 |
| Search
|
|
|
|
|
Arabian Peninsula & Persian Gulf Database
Orders of battle, platform procurement, and technological developments often figure disproportionately in assessments of the capabilities of modern air forces. Building and maintaining an air arm requires careful consideration of the threat profile facing a state, the level of financial commitment, and constraints on the skilled manpower base and available technologies. With growing downward pressures on defence spending and increasing focus on counter-terrorism, as opposed to conventional warfighting capabilities, development of effective air forces requires increasing ingenuity at the dawn of the 21st century.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states ? Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE ? present a revealing case study of how small and medium-sized regional states are adapting to changes in the procurement and operational environments. Despite landmark air operations in the Balkans, Chechnya, and Afghanistan, the Gulf was the crucible of air warfare in the 1990s. GCC militaries have hosted and closely interacted with western air forces for over a decade. The result has been a quiet shift from building fleets and inventories, to building and maintaining capabilities. Long-considered one of the least likely candidates for reform in its military procurement and force planning policies, the activities of GCC air forces now provide key pointers to future trends.
Effective threat assessment, focusing on both the national threat and specific air warfare threat environment, is vital to the development of air power procurement and employment options. Despite this, threat assessment has not always been an integral part of GCC force planning. The early development of GCC air forces was instead primarily driven by a number of socio-economic and political factors. Air and air defence-led deterrent postures were eminently suitable for the GCC states, complementing their low populations and high government revenues. Large transfers of modern aircraft cemented western security guarantees and acted as symbols of national pride and growing modernity. Following two decades of conflict in the Gulf, however, threat assessment has become an increasingly important driver in the development of GCC air and air defence forces. The importance of maintaining effective air defences both over cities and maritime arteries was harshly driven home to the combatant and non-combatant Gulf States alike during the Iran-Iraq war, the associated ?tanker war?, the Gulf War, and the militarised containment of Iraq that followed.
Like many small and medium sized regional states outside Europe, the end of the Cold War did not radically alter the threat spectrum and air force mission profiles facing GCC states. Post-Cold War readjustment stressed expeditionary warfare ? ?out-of-area? deployments and voluntary involvement in ?wars of choice?. ?Wars of necessity? involving conventional military homeland defence receded in incidence. As vital interests are not at stake in typical western interventions, the ?western way of war? calls for minimal exposure of friendly troops and non-combatants to risk, and as air opposition is low in many interventions, air-to-air capabilities are firmly second-place to air-to-ground capabilities. Interventionist countries no longer face a single monolithic threat from either NATO or the eastern bloc and thus require strategic airlift capabilities and ship-borne carrier aviation to meet the geographically dispersed threats of tomorrow.
The strategic context of the Gulf States has not changed as radically nor in the same ways as that of western powers.
? Homeland defence and the maintenance of navigable sea-lanes remains the primary focus of GCC armed forces, despite improving relations between GCC states and their regional neighbours.
? Expeditionary warfare is not a major factor, as states remain focused on the regional military balance.
? Cold-War style overland invasion by armoured forces remains a serious threat in the Gulf.
? Early warning remains a vital force multiplier - defensive forces must be able to fight from a ?cold start? in the case of warning failure. In the case of the GCC states, lack of sufficient strategic depth demands that rapid results are achieved at the early stage of any invasion, the so-called ?Halt Phase?.
? No Gulf State can assume that it will begin a conflict with air superiority and few will manage to attain air supremacy without western assistance. Air-to-air and surface-to-air capabilities remain of great importance in the Gulf States.
The GCC states have found themselves vulnerable to a broadening range of military and paramilitary threats, however, expanding the spectrum of potential threat agents beyond the state?s geographic neighbours.
? The threat radii of Iraqi, Iranian, and Israeli strategic missile forces continue to grow, as have the weapons of mass destruction capabilities of these states. Other states such as the are developing long-range strike capabilities that extend beyond the 150km range of the Missile Technology Control Regime by marrying stand-off heavy air-launched cruise missiles to long-range strike aircraft. The sanctuary of range is fast disappearing for Gulf States.
? Sub-state actors and covert destabilization campaigns remain important proxy weapons in interstate warfare, particularly between Iran and Iraq, and between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Other sub-state actors may be largely transnational and apolitical but nonetheless represent a serious national security threat (such as narcotics, goods, or people-smuggling criminal organizations).
Yet while the offensive capabilities ranged against the Gulf States are increasing, it can be argued that hostile intentions are likely to decline due to drivers such as the rise of moderates in Iran since 1997, the cessation of various border disputes between GCC states, and the possibility of regime change in Iraq. This reduces the likelihood of major armed conflict, particularly between Iran and the GCC states, but does not necessarily reduce the political utility of well-balanced deterrent armed forces in the region. The fluid, incrementally changing balance of power in the Gulf involves long-term battles of perception concerning the identification of regional leaders, revolving around issues such as the contribution of forces during the resolution of crises and the relative willingness of certain states to back their words with actions. As democratic civil society develops in the Gulf, history dictates that nationalistic tensions, posturing, and inter-state clashes will accompany the nation-state building process. Though issue resolution through arbitration and negotiation has enjoyed some success in recent years, there is ample evidence that once issues become politicised, they quickly become resistant to non-violent resolution (e.g., the Iranian-occupied Tunb islands and Abu Musa). In such cases, military capability represents a key bargaining chip.
In designing their air arms, the GCC states thus face a dilemma. As serious as potential external threats are, Gulf leaders are growing increasingly aware of urgent non-military threats to regime stability and national security. Military deterrence is one vital pillar of national security, but economic and socio-political well being provides the other legs that allow the structure to remain standing. Economic stagnation, oil dependence, foreign debt, and profligate spending have left most GCC members incapable of maintaining defence expenditure and subsidized welfare simultaneously.
Thus, on the one hand, strong pressures are depressing spending on high-intensity armed forces, whilst on the other, the GCC are conscious that peace and stability are a product of deterrent dynamics in the region. Though is difficult to imagine military scenarios where western security guarantees will not prove to be the decisive factor, the GCC states have committed to a common defence policy, and increasingly need to display credible military forces to reduce the leverage and high profile of western security guarantors, and increase the political credibility and potential for independent policy of the regional alliance. Though GCC states and their air forces face many common threats, the varied geography and differential sizes of GCC states has led each state to identify the unique roles and missions of its own air arm.
Bahrain
Bahrain?s position at one of the most volatile points in the region makes it impossible for Manama to neglect its external defences. The emirate has identified two primary threat scenarios. The first, and likeliest, concerns the resumption of armed clashes on Bahrain?s shared maritime border with Qatar ? including Hawar Island, and the Fasht al Dibel and Jarada shoals - and the Zubara enclave on the Qatari mainland. The second scenario concerns Bahrain?s important role in US regional contingency planning, which may make the country a target for its northern Gulf neighbours. This was amply demonstrated when Iraq fired Scud missiles at Bahrain in 1991.
The primary role of the small but effective Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF) is patrolling of the country?s extended coastline and offshore assets. Air forces have historically been the primary combatants in such clashes; in April 1986, Qatari helicopters fired on Bahraini positions on Fasht al Dibel, while in June 1991 the Bahraini Air Force penetrated Qatari airspace to warn against further actions. In a major conflict with Iran or Iraq, the Bahrain Amiri Air Force (BAAF) is postured to detect and delay incoming attackers. Bahrain represents a key tripwire in the early warning chain being developed by the GCC. Prolonged forward defence is unlikely, however, as Bahrain lacks the strategic depth or size for effective dispersal. This is despite construction of new shelters and dispersal hardstands at Sheikh Isa, an airbase developed specifically to reduce the vulnerability of the BAAF, which was previously based at the northerly Muharraq field. Under sustained attack, the BAAF would fall back on nearby Saudi airfields used by the BAAF for training.
Kuwait
Kuwait does not have any border disputes with other GCC nations. Instead the threat is confined to the northern Gulf States ? Iraq and Iran - which have alternately dominated Kuwaiti defence thinking since the 1970s. The Kuwaiti government remains the most belligerent GCC state vis-?-vis Iraq. Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed stated in early September that ?while Saddam Hussein continues to keep Kuwaiti prisoners of war, and continues to televise threats against Kuwait, we consider the war against Iraq to have never ended?. Potential causes of conflict with Iraq are long-standing, however, and will not disappear even if the Baathist regime in Baghdad is replaced. The most likely threat scenario remains a major conflict with Iraq, involving the renewal of persistent Iraqi claims to suzerainty over Kuwaiti territory ? ranging in seriousness from the islands of Bubyan and Warbah, through the Rumaila oilfield. A second, less likely threat scenario revolves around a conflict in which Iran and Kuwait are brought to blows either due to bilateral maritime disputes or due to US presence in the country.
The role and mission of the Kuwaiti Air Force (KAF) in a future Iraq scenario would include an early attempt to blunt or delay an Iraqi ground incursion during the crucial ?Halt Phase?. The core mission of the armed forces is to hold key points, including the Mutla Pass and thereafter the road junctions at Al Jahra, until US forces can deploy. The key capability required to undertake this type of action is armour-killing firepower. Kuwait?s ability to undertake this mission would be greatly complicated against a rehabilitated Iraq. Whilst the no-fly and no-drive zones currently provide an unprecedented buffer of range and warning time to the Kuwaiti military, a rehabilitated Iraq could again overshadow the Kuwaiti Air Force. This weakness led Kuwait and the US to develop the more southerly Ahmed Al Jaber as the main operating base, even though this facility is still only around 100km from the Iraqi border. Though Kuwait mulled the development of an additional airbase in the south as late ago as November 1994, the status of the deal is uncertain and the KAF would more probably fall back to Saudi main operating bases at Riyadh and Jubail. In both this scenario, and that of Iranian air attacks, Kuwait recognises that tactical ballistic missiles and air-launched stand-off weaponry make it unlikely that the first wave of incoming attacks can be intercepted. Thereafter, air superiority would have to be contested within enemy airspace and at extended ranges. Kuwait?s vulnerability to heliborne assault from Iraq was proven on 2 August 1990, leading the KAF to stress dense low-altitude air defences.
Oman
After over twenty years of peace in Oman?s Dhofar province and lacking any serious disputes with its GCC neighbours, the two key threat scenarios identified by Oman involve Yemen and Iran. The first scenario foresees an incident similar to the 1987 Yemeni incursion into Oman, which the Royal Air Force of Oman (RAFO) helped repel, and Muscat remains wary of future military adventurism along the 308km border. A second scenario envisages a breakdown in Oman?s successful defence diplomacy and confidence-building programme with Iran, leading to a deliberate or inadvertent clash on the Straits of Hormuz or Gulf of Oman. Omani and Iranian naval forces previously faced off in shows of force in 1980, and the Anglo-Omani Saif Sareea (Swift Sword) exercises both focused on thinly veiled scenarios dealing with the Iranian threat.
The positioning of Omani airfields reflects dual concerns about Yemeni and Iranian intentions, with the main fighter base ? Thumrait ? positioned equidistant between the two threats. The RAFO?s dual role is to provide air-to-ground support to surface forces over its own territory and coastal waters. Oman maintains an ability to operate from strategic depth against either opponent, with Masirah, Thumrait, and Salalah beyond the current comfortable range of Iranian theatre ballistic missiles, and Seeb (plus the planned Masana airbase) well beyond the range of Yemeni strike aircraft. Though Oman?s northern territories are only 60-100km distant from major Iranian naval bases, airfields, and missile launch baskets, hardening at Khasab and Seeb indicates a forward defence posture. The northern islands facing the Straits of Hormuz are faced with the prospect of rapid Iranian heliborne or amphibious assaults, highlighting the need for low-level air-defence and anti-shipping capabilities. Oman must defend over 2,900km of mainland coastline plus numerous islands, placing a high premium on maritime surveillance and transport capabilities.
Qatar
Though there are no explicit threats to Qatar?s national security, the emirate is conscious of past conflicts and future potential for trouble, focusing on Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The most likely threat scenario is a reactivation of the aforementioned territorial disputes with Bahrain. A second potential conflict scenario involves a clash on Qatar?s land border with Saudi Arabia, where Qatari land and air forces periodically practice holding actions in disputed wadis. Though Qatar?s maverick foreign policy has reduced most tensions with the northern Gulf states, two issues could lead to conflict with Iran. The first involves the massive North Pars gas field shared by Iran and Qatar, which hold the key to Qatar?s economic future and represent a strategic prize. The second involves Qatar?s growing role in US contingency planning, including the use of Al Udeid airbase. The role and mission of the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF) is to deter low-level incursions into Qatari territory and offshore holdings, either by denial (air defence, close air support, and anti-shipping strikes) or punishment (long-range strikes against high-value targets in Saudi Arabia and Iran).
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia?s expansive size means that it faces a diverse range of threats on its borders and beyond. These threats must be balanced against a range of non-military threats to national security and the stability of the House of Saud that gained prominence throughout the last decade. Failures to develop non-oil income and boost job creation represent major threats to economic security and social stability. Saudi Arabia is faced by a number of threat scenarios involving its peer competitors in the Gulf ? Iran and Iraq. Though currently dormant, border disputes could turn ?hot? with Yemen or Qatar, and even in peacetime, Saudi Arabia must police a porous 1,458km border with lawless Yemen. Saudi Arabia?s stature, and its possession of ageing Chinese CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles, attracts Israel?s attention, suggesting a final conflict scenario concerning a preemptive Israeli strike on Saudi facilities.
Geography dominates Saudi Arabia?s military aerospace posture. Saudi airbase facilities boast great depth, providing fallbacks against each potential foe ? as the US intended. Conversely, Saudi?s vital targets are mainly within easy striking range of potential foes. Saudi Arabia shares a 488km border with Iraq, plus a 222km border with Kuwait ? which Iraq reached within twenty-four hours of invading Kuwait in 1990. Saudi analysts remain concerned that Iraq could muster the strength to lunge over the border and take a Saudi border town ?hostage?. Candidates include Ar?ar, Rafha, Khafji, or even Jubail or Hafr al Batin. Whether this is possible, it is Riyadh?s perception. Almost 1,000km of coastline faces Iran, where major air bases are positioned less than ten minutes flying time from Saudi airspace. The heart of Saudi political and economic life is concentrated along and inland from this coastline, presenting a bevy of targets, including oil and gas installations, desalination and power plants, port, shipping, and urban areas.
This diverse range of threats and strategic key points moulds the roles and missions of the Royal Saudi Air Force and Royal Saudi Air Defence Force. The core role of these services is to deter attacks by denial and punishment. The core military mission is to be capable of fighting from a cold start, perhaps with little strategic warning, and to be capable of deploying to any threatened area in the country. Saudi?s air and air defence forces must be able to generate tactical warning of incoming aircraft and missile strikes and intercept them (perhaps within visual range) before they penetrate to the Kingdom?s key economic targets or return to their home bases. Air forces must also be capable of acting as a force multiplier to increase the combat power of Saudi Arabia?s land and naval forces. If deterrence fails, Saudi aircraft and ballistic missiles must be capable of penetrating to the heartland of an attacking state and delivering heavy and accurate long-range strikes against high-value targets. In peacetime as well as during war, military airpower must support the distribution of logistics and personnel across wide areas.
UAE
The UAE has no major disputes concerning its land borders, and instead views military threats as originating primarily from its 1,488km Gulf coast, along which the main economic and population centres of the federation are arraigned, including important offshore assets. The most likely military conflict scenario facing the UAE involves the Iranian-held islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. The ongoing development of UAE naval power projection forces, amphibious assault vessels, and navalised helicopters presents the UAE with a new tool to either pressure Iran into co-administering or withdrawing from the islands, or to retake and defend them. Uniquely for a GCC state, the UAE has committed its armed forces to military intervention and support missions outside the Gulf. In 1999, the UAE deployed AH-64A attack helicopters to U.N. peacekeeping duties in Kosovo. In October 2001, the UAE announced its intention to spend $50 million on de-mining operations in Lebanon ? Operation Emirates Solidarity. It is possible that the UAE will continue to deploy troops to emergencies involving Muslim communities, indicating its growing confidence and regional profile.
The role and mission of the UAE Air Force and Air Defence (UAEAFAD) appears to be developing from defensive and deterrent to include offensive and intervention roles. Long-range strike and airlift forces are under development for these missions. Facing Iran, the UAE has little strategic depth, indicating the need for a cordon of forward air and naval defences. The Gulf coast also presents numerous non-military security concerns, acting as an entry point for smugglers, illegal immigrants, and polluters, creating strong impetus for the development of maritime patrol capabilities.
Defence and aerospace spending in the GCC states
The pattern and significance of post-Cold War global defence spending has increased the significance of the Gulf as a source of arms sales. Though global defence expenditure has declined by 33.7 percent since 1985, defence spending in the GCC states only decreased by 21.4 percent during the same period. In contrast, Iraq largely dropped off the spending map, and Iran drastically scaled back spending during its 1991-95 five-year plan. The disparity in the growth and contraction of GCC and non-GCC states has been caused by the combination of sanctions, the withdrawal of foreign credits, the cessation of major hostilities, and economic retrenchment in Iraq, Iran and Yemen.
Average Annual Defence Expenditure in $ millions
Five-year plan..1986-1990.....1991-95.....1996-00
Bahrain................154...........246.........351
Kuwait..............1,342.........6,101.......3,904
Oman................1,442.........1,703.......2,114
Qatar....................842...........580.........1,280
Saudi Arabia....17,371......23,817......20,553
UAE.................1,498.........2,549.......2,711
GCC total.......22,832.......34,999......30,052
Iran...................4,054.........3,171.......4,560
Iraq...................8,869.........3,522.......1,334
Yemen.................683...........569.........439
(Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance (London: I.I.S.S., 1987-2002)
The outlook for future defence spending varies from state to state. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait remain the key markets. Following heavy spending commitments made in the early 1990s, Saudi may defer major procurements until the 2006-2010 period. Of the $12 billion and $15 billion supplemental funds set aside for their respective rearmament programmes, Kuwait and the UAE each have around $4 billion worth of uncommitted funding remaining. Major Kuwaiti procurement projects frozen during the 1996-2000 five-year plan will be undertaken in the 2001-2005 five-year plan instead. Bahrain and Oman are small markets and will rely heavily on the US to assist with procurement. Oman has initiated a sustained increase in spending, with the Omani government indicating that the 2001-2005 period will see Oman?s major rearmament drive, including expenditure of over $2 billion per year. Following very high per capita spending in the late 1990s, Qatar has completed most of its air and air defence procurement for the foreseeable future.
 |
| Row of USAF F-16CGs as seen parked on an Iraqi airfield hit by sand-storm, during operation "Iraqi Freedom", in March 2003. (Photo: USAF)
|
Procurement practices in the GCC
Five key trends emerge from analysis of the air and air defence procurement practices of the six GCC states:
US vendors are increasing their market shares:
As well as dominating traditional markets such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, the US has made key inroads into the UAE and Oman markets. The Bush administration has strongly increased Foreign Military Financing aid to Bahrain and Oman, and may extend aid to other states under the mantle of ?the war against terror?. The US continues to open markets and maintain market share by transferring large amounts of surplus military equipment (Excess Defence Articles or EDA) to GCC states, capturing future sales in the profitable fields of aerospace parts and technologies, military aircraft engines, avionics, and communications technologies. At the other end of the technology transfer scale, the US is rapidly relaxing restrictive export controls to win business in the GCC states. Once one GCC state is cleared to receive a system, breakout occurs (i.e., GCC states ordering the Raytheon AMRAAM jumped from zero to four in two years). No-restrictions technology transfer was a key European and Eastern Bloc market differentiator in the past, but looks likely to diminish.
GCC states may represent partners in collaborative design:
The $2 billion UAE investment in collaborative development of key US technologies (such as the integrated avionics and Agile Beam Radar on the F-16 Block 60) indicates a change in the status of GCC states willing to commit large sums to procurement (for the moment limited to Saudi Arabia).
Buyers are more cautious:
Gulf States have slowed the rate of fleet replacement and aerospace spending in general. Buyers are prepared to delay major purchases, push back out of services dates, and mothball large numbers of aircraft, despite the risks posed by capability shortfalls and reduced inventories. It is often considered preferable to break major procurement commitments and delay in-service dates than order cheaper equipment with deleted sub-capabilities. Upgrading current equipment is increasingly acceptable as an alternative to new procurement. New-build models, with longer operational lifespan, are preferred to second-hand equipment despite the price difference. New purchases may rely on part-exchange or resale of retired types (Kuwaiti and Qatari Mirage F-1, Kuwaiti A-4KU, Saudi F-5E/F).
Buyers are more professional: GCC procurement practices have improved greatly during the late 1990s, led by the UAE and Kuwait, who have both instituted strong oversight into arms deals. Bribery, through the use of commissions payments and local fixers (commission agents) continue at reduced levels, but have been largely pushed underground. Closer ties with the US ? which considers commissions payments as illegal bribes - have reduced commissions, as have local initiatives. Tendering and selection processes are becoming more effective and more rigorous.
Buyers are more assertive:
Even buyers with comparatively little financial clout are growing intolerant towards overpriced and downgraded equipment. Buyers are also ensuring that competitive offset agreements are out in place, guaranteeing that deence companies reinvest a portion of the value of the sale back into investments in the purchasing GCC state. Offset agreements are now approaching 100-115% of the original value of the sale, and may include features such as pre-offset (invested before a sale has even been agreed) or cash offsets (a simple discount, paid in western currency).
 |
| Above and bellow: in the last 15 years, most of GCC states proved good US allies and supporters, providing extensive basing facilities - in return for security guarantees. Regardless if at Kuwaiti airfields (see the USAF F-15E above), or at Masirah AB, in Oman (loading of a GBU-31 on an USAF B-1 bomber, bellow), the US servicemen can feel safe so far. In exchange, the GCC states have experienced a period of immense economic development, which mirrored also in the development of their armed forces. As the US influence is increasing, the times when other arms suppliers were delivering large amounts of arms are past: some of the GCC states are now selling even their advanced aircraft of European origin and replacing them by "Made in America" types. (Photos: USAF)
|
Notes about Author
Dr. Michael Knights worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, and has meanwhile undertaken extensive research on lessons learned from the U.S. military operations in Iraq during and since 1990. He earned his doctorate at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, and has worked as a defense journalist for the Gulf States Newsletter and Jane's Intelligence Review.
© Copyright 2002-3 by ACIG.org
Top of Page
|
|
|
Latest
Arabian Peninsula & Persian Gulf Database
|
| US-Related News from Iraq
|
| Future Development of GCC Air Forces; Part 2
|
| Future Development of GCC Air Forces; Part 1
|
| Hard Target: Rolling-Back Iranian Nuclear Programmes
|
| Shahab 3: an Advanced IRBM
|
| 22 September 2004: Parade in Tehran
|
| Baghdad Impressions
|
| With the 7th Field Hospital in Basrah, Part 2
|
| With the 7th Field Hospital in Basrah, Part 1
|
| Iraqi Super-Bases
|
| Exhumating the Dead Iraqi Air Force
|
| Second Death of IrAF
|
| 22 September 2003: Iranian Military Parade
|
| IRIAF Since 1988
|
| US Air-to-Air Victories during the Operation Desert Storm
|
| Kuwaiti Air-to-Air Victories in 1990
|
| Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait; 1990
|
| Persian 'Cats
|
| Iraqi Air-to-Air Victories since 1967
|
| Iranian Air-to-Air Victories, 1982-Today
|
| Iranian Air-to-Air Victories 1976-1981
|
| Tanker War, 1980-1988
|
| Iraqi Air Force since 1948, Part 2
|
| Iraqi Air Force Since 1948, Part 1
|
| Fire in the Hills: Iranian and Iraqi Battles of Autumn 1982
|
| I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980
|
| I Persian Gulf War, 1980-1988
|
| Kuwait "Emergency", 1961
|
| Oman (and Dhofar) 1952-1979
|
| South Arabia and Yemen, 1945-1995
|
|