pp., $35.00 (HC), ISBN 978-0674504790".
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Anderson, Margaret Lavinia
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- ^
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"
.
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b
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. Princeton University Press.
- ^
Parla, Taha; Davison, Andrew (2004).
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. Syracuse University Press. p. 288.
ISBN
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.
Further reading
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edit
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Organizations
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parties
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events
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