TAB I -- The Camp Doha Explosion and Fires (July 1991)
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TAB I -- The Camp Doha Explosion and Fires (July 1991)
A. Background
In June, 1991, four months after
Operation Desert Storm ended, the US 11
th
Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR)
deployed from Germany to occupy Camp Doha (near Kuwait City) to serve as a deterrent and
rapid response force (see Figure I-1). The 11
th
ACR, with about 3,600
personnel, had not taken part in Operations Desert Shield or Desert Storm. By July 1991,
the regiment was the only US ground combat unit remaining in the Gulf Theater.
[419]
It replaced the 1
st
Brigade of the US Army's 3
rd
Armor Division,
[420]
the last US unit
to engage in ground combat during Desert Storm.
[421]
Due to the threat of renewed hostilities, the 11
th
ACR kept its combat vehicles "combat loaded" with ammunition, even in garrison,
to reduce their response time in case of renewed hostilities with Iraq. The regiment
stored an equal amount of ammunition in MILVAN containers or conexes (large 20- or 40-foot
metal transport containers), located in the North Compound motor pool complex near the
combat vehicle parking ramps.
[422]
Figure
I-1. Camp Doha location
On the morning of July 11, 1991,
the 11
th
ACR deployed two of its three combat formations, called squadrons, to
the field, leaving behind a single squadron (plus support elements) to serve as a guard
force.
[423]
This
squadron was parked in Camp Doha's North Compound, a fenced-off area comprising
several motor pool pads (each the size of two or three football fields), some
administrative buildings, a wash rack, and living quarters for approximately 250 British
soldiers, (mainly from the Royal Anglian Regiment and Headquarters British Forces Middle
East). See
Figure I-2
.
[424
,
425]
Figure
I-2. Camp Doha diagram
At approximately 10:20 A.M, a
defective heater in an M992 ammunition carrier loaded with 155mm artillery shells caught
on fire. Troops unsuccessfully tried to extinguish the fire before being ordered to
evacuate the North Compound. This evacuation was still under way when the burning M992
exploded at 11:00 AM, scattering artillery submunitions (bomblets) over nearby
combat-loaded vehicles and ammunition stocks. This set off an hours-long series of
explosions and fires that devastated the vehicles and equipment in the North Compound and
scattered unexploded ordnance (UXOs) and debris over much of the remainder of the camp.
[426]
The fires produced
billowing black and white clouds of smoke that rose hundreds of feet into the air and
drifted to the east-southeast, across portions of both the North and South Compounds, in
the direction of Kuwait City.
[427]
The fires died down enough by
mid-afternoon to allow a preliminary damage assessment. There were no fatalities; however,
49 US soldiers were injured, 2 seriously. Most of the injuries were fractures, sprains,
contusions, or lacerations suffered when soldiers scrambled over the 15-foot high
perimeter wall to escape the North Compound (
Figure I-3
).
[428]
In addition, four
British soldiers received minor injuries.
Figure
I-3. 11th ACR soldiers evacuate Doha's North Compound, July 11, 1991
The destruction was overwhelming.
The fire and explosions damaged or destroyed 102 vehicles, including 4 M1A1 tanks and
numerous other combat vehicles. More than two dozen buildings sustained damage as well.
[429]
Among the
estimated almost $15 million in damaged or destroyed ammunition were 660 M829 120mm DU
sabot rounds.
[430]
B. Initial Recovery Efforts
Given Iraq's proximity, its
still-formidable striking power, and its belligerence, rebuilding the 11
th
ACR's shattered combat potential was a matter of utmost urgency. The regimental
commander and his staff had to restore basic life support functions (power, running water,
sewage, cooking facilities, etc.) and a secure operating area, and then clear the motor
pool areas so serviceable vehicles could be recovered and the unit's combat readiness
reconstituted. In planning recovery, the unit leadership viewed unexploded ordnance (UXOs)
as by far the most significant, widespread, deadly hazard. The explosions had deposited
huge quantities of live ammunition of every description over the motor pool and in the
adjacent life support area (
Figure I-4
).
[431
,
432]
This ordnance was highly unstable, a fact
underlined the next day when a British explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician
entering the North Compound stepped on a live artillery bomblet, seriously injuring his
foot.
[433]
Figure
I-4. View of wash rack area, showing M1A1 tank hulks and unexploded ordnance
Although
concern over unexploded ordnance predominated, the 11
th
ACR leadership also was
concerned about possible radiological contamination from depleted uranium rounds that had
detonated and burned in the fire.
[434
,
435]
Internal explosions gutted three M1A1 heavy armor tanks in the wash rack area (where
the fire started); the ammunition that exploded was mostly DU. Each M1A1 presumably was
loaded with 37 M829 sabot rounds with DU penetrators and 3 non-DU high-explosive anti-tank
(HEAT) rounds. In addition to the estimated 111 DU rounds loaded on the burned tanks,
several hundred other DU rounds were stored in MILVAN trailers or conexes in the 2
nd
Squadron motor pool. Some of these rounds exploded in fires of such sustained intensity
that steel howitzers and other equipment melted, making it likely that some DU rounds
oxidized in the fires.
Figure
I-5. Burned DU penetrator and sabot
From viewing contemporary logs
and other data, it is clear that the 22
nd
Support Command (SUPCOM), which
supported theater combat units, was aware of the potential for DU contamination. Entries
from the SUPCOM log provide evidence of this awareness, as this entry for noon on July 11
th
states:
ENTIRE 2 SQUADRON MOTOR POOL HAS
BEEN AFFECTED BY THE FIRE. 35-40 VEHICLES ON FIRE, TO INCLUDE ENTIRE HOW[ITZER] BATTERY.
HOW BATTERY HAS 155MM AMMO UPLOADED. DEPLETED URANIUM ROUNDS ARE GOING OFF.
[436]
A later entry at 2:30 PM (by
which time the fire and explosions had largely subsided) amplifies the significance of
this message:
EOD POC [Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Point of Contact] STATES THAT BURNING DEPLETED URANIUM PARTICLES WHEN BREATHED
CAN BE HAZARDOUS. 11
TH
ACR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED TO TREAT THE AREA AS THOUGH IT
WERE A CHEMICAL HAZARD AREA; i.e. STAY UPWIND AND WEAR PROTECTIVE MASK IN THE VICINITY.
[437]
It is unclear who, if anyone,
passed this information to the 11
th
ACR. The former 11
th
ACR
commander emphatically stated that no such warning ever reached him, and, if it had, he
would have responded appropriately.
[438]
On March 10, 1998, the regimental engineer, who
directed recovery operations, reacted similarly to both the SUPCOM log entries and a July
12, 1991, entry in the official diary of the 702
nd
Transportation Battalion
(Provisional), which fell under the 22
nd
Support Command:
BN dispatches HET, LB, and FB
trucks to KKMC to be in positions to support movement of replacement vehicles and
ammunition to Doha. Soldiers are directed to carry protective masks due to possible Alpha
particle contamination from depleted uranium rounds, which exploded in the accident area.
[439]
The regimental engineer pointed
out that 11
th
ACR soldiers put their gas masks in storage when they arrived at
Doha and the masks were not issued or worn at any point during the cleanup -- a
directive, annotated in the unit's deployment orders, that he attributes to Army
Central Command (ARCENT). He added that he and other members of the unit leadership were
directly involved in leading recovery operations in the North Compound and would not have
knowingly subjected themselves and their personnel to a clearly identified hazard.
[440]
Entry 32 of the SUPCOM log on
July 11
th
states:
1450 hrs (2:50 PM) -- ARCENT
G-3 called for Chemical Officer to do Downwind Predictions because of DU rounds. Message
passed to Captain [redacted], FASCO [Forward Area Support Coordinating Office].
[441]
The unidentified chemical officer
cited in the log is presumably the 11
th
ACR commander's staff nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) officer, who would have advised the commander of any NBC
threats and recommended appropriate action. As it happened, the previous regimental NBC
officer had departed on July 1, 1991, and this officer arrived at Doha on the morning of
the fire. Nonetheless, two captains and three senior non-commissioned officers (sergeants)
performed staff NBC functions at the time of the fire. Investigators contacted the senior
NBC officer, but he did not recall receiving specific guidance or direction from higher
headquarters (ARCENT or the 22
nd
Support Command) about the potential DU
hazard. He emphasized that the 11
th
ACR's NBC personnel were trained,
staffed, and equipped to deal with battlefield radiological hazards, rather than DU
contamination, for which detection and remediation requirements are substantially
different.
[442]
At 3:48 PM on the 11
th
,
the SUPCOM log states:
Regiment reports they have no
capability to do "Airborne" monitoring. Will check to see if they have
AN/PDR-27s. SUPCOM LOC initiating actions to locate "Airborne" capability.
[443]
Airborne monitoring would have
been invaluable in quantifying and documenting the presence or absence of alpha particles
in the areas downwind of the burned tanks and DU ammunition. However, the 11
th
ACR's NBC personnel were not trained or equipped to monitor for airborne DU.
Although the regimental
leadership was generally aware that DU could pose a radiological hazard, in the crucial
days after the fire it lacked clear, authoritative guidance regarding the radiological
characteristics of DU, its chemical toxicity, or methods by which these exposure hazards
could be prevented or minimized.
The 22
nd
SUPCOM
apparently was aware of the regulatory requirement to establish a radiation control
perimeter in response to the hazard of oxidized DU. The SUPCOM log entry at 2:56 PM on
July 11
th
states: "G-3 notified LTC [Redacted],[FASCO] to start an
Alpha' Damage Assessment, and figure out total complacent [sic] area to be
cordoned off."
[444]
Because of the unexploded ordnance hazard, SUPCOM sealed off the North Compound for
three days after the fire, with entry tightly controlled thereafter.
[445
,
446
,
447]
The SUPCOM log confirms this in a 10:00 PM entry on the 11
th
:
CPT [Redacted] reported no
movement because of FASCAM for 72 hrs in area of vehicles per EOD guidance. This means no
early recovery of damaged vehicles and no EOD activity for 72 hrs.
[448]
Access to the 2
nd
Squadron motor pool and wash rack (the area holding the contaminated tanks) was even more
restricted than the access to the North Compound in general.
[449]
No formal
radiation control line was established, however, until after July 24
th
, when a
radiation control team from the US Army's Directorate of Safety Risk Management,
Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) arrived at Doha.
[450]
C. Initial DU Contamination
Assessment and Control Efforts
The radiation control (RADCON)
team came to Doha in accordance with the Army's Technical Bulletin 9-1300-278 and
related directives, which required a RADCON response for accidents involving DU munitions
and tanks with DU armor. Military authorities notified two agencies -- the US Army
Armament Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM), based at Rock Island, Illinois, and the
Army Communications-Electronics Command based at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, which began
preparing RADCON teams for deployment to Doha. In the first week after the mishap,
however, the 11
th
ACR had to rely primarily on its own resources to initiate
cleanup and recovery operations.
Figure
I-6. Aftermath of Doha motor pool fire
On July 12, the day after the
fire, the 11
th
ACR leadership completed a preliminary damage assessment and
began formulating plans and establishing priorities for the massive cleanup and recovery
operation. The regimental commander had three units at his disposal for handling the
specialized tasks the cleanup would require:
- The 146
th
Ordnance Detachment (EOD);
- The 54
th
Chemical Troop; and
- The 58
th
Combat Engineer Company.
Since these units were the first
to respond to the accident and continued to play a key role for the duration of the
cleanup, a discussion of their roles and activities is helpful.
D. Role and Activities of
the 146
th
Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
The 146
th
Ordnance
Detachment (EOD) had two EOD technicians at Doha on the morning of the fire, and deployed
most of its remaining members (approximately 10 to 12 personnel) from King Khalid Military
City (KKMC) and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, to Doha over the next two or three days. They
focused on disarming and removing the huge quantities of unexploded ordnance scattered all
about base.
Figure
I-7. EOD personnel at Doha
After the fire, the North
Compound was sealed off for three days because of the threat from delayed-action FASCAM
(artillery-delivered) mines, which might have armed during the explosions and fire. For
two days, the EOD team developed a plan of action in coordination with the engineers.
[451]
The 146
th
EOD soldiers
were aware of the presence of DU and were familiar with the potential hazard it posed.
More importantly, they were trained and equipped to detect DU contamination. Their initial
survey, which was limited by the unexploded ordnance in the North Compound, found very
little DU outside the immediate vicinity of the three destroyed tanks.
[452]
EOD personnel
normally wore flak jackets and kevlar helmets when they cleared unexploded ordnance; they
also wore gloves when they moved debris. Because of the extreme summer heat, EOD personnel
normally wore only T-shirts under the flak vests. No one provided them with protective
suits, respirators, or dust masks to wear during clearing and cleaning operations.
[453]
Figure
I-8. DU penetrators collected at Doha
The 11
th
ACR had
loaded most of the DU rounds at Doha on to the tanks, all but three of which survived the
fire intact. A fourth tank suffered minor external damage, but its load of ammunition and
fuel remained intact. The regiment stored other DU rounds in conex containers in the
immediate vicinity of the tanks. The conexes held each platoon's ammunition
stocks -- 7.62mm, .50 cal., and heavier munitions, including DU.
Post-fire photos show many intact
conexes among the burned-out wreckage. The 146
th
Ordnance Detachment commander
stated that stored ammunition is more stable than generally believed, and survives fairly
well except when directly exposed to fires, extreme heat, or explosions. Even in the
conexes that blew up, typically only a few shells detonated, scattering the other rounds
rather than touching off a massive "sympathetic" detonation. This explains the
huge quantity of unexploded ordnance littering the motor pool area.
[454]
Explosions flung
large numbers of lightweight FASCAM mines into the South Compound, but the heavier rounds,
such as TOW anti-tank missiles and evidently all the DU penetrators, remained in the North
Compound.
Figure
I-9. Surviving munitions conex
The cleanup plan for the North
Compound involved the 146
th
Ordnance Detachment (EOD) personnel working
together with the 58th Combat Engineer Company to find, mark, render safe, and remove
unexploded ordnance. The former 146
th
Ordnance Detachment commander stated,
"Engineers didn't pick up any DU unless an EOD guy told them to." EOD personnel
spray-painted an orange circle around the DU penetrators they found and wore leather
gloves to pick them up. The cleanup personnel wrapped exposed DU penetrators in heavy
plastic and put them in wooden boxes or 55-gallon drums. Later, after the AMCCOM Radiation
Control team arrived at Doha, EOD and engineer crews placed the DU inside one of the
destroyed tanks being sent to the Defense Consolidation Facility in Snelling, South
Carolina.
[455
,
456]
Figure
I-10. Marked DU penetrator and sabot
Despite the 146
th
Ordnance Detachment commander's statement, it appears that some engineer personnel,
including their commander, picked up DU (generally while wearing leather gloves, but in
some cases with bare hands) to allow the EOD personnel to concentrate on the unexploded
ordnance.
[457]
Cleanup personnel picked up most,
if not all, of the recovered DU penetrators in the North Compound within a 120-meter
radius of the three destroyed tanks. The EOD veterans we interviewed believe those rounds
came from the nearby conexes rather than the tanks, since the design of the M1A1s'
blast panels confined most of the intact DU rounds inside.
[458]
Figure
I-11. Unexploded ordnance in Doha's North Compound
The 146
th
Ordnance
Detachment (EOD) personnel viewed the staggering quantities of unexploded ordnance as the
gravest, most immediate threat. By its nature, explosive ordnance disposal is an extremely
dangerous undertaking, and the sheer magnitude of the task facing the 146
th
at
Doha cannot be overstated. These hazards were tragically underscored on July 23
rd
,
12 days after the initial explosion and fires. Two senior EOD non-commissioned officers
and a 58
th
Combat Engineer Company soldier died instantly in an accidental
unexploded ordnance explosion. The fatal mishap had a significant general impact on the
remainder of the cleanup effort, and more particularly on the 146
th
.
Between the July 11
th
fire and the July 23
rd
mishap, 146
th
EOD personnel cleared most of
the South Compound, the periphery of the North Compound, and about one-third of the 2
nd
Squadron motor pool. After July 23
rd
, the base leadership prohibited all
personnel from entering the North Compound, except for a small area somewhat distant from
the 2
nd
Squadron motor pool where personnel conducted supply operations and
other activities. This area had survived the explosion and fires more or less unscathed,
except for unexploded ordnance that was soon cleared.
[459]
E. 54
th
Chemical
Troop's Role and Activities
In the immediate aftermath of the
July 11
th
fires and explosions, the task of monitoring for radiological
contamination fell to the 54
th
Chemical Troop, the 11
th
ACR's
primary asset for responding to nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) hazards. On the
morning after the explosion, the 54
th
Chemical Troop conducted initial
monitoring for alpha, beta, and gamma radiation at the periphery of the North Compound
using the XM93 Fox Nuclear, Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (called the Fox
vehicle) and hand-held radiation detectors.
[460
,
461]
Figure
I-12. XM93 Fox vehicle
The Fox vehicle deployed with the
54
th
Chemical Troop is a sophisticated chemical warfare agent detector. Built
in Germany and widely regarded as the most capable chemical detection vehicle then in
service, it had a secondary capability to detect beta and gamma radiation, and a very
limited capability to detect alpha radiation. The Fox had two onboard radiation detectors:
the German-made ASG-1 and the US AN/VDR-2. The 54
th
Chemical Troop's
reconnaissance platoon operated and maintained six Fox vehicles, with a seventh serving as
a "floater" or spare. Each Fox had four crewmen.
[462]
Three Fox vehicles conducted the
initial radiological monitoring effort on July 12
th
, the day after the fire.
The 54
th
Troop commander and other unit personnel have stated that their
monitoring equipment was fully operational and calibrated. The Foxes conducted radiation
surveys around the North Compound's perimeter and inside the South Compound.
[463
,
464]
In a March, 1998 meeting with investigators, the 54
th
Chemical Troop commander acknowledged that while he and his troop were well-trained to
detect battlefield radiation, they had little training or experience with DU and its alpha
radiation. Nevertheless, his superiors directed him to use the Fox vehicles in this role,
so he did (for lack of a better alternative).
[465]
A week after the explosion (July 18
th
),
troop personnel entered the motor pool area on foot, using hand-held VDR-2 monitors to
check for beta and gamma radiation. These forays produced "negative" readings
for radiation.
[466]
The former regimental NBC officer
and several former 54
th
Chemical Troop members, including the platoon leader of
the 54
th
Reconnaissance Platoon, which operated the Fox vehicles, have
indicated that they doubted the utility of these initial surveys, since their equipment
lacked the sensitivity to detect the low levels of radiation associated with DU
contamination. In addition, the Foxes operated in the South Compound and around the
periphery of the motor pool, where the likelihood of encountering detectable DU
contamination was very low. The NBC officer voiced these concerns to the regimental
commander, as did the first radiation control (RADCON) personnel on the scene.
[467]
The regimental
commander subsequently directed the Foxes to discontinue their monitoring efforts.
[468]
Because of the huge quantities of
unexploded ordnance and parallel efforts by EOD and RADCON personnel, the 54
th
Chemical Troop and NBC regimental staff at Doha conducted limited operations inside the
North Compound. While they did not play a major role in detecting or cleaning up DU alpha
particle contamination, they helped pick up DU penetrators and fragments.
[469]
F. 58
th
Combat
Engineer Company's Role and Activities
The 58
th
Combat
Engineer Company (CEC), the 11
th
ACR's engineer unit, had the primary
responsibility for the cleanup and recovery effort. Working closely with the 146
th
Ordnance Detachment (EOD) and later with a contract EOD team, the 58
th
CEC used
its bulldozers and graders to clear heavy debris from the North Compound after EOD
personnel had cleared away unexploded ordnance and exposed DU penetrators. In this
capacity, the 58
th
CEC represented the largest contingent of personnel who
operated in the North Compound during cleanup and recovery operations. Former 146
th
personnel have stated they gave 58
th
CEC personnel safety briefings before they
entered the North Compound, warning them to alert EOD technicians when they found
unexploded ordnance and DU. For obvious reasons, engineer personnel avoided unexploded
ordnance; however, some have stated that they did not recall being briefed on DU and
therefore picked up exposed DU penetrators, which they did not realize were hazardous
material.
G. Impact of the Fatal July
23
rd
Unexploded Ordnance Mishap
After the July 23
rd
unexploded ordnance explosion, Army Central Command (the 11
th
ACR's
in-theater higher headquarters) immediately halted cleanup activities in the North
Compound while it reassessed the situation at Doha. From then on, the 146
th
was
effectively sidelined, relegated to supporting the Armament Munitions and Chemical Command
(AMCCOM) and Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) personnel who had arrived on July
19
th
and July 24
th
, respectively, to decontaminate and remove
contaminated M1A1 tanks.
[470
,
471]
After the explosion Army Central
Command decided to bring in the 512
th
EOD Control Team and a civilian EOD
contract company staffed by ex-military EOD technicians to finish cleaning Doha's
North Compound (the 146
th
Ordnance Detachment already had cleared the South
Compound). This decision halted nearly all activity in the North Compound until
mid-September, more than two months after the motor pool fire.
[472
,
473]
H. AMCCOM Radiation Control Team
Activities
While the 146
th
Ordnance Detachment, 54
th
Chemical Troop, and 58
th
Combat Engineer
Company played key roles in the cleanup and recovery, the stringent demands of handling
and disposing of DU-contaminated equipment required the commitment of additional
resources. This came initially from two radiation control teams (AMCCOM and CECOM)
deployed from appropriate agencies in the United States, and later from a civilian
consulting company, Environmental Chemical Corporation, which conducted the final cleanup
of unexploded ordnance and DU contamination at Doha.
The US Army Operations Support
Command (called Armament Munitions and Chemical Command, or AMCCOM, during the Gulf War
and Industrial Operations Command after the war) based at Rock Island, Illinois, maintains
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license authorizing DU ammunition storage at Army
installations in the United States and US territories.
[474]
Since the Doha explosion involved DU, the Army
directed AMCCOM to assemble and deploy a team to assess the levels of DU contamination in
and around the damaged and destroyed tanks.
[475]
Several hundred 120mm DU sabot
rounds stored in the motor pool area had exploded, leaving behind the DU penetrators.
Intact, each penetrator (27 inches long and 1.5 inches thick) weighed 10.7 pounds.
[476]
The first AMCCOM
representative to enter the North Compound on July 18
th
noted (erroneously)
that the motor pool contained a total of about 900 DU rounds, of which all but 10 to 40
had been loaded in the tanks. He found five spent (but otherwise intact) DU rounds within
150 meters of the tanks. Due to the extraordinary quantity of unexploded ordnance, his
preliminary assessment was limited, but his initial reaction was that the area was not
nearly as badly contaminated as first believed.
[477]
He apparently was unaware adjacent MILVANs and conexes
had contained several hundred additional DU rounds.
The three-man AMCCOM radiation
control team arrived at Camp Doha on July 19
th
. The team's mission was
only to assess the state of the M1A1 tanks, and then decontaminate the damaged or
destroyed tanks to allow their entry into the United States for further decontamination or
preparation for disposal at the Barnwell, South Carolina, low-level radioactive waste
disposal site. Although the team was equipped with various sophisticated radiological
detection equipment, it essentially confined its activities to collecting DU penetrators
found in and around the tanks, and preparing the tanks for shipment to the port of Dammam,
where they would be readied for shipment to the US.
[478]
Figure
I-13. AMCCOM RADCOM personnel at Doha
On arriving at Doha, the AMCCOM
team visually inspected the motor pool, accompanied by members of the 54
th
Chemical Troop and some EOD personnel. The North Compound had been cordoned off since the
July 23
rd
explosion, with entry strictly controlled and limited almost
exclusively to 58
th
Combat Engineers and 146
th
Ordnance Detachment
personnel involved in unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearing operations.
[479]
Later, after lanes
had been cleared through areas of UXO concentrations, small groups of drivers were brought
in to move operational equipment (Bradleys, trucks, etc.) out of the motor pool area to a
new site some distance away.
[480]
The AMCCOM team found that almost
all the DU rounds in each tank's basic load had remained trapped inside the hull.
Most penetrators found in the tanks were scorched, but intact. Others had melted,
fragmented, or oxidized to varying degrees in the intense heat.
[481]
A Battle Damage
Assessment Team from the US Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, which examined the four
destroyed or damaged M1A1s, corroborated these observations. In an August 5, 1991,
memorandum the team stated:
All four of the M1A1s were
damaged/destroyed as a result of fires external to the vehicle.
There were no
penetrations anywhere of the exterior armor
[emphasis added]. Three of the four M1A1s
had their fuel and ammunition destroyed. In these three cases, there was an explosion in
the ammunition compartment. The ammunition doors and blowout panels functioned properly,
keeping the explosion from entering the crew compartment. The fourth M1A1 was damaged on
the right suspension only, and except for the gunner's computer and transmission
warning lights, was completely operational.
[482]
This memo indicates that concerns
about the M1A1's DU Heavy Armor panels burning and adding to the DU contamination
were unfounded. For oxidization to occur, the DU armor panels, sealed between (and
shielded by) regular rolled homogenous steel armor, would have required exposure to air as
well as to intense, sustained heat. Since the tanks' structural integrity remained
intact, the possibility of contamination from burning DU armor was negligible.
Figure
I-14. Burned-out Doha M1A1
A small number of DU rounds were
ejected through the burned tanks' blast panel (designed to allow the release of
extreme overpressures created during an ammo-compartment explosion). The anecdotal
evidence we collected, however, suggests fires and explosions ejected very few rounds in
this manner.
[483
,
484]
After the AMCCOM team head
ascertained that the 54
th
Chemical Troop members were familiar with operating
the hand-held PDR-77s (alpha detectors) the team employed, he led them on a limited survey
of the motor pool and its periphery. Again, the danger from unexploded ordnance prevented
a more comprehensive effort. The AMCCOM members also inspected the burned-out tanks. After
a team member nearly stepped on a live artillery bomblet, EOD and 58
th
Combat
Engineer soldiers cleared a lane to facilitate access to the tanks.
[485]
Although the AMCCOM mission was
limited in scope, it seems to have elevated the DU issue to new prominence. Before the
AMCCOM team's arrival, engineering personnel deposited any DU penetrators they picked
up in an on-base trash pile. The AMCCOM team halted this practice, segregating and
retrieving the DU penetrators for proper disposal. The team collected enough DU
penetrators to fill at least two 55-gallon drums. Eventually, the team dumped these
penetrators inside one of the burned-out M1A1 tanks designated for shipment to the Defense
Consolidation Facility at Snelling, South Carolina.
[486]
Communication and coordination
between the 11
th
ACR leadership, and the two AMCCOM and
Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) radiation control teams was limited.
[487]
The regimental
engineer officer recalls that he knew nothing about the arrival of the AMCCOM personnel
until they showed up at Doha. He also said the 11
th
ACR commander asked the
first radiation control personnel on the scene if a radiological hazard existed at Doha.
The answer was no.
[488]
This exchange, of course, did not address the issue of DU's chemical toxicity.
I. CECOM Team Augments
Radiation Control Efforts
On July 24
th
, the day
after the fatal unexploded ordnance explosion, a team arrived at Doha from the
Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) based at Ft. Monmouth, NJ. The Project Director
for the US Army Radiological Control Team (from Headquarters, Department of Army
Operations) headed the CECOM team. Using Eberline Field Instruments for the Detection of
Low Energy Radiation (FIDLER) and SPA-3 gamma detectors, the team conducted what one
member called a "site characterization survey."
[489]
These surveys
located a sizable number of DU fragments and areas of DU contamination, but were hampered
by the general "background" gamma radiation fields from the DU in the tanks and
ammunition connexes. This was not a grid-by-grid survey, but rather a more general
sampling, mostly in and around the motor pool. The CECOM team surveyed the areas EOD
personnel had cleared (an estimated two or three acres of the motor pool, or about the
size of several football fields).
The CECOM team emptied three
55-gallon drums filled with DU penetrators and a separate pile of penetrators into the
three contaminated tanks that were to be shipped back to the US. The team also surveyed
the dump located near the camp and found one DU penetrator (see Figure I-15), which the
team removed and shipped away for disposal.
Figure
I-15. DU penetrator found in doha dump
The Doha fire also affected M8A1
Chemical Agent Alarm Systems containing Americium-241. From the area they cleared EOD
personnel recovered one M8A1, whose radioactive source cell was undamaged and another M8A1
from one of the M1A1 tanks removed from the area near the wash rack. A fragment from the
explosion penetrated the radioactive source cell, which burned in the fire. The CECOM team
detected no alpha radiation contamination and placed this M8A1 in one of the contaminated
M1A1 tanks shipped to the US for disposal.
A July 31, 1991 CECOM report
submitted to the commander of Task Force Victory, Forward, which oversaw the overall Doha
recovery effort, reported that there was no radiation hazard to personnel outside the
North Compound. The report noted that five M8A1s and an unknown number of DU penetrators
in solid, melted, or burned states remained unaccounted for inside the North Compound, and
recommended warning all persons entering that area of the potential hazard. After
arranging to ship the contaminated tanks to the port of Dammam for shipment on August 6,
1991, back to the US the CECOM team departed Doha in early August.
[490
,
491]
As specialized teams cleared
sections of the 2
nd
Squadron's concrete pad of unexploded ordnance and DU,
the 11
th
ACR leadership brought in regular support and combat soldiers to do a
final cleanup using brooms and other hand tools.
[492]
Although radiation control personnel had cleaned up
the area with the heaviest concentrations of depleted uranium contamination -- the three
burned M1A1s on the wash rack -- DU oxides or residues could have remained in the
surrounding areas. The fire and explosions also scattered, partially burned, or oxidized
several hundred spent DU penetrators in and around the MILVAN containers holding each
platoon's reserve ammunition.
[493]
The regular support and combat personnel doing the
final cleanup and other soldiers in the vicinity could have inhaled or ingested any
remaining DU particles their brooms stirred up.
J. Further Radiation
Control and Cleanup Activity
After the removal of the
contaminated M1A1 tanks and the AMCCOM and CECOM teams' departure on August 2
nd
,
a hiatus of several weeks ensued in radiation control and cleanup activities. The only
activity occurring in the North Compound during this time was several hundred meters away
from the 2
nd
Squadron motor pool area, in the supply area which had been
cleared earlier of unexploded ordnance thrown into the area by the July 11
th
explosions. The 11
th
ACR did not store any ammunition in this area, and cleanup
teams found no DU in or near it.
Figure
I-16. Removing burned M1A1
After having been virtually
sidelined since July 23
rd
, the 146
th
Ordnance Detachment rotated out
of the theater in September 1991. The Pentagon contracted a civilian firm, Environmental
Chemical Corporation (ECC), to finish all clean up and recovery in the North Compound. Two
Army Reserve EOD officers managed the contract, while a highly trained, experienced Army
sergeant first class provided on-scene oversight, support, and safety monitoring to
approximately 14 ECC EOD technicians. In this capacity, the sergeant conducted most of the
actual radiological surveys carried out in this second and final phase of the Doha
cleanup.
The ECC team surveyed the North
Compound with its own radiation detection and measurement equipment. On entering the 2
nd
Squadron motor pool, they found large quantities of DU scattered around the MILVAN ammo
storage containers that had detonated in the fire. Many of these DU penetrators were
intact, but others had fragmented or burned down to varying degrees, with some almost
completely reduced to ashes. Individual rounds exploding among the stacked ammunition
ejected some rounds and penetrators into the open. Other rounds, burned or unexploded,
remained within the shells of the conexes. Using an AN/PDR-56 radiation detector fitted
with a small alpha probe, the EOD sergeant measured the DU cores, and after they were
removed, monitored the surface beneath them. Most DU penetrators inside and outside of the
conexes gave off very low radiation readings. The ECC team then double-wrapped the DU
penetrators in plastic, bubble-wrapped them, and put them in 55-gallon drums. Personnel
packing the drums with DU penetrators wore surgeon's caps, safety glasses, half-face
protective masks, coveralls, butyl rubber aprons, rubber surgeon's gloves with cotton
inserts, and rubber "booties" over their normal work boots. The team filled
eight drums with about 250 DU penetrators.
[494]
Figure
I-17. Doha motor pool pad after cleanup
The sergeant took readings inside
the MILVAN containers, where levels of radiation were somewhat higher. He typically
detected 9,000 disintegrations per minute (dpm, or the number of radioactive particles
decaying per minute), corresponding to 0.004 microcurie, on the penetrators' surface.
The levels on the surface of the ground directly beneath a penetrator typically were half
the levels on the surface of a penetrator, or 4,500 to 4,600 dpm. At the 10,000-dpm level
(0.0045 microcurie), Army guidance requires personnel to wear an M17A1 protective mask
(gas mask) or equivalent respiratory protection. Given the reading of approximately 9,000
dpm, ECC elected to don white surgeon's masks in addition to their other protective gear
while working on the motor pool pad. ECC personnel brushed down the MILVAN containers
until the radiation levels had reached normal background levels.
[495]
The sergeant also took readings
on the decontaminated surfaces formerly occupied by the four burned-out (and
DU-contaminated) M1A1 tanks. Since the RADCON teams had already cleaned those areas, no
radiation was found.
[496]
K. The Final Cleanup
When the ECC team started work in
mid-September 1991, approximately two-thirds of the North Compound remained uncleared, and
due to the unexploded ordnance threat, no one was permitted into those uncleared areas. It
took the ECC team two months to clean up these areas. Once the team rendered explosive
munitions safe for transport, they moved them to the EOD demolition area approximately 750
meters east of the compound for destruction. All submunitions considered unsafe to
transport were destroyed in-place. After the ECC team had cleared the concrete pads of
unexploded ordnance and DU penetrators, heavy equipment scraped up remaining debris and
transported it to the EOD demolition area. As a precaution, the team poured diesel fuel
over the scrap metal and ignited it to detonate or destroy any small-arms rounds or
submunitions that might have been missed, a process repeated twice.
When the entire North Compound
and the sandy strip between the North and South Compounds had been cleared, ECC hired
local civilians to perform the final sweeping of the motor pool pads. ECC provided the
workers with dust masks, gloves, cotton overalls, and other personal protective equipment
(PPE); the levels of detected radioactivity were less than the Army's criteria for
donning M17 or similar gas-mask type respirators. Eleven water tankers were brought in to
hose the area down after the motor pool had been swept completely clean. The Army EOD
Control Team then performed a radiological survey to ensure no residual contamination
remained. When none was detected, the contractor was certified as having fulfilled all
contractual obligations to clean up the North Compound and its periphery.
[497]
L. Working Conditions
During the Doha Clean up and Recovery Operations
No discussion of the Doha cleanup
would be complete without describing the extremely severe working conditions. Summer
temperatures typically reached 115 degrees by mid-afternoon. Smoke from oil fires billowed
constantly, coating the western surfaces of poles, walls, and parked vehicles with a black
film, forcing soldiers to don handkerchiefs over their mouths and noses. Life-support
facilities, marginal before the fire, were practically wiped out. Since water was severely
short, soldiers often wore the same uniforms for days on end. Biting sand flies and other
parasites and pests were common. During the initial clean up, soldiers typically labored
in these conditions 12 or more hours a day, often 7 days a week.
[498]
Army Technical Bulletin (TB)
9-1300-278, "Guidelines For Safe Response To Handling, Storage, And Transportation
Accidents Involving Army Tank Munitions Or Armor Which Contain Depleted Uranium"
(dated September 1990) states:
Anyone passing over (the
radiation control line) to the fire area is to wear appropriate protective equipment that
may include: protective coveralls, gloves, rubberized boots, head covering, and
respiratory protection. EOD personnel are to wear the M25 or M17A2 protective mask with
the M13A2 filter element and the accompanying head covers (i.e., MOPP Level 4). Personnel
assisting in the radiation survey and decontamination operations should wear full-face
respirators with high-efficiency dust filters. Tape is to be used to seal the clothing
where there are any openings to the body.
[499]
These recommendations were
impractical at best, and dangerous at worst, under field conditions. The searing
temperatures coupled with physically exhausting duties would have created mass heat
casualties among personnel in full MOPP in very short order. As it was, EOD personnel
working around unexploded ordnance were required to wear flak vests and helmets at all
times. Most personnel wore gloves because they picked up sun-scorched metal fragments and
sharp-edged debris.
[500]
Even the AMCCOM Radiation Control (RADCON) team thought cotton overalls, work
gloves, and dust masks offered sufficient protection for their activities.
[501]
Under the
conditions described, this level of PPE would have provided adequate protection,
especially from inhalation and ingestion and protection for wounds, while allowing
important cleanup operations to continue with maximum efficiency.
M. Comments on the Radiation
Control Efforts
For this report we contacted
seven of the eight AMCCOM and CECOM team members -- including the heads of both
teams -- directly involved in the Camp Doha radiological efforts. The consensus among
the team members was "we did what we were sent over to do," and the DU hazard
was negligible outside the immediate vicinity of the tanks. Key ECC team members and the
Army representatives who assisted and oversaw their efforts have expressed similar beliefs
and think they left behind an uncontaminated site when their efforts were completed.
It is noteworthy that all the
AMCCOM, CECOM, ECC, and EOD personnel with the highest risk of exposure to any DU
contamination in the North Compound continue to report good health. It also should be
noted that these individuals (except for EOD members) generally took appropriate
precautions and often (but not always) wore half-face respirators, gloves, and similar
protective equipment.
A review of the radiation control
response raises these concerns:
Coordination and support from
ARCENT, AMCCOM, CECOM, and contract personnel
As log entries and other evidence
indicates, ARCENT was aware of the potential hazards alpha radiation posed. This
information, however, apparently did not reach the 11
th
ACR's key leaders
and decision-makers. The 11
th
ACR Engineer was unaware the AMCCOM team was
en-route until the team "showed up" at Camp Doha. Little formal coordination and
contact occurred between RADCON personnel and the 11
th
ACR leadership, who, had
they been better informed, could have issued more appropriate environmental and safety
guidance to the soldiers.
[502]
Relations between the heads of the AMCCOM and CECOM
teams appeared strained, and cooperation between the two teams was limited.
[503]
The 11
th
ACR commanders and decision-makers believed they were largely disconnected from the
radiation-control information loop, since ARCENT was, in effect, "running the
show" after the motor pool fire. The reasons for these disconnects remain
undetermined, but the net result is that 11
th
ACR soldiers were needlessly
subjected to potential DU exposures.
Promptness of the response
The AMCCOM team arrived a week
after the explosion; the CECOM team, almost two weeks later. During the crucial first few
days after the explosion, the unit leadership and personnel lacked clear, authoritative
guidance about DU's potential hazard and, therefore, how to handle DU. This led to
unsound practices, such as soldiers picking up spent DU penetrators with their bare hands
and dumping DU penetrators in an open, on-base, trash pile.
[504]
Limited early scope of the effort
Radiation control efforts focused
almost exclusively on the M1A1s until the CECOM team arrived on July 24
th
.
Contamination from the DU rounds in each tank's magazine had largely been confined to
the vehicles' interiors. However, DU rounds stored elsewhere also were exposed to the
fire. In the intense heat, some penetrators stored outside the tanks may have burned.
There was no concerted effort to assess possible DU contamination from rounds stored
outside the tanks until the ECC team arrived in mid-September.
[505]
Lack of documentation and
reporting
Paragraph 1-3c of TB 9-1300-278,
the existing guidelines for responding to accidents involving DU, states: "Interim or
final written reports will be transmitted through the local Radiation Protection Officer
(RPO) to the license RPO within 30 days of the accident or incident. If an interim report
is submitted, a final report will be submitted as expeditiously as possible." The
CECOM team chief said he submitted daily reports to AMCCOM (now the US Army Operations
Support Command), but says a final report was never submitted.
[506]
AMCCOM personnel
submitted frequent memos and very brief descriptions of their efforts, but no detailed
accounts, complete with daily measurements and written reports, were generated. In the
absence of such documentation and other supporting material (daily logs and records,
etc.), attempts to quantify possible radiological exposures will remain inexact.
The central question remains: How
much DU actually released into the environment? A precise estimate is impossible, but some
key variables have been established. The ammunition stored at Camp Doha constituted the 11
th
ACR's "basic load," or combat requirements. A relatively small number of DU
rounds (660) were destroyed or damaged.
[507]
Of these, about 111 would have been loaded in the
three burned-out tanks.
[508]
Many of the 660 lost rounds survived the fire without exploding or burning (Figure
I-18) but had to be removed from the inventory since they had been in a fire.
Figure
I-18. Unexploded DU rounds
Most of the exposed penetrators
recovered at Doha were found intact or nearly intact. RADCON teams' surveys found no
DU contamination outside the North Compound. The heaviest DU contamination was found
inside the burned tanks. Localized contamination was also found around three tanks and
several burned conexes. RADCON reports and accounts indicated that the levels of radiation
here were below even the regulatory guidelines for donning respiratory protection. While
several hundred soldiers could have contacted DU rods, fragments, and residual particles
while cleaning the 2
nd
Squadron motor pool, the available evidence suggests
these exposures were well below the threshold levels at which health effects might occur.
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