- Remembering Our Warriors
- Brig (Retd)
- Shamim Yasin Manto
- S.I.(M), S.Bt
DJ?s A H AMIN
interviews a soldier who has made his mark in every task that he was
assigned.
Please tell us something about your early life?
I was born in 1933 at Amritsar, initially raised in
Kucha Vakeelan (Lawyers Street) ancestral abode of Manto family, after
their migration from Kashmir in approximately middle of
nineteenth century. Schooling in Government Primary School and in
Pandit Baij Nath High School upto 9th class. Migrated to Lahore after
Independence in Aug 1947. Did Matric in 1948 from Rang Mahal Mission High
School and joined Islamia College Lahore. Was in 2nd year when selected
for 6th PMA Long Course and started my military career on April 1, 1950 at
Pre-Cadet Training School (PCTS) Quetta at an early age of less than 17
years.
Memories of my life in Amritsar are both very
pleasant and very unpleasant. Communal peace existed between Muslims and
Non- Muslims ? Hindus and Sikhs. Each of these communities lived
separate lives in their own ways residing generally in separate areas of
the city. In 1940s, when struggle for attainment of freedom of India from
the British Raj gathered strength on separate platforms of Congress and
Muslim League, this struggle turned into communal clashes. In 1947,
Amritsar was subjected to the worst kind of
blood shed, arson and loot. My family were lucky to have migrated
to Pakistan, by the end of Aug, without losing lives, but losing
everything else. Many families were not so lucky.
They lost both lives and their worldly belongings
There are other interesting memories of my life at
Amritsar:-
Travel from Amritsar to Peshawar/Landi Kotal/Haripur
When I was about ten, an uncle of mine was going to
Peshawar and had asked my parents if I could accompany him since it was
summer holidays. Although I was very young I do remember this pleasant
journey. I have two interesting memories of this adventure. First the
Landi Kotal itself, its awesome military surroundings and GORA SAHIBS.
Second on our way back visit to Haripur Jail another uncle of mine who was
a die-hard congressite, Khwaja Zahoor ud Din was serving a sentence as a
political prisoner.
Interaction with Hindus and Sikhs
The relationships between the two was rather cordial.
There were elements among the Hindus who were fanatics and harboured
ill-feelings but then there were many Hindus and Sikhs who had very good
relations with the Muslims.I had studied in a Hindu school. In this school
the first period was devoted to religious studies. Muslims, Hindus and
Sikhs gathered separately and performed their respective religious
rituals. Every Friday all Muslim students were taken in a group to a
mosque for Friday prayers. There were cordial business relations between
Muslims and non-Muslims. However, in the 1940s when the struggle for
independence gathered momentum things became tense and communal tensions
increased to tragic proportions.
Communal Carnage
Between February and August 1947 there were incidents
of arson and brutal killing between the two communities almost every other
day. Amritsar remained under curfew most of the time. During certain
periods the city was handed over to the army. In the end of July all the
Muslim police were disarmed and the police posts established between the
localities of the two communities were manned by all non-Muslims. The
Non-Muslims made serious plans, using the Nihangs (Sikh Military wing) to
attack the Muslim localities in the city. They implemented this plan and
the non-Muslim police force, instead of protecting the Muslims
participated in their killings. By about 15th August practically all
Muslims living in the city had been driven out and they were concentrated
in relief camps established outside the city; Sharifpura was the major
camp. Almost entire population of Muslims of Amritsar was then evacuated
by road convoys and trains, to Lahore.
How was the Lahore of 1947?
The people of Lahore extended all possible help and
assistance to the incoming refugees
from
the entire East Punjab and beyond
during
many months after 15th August. Our relatives looked after us with open
arms. One ghastly sight I cannot forget was dead bodies at Railway
Stations from the trains coming from East Punjab. Evacuee property left by
Hindus/Sikhs comprised approximately two thirds of entire built up area,
if not more of Lahore city.
Any contemporaries or teachers about whom you
would like to say anything?
I did my Matric from Rang Mahal Mission High School.
The principal was Mr K.L Ralyaram a Christian was an outstanding teacher.
He not only ensured excellent teaching and academic standards but arranged
healthy extracurricular activities for the senior classes. One of his
favourite practice was to get the entire class into the principal?s
room. He would entertain them by a personal piano recital. Unfortunately
he died very early and we attended his funeral.
In Islamia College Lahore Railway Road I spent just
over a year. The famous poet and intellectual Dr M.D Taseer was the
principal. He was giant of a personality both physically and
intellectually.
The faculty
included Professor Hamid Ahmad Khan and Allama Allauddin Siddique. Both
became Vice Chancellors of Punjab University. I must narrate one small
incident when I decided to apply for the army and filled up the
application forms. It needed
principal?s signatures. Since not much time was left for
submission of application I had to go to Mr Taseer?s house, knocked at
the door, Begum Taseer came out, I explained the purpose of my visit. She
made me sit down in the drawing room because Mr Taseer was having a bath.
He came out with a big towel wrapped around him and sat next to me. He
promptly wrote his remarks on my application paper and signed it. Having
done that he very kindly remarked, don?t you think you should have done
this much earlier? He could not have conveyed what he wanted to,
more
effectively.
In those days one of the major sports events in
Lahore used to be
cricket
finals between Islamia College and Government College in the university
grounds. The finals that I witnessed were a sight to see. M.D Taseer with
all the faculty of Islamia College sitting on one side and
Professor A.S Bukhari (Patras) with Government College faculty
sitting on the other side. A bevy of luminaries indeed. Almost the entire
Pakistan cricket team was divided between the two sides. Islamia College
having Khan Mohammad, Nazar Mohammad, Fazal Mahmood. On the Government
College side
Mahmood Hussain,
Waqar, Shujauddin etc.
Motivation to join the army?
In college I joined the U.O.T.C. I regularly attended
their parades behind Civil Secretariat Lahore and participated in two
training camps at Niaz Beg and Walton. That is
where my interest in army developed.
How was life at PMA and PCTS?
The two and a half years training period, six months
at PCTS Quetta and two years in PMA Kakul, as is well-known, were very
tough but satisfying and rewarding. The Commandants, the military faculty
and academic faculty
were
excellent. Most of the professors were PhDs and had been teaching in
Usmania University Hyderabad Deccan and in Aligarh University. They taught
and imparted training with dedication, imagination and high level of
competence. For our impressionable minds most of them stood out as perfect
examples to emulate. To me, noteworthy were Dr Qureshi in PCTC; In PMA
Brig Ingal; Dr Mazhar, Prof Ishaq, Capt (later Maj Gen) Qamar Ali
Mirza, my platoon commander; Capt (later Brig) Ali El Edroos. 6th PMA
crowd were a fine lot, a good blend of the Pakistani nation. It was a
coincident that I became interested in riding, to the extent that I and my
friend Rana Abbas stayed on in the Academy during two mid-term breaks just
to have an opportunity of riding better horses morning and evening. A
crazy venture!! 5th PMA Course passed out six months earlier because of
1951 flap. 6th PMA were Seniors for two terms. General officers produced
by our course are; General Mirza Aslam Beg, Lieutenant General Nishat
Ahmad, Lieutenant General Saghir Hussain, Major General Abdul Sattar
Chaudhri and Major General Salahuddin Khawaja. Rahatullah Jarral C.S.P
rose to be a Federal Secretary. 22 Officers rose to the ranks of Colonel
and Brigadier, including Professor Abdul Qayyum an outstanding
intellectual.
Please tell us something about your service
profile from passing out till 1965?
I was commissioned on 23 Aug 1952 in the corps of my
choice Armoured Corps. Initially, I was posted to 19 Lancers. This was
changed to The Guides Cavalry FF before we left PMA. Guides was a very old
cavalry Regiment with rich history and traditions. I got fitted into its
crowd with ease. The Regiment has a strong espirit-de-corps nurtured by
all its officers, notably, by
its
elders, namely, Lt Col Abbas Durrani, Col Pir Abdullah Shah, Maj Gen
Jehanzeb, Col Hashim, Major Dildar and Gen M Zia ul Haq; ably followed by
second string of elders : Maj Gen Wajahat, Brig
Amir Gulistan Janjua, Lt Gen Fazle Haq, Lt Gen Ijaz Azim and Brig
Jafar Khan.
I attended basic/advance courses at Infantry School,
School of Armour and EME College.
In 1953 I was involved in
an ?Escort Operation?. I
collected
400 .303 Rifles from Central Ordnance Depot Rawalpindi and safely handed
over to Political Agent
Malakand
for onward delivery in Dir. These rifles were a gift to Nawab of
Dir by the
visiting
Pakistan
Government dignitaries General Ayub C-in-C, and Mr Iskandar Mirza,
Secretary Defence. It is an interesting coincident that about half of
these rifles were sealed by me after Dir Operations in 1960.
Ex-November Handicap 1954
This was a major exercise ? with-troops in which
bulk of Pakistan Army participated. Guides Cavalry, who had recently been
equipped with 90 mm M 36B2
Gun
Carriage (Tank Busters) also participated. This was a test exercise for
Brig (later Lt Gen) Habibullah. A bevy of
foreign military leaders visited this exercise. Looking back, one
finds that Tank Busters were acquired without
establishing
their
need for the Armoured Corps. These were found to be utterly useless during
1965 War. Some of these were deployed under my command in 1971
War.
In 1956 I was selected to attend the ?Armour Motor
Officers Course? at US Armour School Fort Knox Kentucky, USA.
In 1957 I was selected for service in the Special
Services Group and stayed there till 1962. This period was a thrilling
experience of my military career. Did Advance Commando Course conducted by
the US Training Team at Cherat. The tough arduous and imaginative training
for unconventional warfare instilled physical fitness, mental robustness
and self-confidence of very high order. Commanded H Company (later HUMZA
Company). During this tenure underwent many very interesting training and
operational events. Noteworthy are:-
a. 1960 Company training
in area Buner, Swat and Upper Swat for a period of
3 months. This training gave excellent exposure to small teams and
junior leaders for unconventional operations in hilly terrain. One
interesting event was rescue of an injured American mountaineer who
attempted to climb Flak Sher Peak 21,000 ft, single handed. He fell down
and suffered very serious injuries. He was carried on shoulders, bound on
a stretcher, from 17,000 ft to 10,000 ft. Most of the visitors to Kalam,
our Coy HQ, were foreigners. One Italian couple had left their small baby
with friends in Faisalabad and came to climb Mankial peak about 18,000 ft.
It was heartening to note that a young student of Engineering University,
son of Brig Azeem of Armoured Corps, accompanied this couple. This
?youngster? is
Brig Sher
Khan. I was reminded of him when I read one of his articles in a
newspaper. I had very fine platoon commanders, Capt (later Brig) Humayun
Malik, Capt (later Maj Gen) Syed Mustafa Anwar Hussain and Lt (later Col)
Fakhre Alam. It was a pleasure working with these fine officers,
especially Humayun Malik who is forever such a jovial company, second only
to my dear friend Maj Z U Abbasi Shaheed. Captain Agha Asad Raza was
second in command. He held the rear at Cherat and ensured logistical
support. Agha Asad was a very fine soul.
b. Dir Operations Oct 1960:--After independence
Pakistan encountered serious problems with the Nawab of Dir and one of his
sons, Khan of Jandool. After exhausting all peaceful efforts to win him
over, Pakistan decided to take action to remove the Nawab. In this
operation I Commanded SSG Company which operated from
Chitral as a part of
Shariff
Force commanded by Brig (later Gen) M. Shariff. The Company
operated against the town of Dir with the task of removing the Nawab. The
operation was conducted, as planned, without any blood-shed which
was intended. For secrecy we operated in Scouts uniform. Maj (later
Lt Gen) Nishat Ahmed, Capt (later Lt Col) S.M. Naeem and Lt (later Col)
Fakhre Alam were with me in this operation.
It may be noted that after coming into being in 1957,
this was first operational employment of SSG sub-units. The
second SSG company, commanded by Maj (later Gen) Aslam Beg, was in
support of
Rakhman Gul Force
which operated in area Munda Killa against Khan of Jandool. Lt Col
(later Maj Gen) A O Mitha, Commander SSG, also took part in these
operations. He escorted the Nawab in helicopter to Risalpur.
After the removal of Nawab, his eldest son was
installed. Sahibzada Ayub a fine political officer was appointed Political
Agent cum Wazir-e-Azam. After this changeover I remained in Dir for about
a month. During this period I listed all the weapons owned by the Nawab
and his sons and sealed them in the Armouries.
Training Exercise in Tribal Areas (ILAQA GHAIR) lying
between
Cherat and Kohat
This was also an interesting experience involving
confrontation with a
Tribal
Jirga, who could not accept the fact that a uniformed detachment of
Pakistan Army
had entered Tribal Territory to carry out training for a
period of 4
weeks. Capt
Humayun Malik was with me in this training as well.
Training Camp at Batrasi:-- This was conducted for
the training of Platoon Commanders of newly formed commando platoons in
each infantry battalian in West Pakistan. The training team was headed by
Maj (later Maj Gen) Imtiaz Ali, with Maj (later Col) Asadullah, Capt
(later Brig) A H Qureshi and myself. Training for the Platoon Commanders
of infantry battalions in East Pakistan was conducted at Lal Mai Hills,
Comilla. I with Capt (later Col) Afzal
Warraich and Lt (later Lt Gen) Shafiq carried out this training in
Oct 1958. At the end of this training in March 1959 I spent one month
leave in Sylhet,
and mostly Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Again a very interesting experience. Participated in the
marriage ceremony of Chakma Chief?s brother/or
cousin with the daughter of another chief, a very colourful event.
Provided logistic support to an 18 years old German Globe Trotter, who was
going around the world to avoid compulsory military service for two years.
From 1962 to 1965 my service was divided between
command of a tank squadron of the Guides Cavalry at Kharian, as a General
Staff Officer Grade Two at the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate at
Karachi and an attachment for three months with the SSG to carry out an
operational survey of the Kargil Sector.
How was the stint in the ISI ?
Nothing much of interest professionally. Of great
interest personally since I got married in Karachi.
What was the aim of the operational survey in
Kargil and what were your conclusions?
The aim was to update the operational information of
this Sector to
be used
whenever the necessity arose.
How was the standard of training in the army
during the period 1952-1965? Particularly in relation to its performance
in 1965?
There was a great deal of keenness shown in training
prior to 1965. It was basically oriented to War in Burma or North Africa.
Working on Regimental frequency the hallmark of an exercise with troops
was a wide manoeuvre. For this concept the standard of training was high.
But when we went to war in 1965 the situation confronted by
Troops/Squadron/Regiment was quite different. The terrain of Punjab with
clumps, crops and boggy area did not allow clear fields of view/fire for
manoeuvres. Squadron were required to operate on their own. Regimental
frequency had to be abandoned in a hurry. Training acquired prior to the
war was not much use. This happens to all armies, they usually train for
the previous war.
How was the Fort Knox experience?
This course provided me exposure to the life in what
is referred to as land of opportunity (USA). We were very fascinated with
the advancement in everything especially the automation in everyday life.
As far as the course is concerned it was very well organised with modern
training aids. There were officers from possibly 12 different countries
who attended this course. There were two officers from West Germany whose
army came into being on 1st January 1956 after the Second World War. I
asked these officers their opinion about Hitler. They felt that he was a
great man surrounded by wrong and bad people. I must mention about South
Korean officers. Theirs was the largest contingent of about ten. These
officers were getting only USD 4.5
per
diem from US Government. This money was not enough for them for dining in
the officers mess or clubs. They would buy groceries, cook their meals in
the kitchen provided in the BOQs and they had no means for recreation.
This was because of the economic situation of their country at that time
did not allow anything better. I must mention that we Pakistanis were so
?well off? that we got the USD 4.5
per diem plus our entire pay in foreign exchange plus an
additional allowance from Govt of Pakistan. Compare this with South Korea
and Pakistan of today. I feel we were simply living lavishly and beyond
our means.
Impressions/memories of Staff Course?
Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan was our
Commandant. The Deputy was another illustrious officer Colonel (later
Lieut Gen) A.I Akram. The
Directing
Staff included colonels Ali Edroos, Ziaul Haq, Majeed Malik, Golwalla (16
Punjab) and some others, brilliant officers.
The standard of instruction was high. I would like to
mention one small incident. The Commandant was very fond of playing Polo.
He made arrangements for almost daily game in
arena polo. One morning sitting in the syndicate room the peon of
the commandant brought a book which had been flagged and gave it to me. I
opened the book. There was a photograph of a polo player being taken out
of the field on a stretcher. There was a handwritten remark by Gen Yaqub
?Manto, this will happen to you if you play rashly as you do?.
How far is the assertion correct or incorrect that
emphasis in the pre-1965 armoured corps was on polo and social contacts
rather than hard core professionalism and training?
This is incorrect assertion. Few Armoured Corps
officers played polo. Social life received due attention because of the
characteristic traditions. But it was not at the cost of profession and
training. Each armour regiment went through regular training involving
MDs, TEWTS, and signal exercises followed by collective training for eight
to twelve weeks every year. The concept of training may not have fitted
into the needs of 1965 war, but its intensity was not lacking. Besides,
polo is a noble game. It nurtures in players offensive spirit which is an
essential ingredient for an armour officer.
What were your experiences of 1965 War?
I was doing Staff course. It was terminated on 6
Sept. I was posted to my Regiment Guides Cavalry. Left my 21 years old
wife with 3 months
old
daughter at Staff College and proceeded by train on 8 Sept, reached Jhelum
on 9th and arrived in the leaguer of Guides Cavalry at Badiana (Chawinda)
on the evening of 10 Sept. Met most of the officers, CO, Lt Col (later
Brig) Amir Gulistan Janjua, 2IC, Maj (later Lt Gen) Fazle Haq; Maj Shah
Behram Khatak C Sqn; Maj Z U Abbasi B Sqn, Maj Latif Malik A Sqn; Capt
Farooq Shahbaz, Adjt; Capt J K Durrani, OC HQ Sqn. By the way, each of the
three armoured regiments of 6 Lt Armd Div had two Sqns of M 48 tanks and
one Sqn M36B2 Tank Busters.
It
was a pleasure meeting all the regimental officers. Meeting with Z.U
Abbasi was rather emotional. Before going back to his Sqn he took me aside
and we chatted for quite some time. It did not occur to me that this was
my last meeting with him ever. Since all the appointments were held, CO
told me to remain at RHQ and man the rear link with Div HQ from his Rover
or his Tank. I must say all the officers were in high spirits. Before
first light next day, 11 Sept Squadrons were deployed along the general
line of railway line, aside Alhar Railway Station. Being on the rear link
I became aware of some serious setbacks in Philora, where CO and 2IC 11
Cav and CO Arty Regiment had become casualties. Guides Cav were ordered to
take action to relieve pressure on Philora. CO ordered a classic tank
attack by two M 48 Sqns. It was a partial success. Both the Sqns suffered
casualties; Maj Z U and his 2IC Capt Hussain Shah (son of Col Pir Abdullah
Shah) embraced Shahadat; Maj Latif was wounded, with other casualties as
well. More on this attack later.
I took over command of B Squadron on the evening of
11 Sep. For the next six days or so as part of Guides Cavalry my Squadron
was in the thick of tank battles resulting from the incessant attacks from
the units of Indian 1 Armd Div, every time supported by heavy artillery
and Indian fighter aircraft. Daily routine: After first light we would
break leaguer and deploy along a given line between Badiana and Chawinda.
Sooner or later Indians would attack, their main thrust would directly or
indirectly be against Guides Cav Sqn positions including that of 11 Cav
Sqn commanded by Maj (later Maj Gen) Raja Iqbal, which had been placed
under command Guides Cav. Fire fights would ensue involving direct tank
fire, arty shelling and aircraft rocketing or straffing. These would last
for two to four hours. Casualties would take place on both sides.There
were no manoeuvres except adjustment of tank/troop positions to frustrate
enemy attempts to break through. By the time darkness fell in the evening,
automatic disengagement took place between tank elements of both sides.
This was necessitated by need of replenishment of fuel and ammo and crew
fatigue who were cramped in the enclosed space of tank almost throughout
the day and had been subjected to the strenuous effects of exposure to
enemy fire, direct and indirect. By the time we would arrive in leaguer it
would be 2100 hours or so. The crew would get busy for replenishment. For
fuel they had to physically pick up 45 gallon barrels and pour fuel into
the petrol tanks. Then they would replenish ammo into the enclosed space
of tanks, a very laborious work. Tanks also required maintenance and,
often, repairs. The crew would barely have time for hot meals and to
collect their haversack meals for the next day. By the time all this work
was done it would be past midnight. The officers had to supervise all this
work. In addition they would receive orders for the next day and make
their plans to execute those orders. With this work in the leaguer the
crew would get hardly three to four hours sleep, officers, even less. This
would be the case if the echelons reached leaguer in time. Thanks to Capt
J K Durrani it happened so. Before first light the Sqns would disperse and
move to their battle locations. My Sqn went through this daily day and
night routine for almost five days at a stretch. Towards the later days
the heavy effect of weariness and
fatigue
was exhausting. There was also the emotional effect of losing your
comrades either Shaheed or wounded. I personally felt it whenever I lost
someone from my Sqn, like 2/Lt Saber Beg Shaheed. He fought valiantly. It
goes to the credit of officers, JCOs and men of my Sqn and indeed to the
CO and Shaheed Z U Abbasi, who had trained and motivated them, that with
very heavy odds and in the face of relentless offensive of numerically
superior enemy ?B Squadron? frustrated every attempt by him to break
through. Throughout these five days or so the enemy only managed to inch
forward from the line of railway line to the line of Rd Chawida ?
Badiana, a distance of
four
to six kms. I learnt a great deal from this toiling experience. It is a
common knowledge that battle or war is a different ball game as compared
to all types of peace time training. I got to know
that difference first hand.
Please tell us something about the famous two
Squadron attacks launched by the Guides on 11th September 1965?
I was manning the rear link of the regiment from
CO?s Rover. This means that I was listening into the transmissions being
made on the command net of 6 Armoured Division as well as command net of
my Regiment. Guides Cavalry received orders on wireless at about 1000
hours to the effect that there has been a serious setback at Phillora, and
that Guides Cavalry should take action to relieve pressure on
Phillora.There was a small meeting in the RHQ between CO, 21C Fazl-e-Haq
myself and Adjutant Farooq Shahbaz. The CO decided to attack with two
Squadrons of M-48s with the objective being area Libbe on track
Phillora-Bhagowal. He issued orders to this effect on wireless. Both the
squadrons attacked at the H-Hour. A Squadron led by Major Lateef and B
Squadron led by Major Z.U Abbasi. Both the Squadrons reached short of the
objective, inflicted number of casualties on the enemy and suffered
casualties themselves losing in the process Major Z.U Abbasi and Captain
Hussain Shah and Major Lateef wounded. I think this attack was a success,
though at a cost. It imposed caution on the enemy (the advancing Indian
1st Armoured Division) to the extent that they did not resume their
offensive till 13th September. Just as action of 25 Cavalry of knocking
down the leading enemy tanks on 8th September at Gadgor imposed caution on
this force which resulted in
resumption
of their offensive on 10th September. There are many points of learning
and criticism of this particular attack but we must not forget that it
made a major contribution in improving the defensive operations in the
area.
Anything else that you would like to say about
your experiences of the
1965
War?
Yes. Guides attack was the first battle action of the
Regiment since skirmishes in Tribal Areas using armoured cars and Stuart
light tanks in late 40s. Many lessons were learnt from this attack.
Regimental frequency was abandoned, because command and control was
disrupted due to unintending jamming. Terrain with clumps of trees and
sugar cane high crops restricted fields of view/fire during the move
between start line and objectives thus reducing the shock action on the
enemy. While this terrain imposed disadvantage on the attacker we used it
to our advantage in our subsequent defensive operations. Artillery fire
support was limited. In training more emphasis needs to be given on Attack
than to Advance to Contact. Different techniques need to be evolved for
Attack in different types of terrain in which our armour is likely to be
used. I must mention that our troops learnt some of those lessons very
quickly.
One night in leaguer when CO was briefing his ?O?
Group for the next day?s tasks. LAD JCO came rather anxious. A local had
brought information that some enemy Guerrillas have taken up position
outside a village couple of kms behind our leaguer. CO ordered me to deal
with this problem. I could not take any men from my Squadron because they
were too busy in replenishment. I mustered about 10 men of LAD, put them
in the snub nose 15 Cwt truck and moved to the village guided by the
Informer. Due to my SSG training I was quite sure that these can?t be
enemy ?Goreelas?. To cut the long story short. The enemy
?Goreelas? turned out to be own stragglers.
How would you sum up 1965 War in terms of
operational and strategic failures and successes ?
I think operations of 6 Lt Armoured Division
including 24 Brigade in Sector Chawinda was an operational success. The
main counter offensive of India was blunted. Our Khem Karan offensive was
operational failure. Operational Gibraltar in which freedom fighters were
launched in Kashmir was strategic blunder. If such an operation was
intended, the entire SSG should have been given this task with at least 3
years to prepare for it clandestinely.
How would you compare Pakistani and Indian tanks
on the technical planes in terms of firepower mobility standard of gunnery
and armour protection?
The Indian Centurion tank, their MBT, was a heavy
tank with less mobility. In fire power it was more effective than M 47/48.
So was it in armour protection. M 47/48 tanks were better in mobility,
slightly less effective in fire power in terms of range and comparatively
less effective in armour protection. These tanks caught fire quickly.
How would you rate Major General Ibrar Hussain the
then GOC 6th Armoured Division as a military commander?
Credit must go to him for not heeding advice to fall
back to MRL canal after Philora setback in which 11 Cavalry and 9 FF were
temporally incapacitated. He was really left with five Squadrons of M/48s,
two each in Guides and 22 Cav and one of 11 Cav. He fought the defensive
battle successfully.
What do you have to say about the system of
awarding gallantry awards? Were these awarded on merit or on whimsical
motivation and regimental nets etc?
On merit as well as not on merit.
How far were lessons of 1965 War implemented in
military training, organisation and leadership etc in the post-1965
period?
In Armoured Corps the lessons of 1965 War were
confined to improving Tank Troop and Squadron Training and that too under
the direct supervision of the GOCs. The manner of training destroyed the
initiative of Troop Leaders and Squadron Commanders and Commanding
Officers. The job of Squadron Commanders and Commanding Officers was being
done by Brigade Commanders and GOCs. Unfortunately no one realised that
this was not possible in case of war since a brigade commander and GOC had
other responsibilities. Training of Brigade/Division Commanders was not
considered necessary. They needed it as much as their juniors. According
to my experience Troop Leaders, Squadron Commanders and the CO are the
most important entities in armour battles. No effort should be spared to
train them technically, tactically and mentally. They will make up for any
lacks in equipment or otherwise which Pakistan Army are most likely to
have against our enemy. Generally speaking lessons of 1965 War were not
implemented in correct manner. Making officers as troops leaders was a
lesson implemented.
How would you assess the failures and successes of
the SSG in the 1965 War?
I was posted to SSG in Dec 1965. This was my second
tenure, this time as GSO 2(ops) in Group HQ with Brig (later
Maj Gen) Nasir Chaudhry as Commander SSG.
It was a pleasure working under him. He is a gentleman and very
thorough in his work. I learnt a great deal from him. Main activities:--
a. Critiques in GHQ and Air HQs, of SSG operations in
1965 War. Para droop attacks on Indian forward airfields at Pathankot,
Jallunder etc.
b. Return of SSG POWs, approximately 170. I was
President of the Court of Inquiry for this large number of SSG POWs. Maj
(later Gen) Shamim Alam Khan and Maj (later Lt Col) S.M. Naeem were
members of this court. This Inquiry recorded the performance of SSG teams,
as described by them, during the preparations, para drops and actions
against
targets. It also
recorded their experience as POW.
c. A review of operational planning, preparations,
and this inquiry provided sufficient material for an objective and
dispassionate critique of these operations with a view to learning for the
future. From what I recollect, main causes of failure of this
unconventional operation could be attributed to the following :-
(1) Well trained/motivated troops could not be
delivered in the area of their operation in an organized state. The Drop
Zones (DZs) were in civilian populated areas
which hindered
the
force to get together in teams as planned.
(2) They did not have enough information/intelligence
of Targets and target areas, evidently for security reasons!!
(3) Unconventional operations, especially of great
importance, require thorough planning including catering for the
unforeseen, very thorough and meticulous preparations including
rehearsals. Evidently, the preparations for these operations were not
thorough enough.
(4) Command of SSG was changed, so to speak,
?mid-stream?, few days before the actual launch of
troops.
d. These para-drop operations did contribute in
creating caution in the minds of enemy forward commanders. According to
one Indian book a force of at least a
brigade was sent
from
forward areas to deal with these para droops. This force remained tied up
throughout the war.
In 1965 War, we should not forget, that a scare of
Indian
?Goreelas/Commandos?
did sizeable damage to us in Sialkot
and Lahore Cantts, when, in fact, there were no Indian
Goreelas on ground. One can imagine the effect when there
were actual Pakistani ?Goreelas? in Pathankot, Jallundhar etc.
Please tell us something about your service
profile from 1965 till promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel?
In December 1965 I was posted back to the SSG where
as mentioned above I was involved in some critiques/debriefings/inquiries.
In the
second tenure with SSG I also did para course in 1966. From 1968 to 1969 I
was a squadron commander in the Guides Cavalry. The Guides was at that
time on the orbit of the 6th Armoured Division at Kharian. GOC was
Major General Eftikhar Khan Janjua, an infantry officer. Once
again, due to ?dearth? of competent
Armour officers, an Infantry officer was put in command of an
armour
formation. General
Janjua worked very hard first to acquire himself
basic technical knowledge of tanks, and troop/squadron tactics
and then went about ensuring that each and every Tank Commander,
Troop Leader and Squadron Commander was
thoroughly trained. His devotion to this task was unmatched.
During the same period I also served as Second in
Command Guides Cavalry with Lt Col (Later Lt Gen) Fazle Haq in command.
For some time I also officiated as Commandant Guides Cavalry. In June 1969
I was promoted Lieutenant Colonel and posted as Commandant Guides Cavalry.
From 1st October 1969 till 31 March 1970 I attended
the Tank/Battalion Brigade Commander Course in Moscow USSR. This was part
of the deal with Soviet Union in which Pakistan bought military hardware
(tanks, artillery guns, helicopters etc) after stopping of supplies by the
USA.
What were your impressions about the USSR of
1969-70?
The course was conducted in Armoured Forces Academy
located inside Moscow city. It consisted of technical part and tactical
part. The period being winter (Oct 69 ? March 70) all training was
conducted indoors except the last two weeks when we were taken outside the
city in a camp. Open range firing, recovery and underwater demonstration
and a TEWT was conducted in this training camp. All training was conducted
through interpreter because the instructors did not know English. Three of
us on the tactical course, Major Farooq Ali Qureshi, Maj Raashid and
myself formed the class. We were not mixed with other students. Major
Ghulam Yusaf, Maj (later Maj Gen) Munir Khalid, both EME and Capt (later
Lt Gen) Akram, AC were on a technical course of same duration.
The Academy was a very elaborate institution It
catered for training of a large number of officers in technical, tactical,
staff and command courses covering armoured and mechanized warfare. The
principles applied were generally the same as in other armies but the
Soviet doctrine laid more emphasis on concentration of fire power than
mobility. In their battle procedure they particularly emphasized that
after giving his orders, Commander must locate himself from where he can
supervise and help implementation.
Although Soviet Union was a Super Power the day to
day life of its people was miserable. Lack of consumer goods and Liberty
was devastating. Alcoholism and petty corruption were rampant. You could
get anything done, including reduction in Custom duties by paying a few
roubles. The institution of family was in disarray. The leadership was
aware of this. They vainly tried to compensate by promoting culture and
sports, having elaborate activities in these fields and paying handsomely
to the artists and sportsmen. The emphasis on Education was great. It was
extensive, of high quality and accessible to everyone without any cost.
Our encounters with Soviet Musalmaans was very
pleasant and emotional. They treated us with characteristic brotherhood.
They would very much welcome and even ask for a copy of Quran as a
present.
Please tell us something about your service
profile after return from USSR till 1971 War?
On return from USSR I was appointed as Instructor
Class ?A? at the School of Armour Nowshera where I served from April
1970 to August 1971. In August 1971 I was posted to command
26 Cavalry which was a relatively newly raised unit and at that
time was a part of the newly raised 23 Division with headquarters at
Jhelum. This division was commanded by Major General Eftikhar Khan Janjua.
It was during this tenure that we went to war with India in December 1971.
What were your impressions about the standard of
training in the School of Armour in 1971 as compared with what they were
when you first attended the basic course in the fifties?
There was marked qualitative and quantitative
improvement by way of training material, training aids, overall planning
of courses and conduct of training. In fifties this school was commanded
by a Major under Armoured Corps Centre Commandant. In 1970 it was
commanded by a Brigadier (S.R.C Daniel) with Colonel Sardar Ahmad as his
Deputy.
How would you compare the Pakistan Armoured Corps
of 1971 with the Indian Army vis-a-vis that of 1965 in technical,
qualitative and quantitative terms?
In 1971 the Indian Armoured Corps had a clear edge
over Pakistan Armoured Corps technically and quantitatively. The quality
of our troops had an edge over Indians.
Please tell us something about your war experience
of 1971 War?
After taking over 26 Cavalry at Jhelum, we went to
Tilla Ranges for annual firing. The situation in East Pakistan (Sept 1971)
was getting serious. Being a very dedicated and keen commander, and
keeping in view his likely future task, General Eftikhar Janjua moved his
entire 23 Division in Sept 71 to its operational area between Bhimber and
Gujrat against the Indian salient of Chumb. From then on 23 Div was put
through intensive training and preparations for war involving recce,
Coordination, Liaison, Planning, MDs, Exercises. 23 Div was given
offensive task: eliminate Chumb salient and advance through Jaurian and
capture Akhnoor. For this mission, 23 Div had four infantry brigades : 20
(Brig
) 66
(Brig Qamar us Salam) 111 (Brig Rahim ud Din) 4 Ak (Brig Ahmed Jamal); 2
Indep Armoured Brigade (Brig Sardar) with 11 Cavalry (Lt Col Khurshed Ali
Khan) and 28 Cavalry (Lt Col Dogar) its integral
Armour Regimental. 26 Cavalry (Lt Col Manto)
one additional Div Arty and
corps
artillery (Brig Kamal Matin and Brig). His own CC Arty was Brig Nasir
Ullah Khan Babar, SJ. His Col Staff was
Col
Ch Rehman and
GSO-1 Lt Col Saeed.
Adequate
Air
cover was also provided.
This was indeed a very strong force, under
the command of a dedicated, battle hardened soldier Commander.
Being on Command Net of the Division, I was in picture of generally the
whole operational area, through out
the
War. It will require too much of space to record the entire operations of
23 Division Group, as seen and experienced by me. I will mention
following observations/events :-
a. After commanding an armour squadron in battle in
1965 in Chawinda Sector,
participation
in Chhamb Operations in command of an armour regiment was
an experience of life-time for me. On one
hand I went through rigours of
a command in battle with ease, on the other hand, as a professional
solider, I got a chance to do war time soldiering with honour,
dignity and to
my full
satisfaction. Not very many professional officers get this chance.
b.
I had
a fine set of officers and JCOs in 26 Cavalry. 21C Maj Namji/Rashid;
Maj Shamshad, A Sqn; Maj Ashraf
B Sqn; Maj (later Brig) Asif Kamal, C Sqn; Capt (later Maj Gen) Ali
Hamid, Adjutant. Other officers were Capts Shahid Zaman (QM) Mujeeb (TO/Sqn
2IC) Hasan Zaheer, Naeem Amjad Naqibullah Bangash, Hanain Hyder. Lts
Ishtiaq Mahmood, Mohammad Hassan, Anwar Moez and Maqbool Malik. 2/Lt
Beg
joined just before
the war and was promptly made second driver in a tank. Ris Major was Sher
Khan, later Honorary Capt. Ris Ghafoorullah and Ris Yusaf were with me
practically all the time during the operations. Maj Waheed ?Sootta?,
my brother officer in Guides and SSG, commanded the Ad-Hoc Squadron of
M36B2s (12 Independent Armoured Squadron) placed under command 26 Cavalry.
Maj Haq DS Bty Comd 64 Med also gave me very happy and supportive company
throughout the operations.
c.
26
Cavalry was equipped with Sherman II Tanks with 76 mm gun and Radial
Engines. These engines get
hydrostatic
lock frequently. Indians had the latest Russian T55s and T54Bs with 105 mm
gun and modern fire control instruments. One of the important tasks with
me and my officers was NOT to let this vast difference have an adverse
effect on our crew. I visited two sabre squadrons in their forward
concentration areas just before start of operations. Their morale was
high. It gave boost to mine !! It was grace of ALLAH that there was not a
single incident of hydrostatic lock in the tanks throughout the war.
Possibly, it was due to their constant running, but certainly due
to the care of the crew.
d.
26
Cavalry with these inherent setbacks fought bravely and with dedication.
Being an integral regiment of an infantry div, sqns were deployed mostly
in
direct support of
infantry. They provided this support effectively with their sweat and
blood. To start with, A Sqn to 66 Bde, B Sqn to 20 Bde and C Sqn to 111
Bde. Later, change in groupings took place from time to time.
In Nadala enclave a troop ex B Sqn commanded by Capt Naeem Amjad
did an excellent job. In almost every operation RHQ was assigned
a task to perform with M36B2 Sqn and some infantry elements placed
under command. Following statistics will show the gallantry and commitment
with which this Regiment fought:-
(1) Operational Awards:? SJs (Shaheeds)?2
(Captains Hassan Zaheer, Bangash)
TJs (one Shaheed)
2
Imtiazi Sanads
5
(Captain Naeem Amjad)
(2) Shaheeds:? Officers = 3,
JCOS=1, ORs incl LAD = 20
(3) Wounded:? Officers= 3, JCOs= 2, Ors incl LAD=
12
(4) Enemy losses to the credit of 26 Cav: 3 x SU-7s
fighter aircraft, 4 x Tanks, 8 x RRs.
5 x Tanks captured in running condition.
(5) Own losses: 8 tanks hit, 4 were repaired. All
Ranks Shaheed and
Wounded 41.
e. I would like to record my commendation for the
brave performance of Lt Col Rashid CO 4 Punjab and Maj Khadim Changezi of
11 Cavalry in the gallant and successful attack by 4 Punjab supported by a
troop of 11 Cavalry, on Mandiala North and capture of its northern half. I
along with 'R' Group of 4 AK Bde was a witness to this operation on the
afternoon of first day 4 Dec.
f.
The
Ad-Hoc Squadron, 7x M 36B2s, was deployed on the front line
at Tawi
on the
first night to provide direct fire support to 4 AK
Bns in their assault
across
Tawi, Phase II
of the Div Operations. Move of these ?tanks? from rear
area to the front at night was a fete. The RHQ tanks of 26 Cavalry
also took
part in this fire
support. A
fire
fight raged with Indian tanks (T-55s and T-54Bs) for good
two hours at first light
on
the second day. The gunners of M36B2s were personally shown the targets by
me and Maj Haq because their
IC
systems were not working.
The
fact that
they actually engaged the enemy
tanks with fire was really remarkable. The crew were recalled
Reservists,
some of
them
in their civilian clothes.
g. An interesting event. I was called by GOC in
Division HQ at Padhar,
on the
morning of the day Chamb town was captured (possibly 6 or 7 Dec).
He had
written an Operations
Order in his handwriting. He made me read it, and
ordered me that I should take his helicopter, locate and meet
personally
Commanders 2
Armoured Brigade and
111
Brigade (Brig Abdullah Malik) who had joined the Division the same day
GOCs orders were to the
effect
that 111 Brigade
should
launch an attack across Tawi by about 1400 or
1500 hours, establish
Bridge
head for 2 IAB to pass through and commence
offensive towards Jaurian and Akhnoor. It was about 0900 hours. The
enemy
had been pushed back
across Tawi,
111 Brigade
along Road Koel ? Chamb
were
in
the process of
consolidating in line of Chamb; Elements of 2
Independent Armoured Brigade were also moving towards Chamb from
the
south from the direction
of Chak Pandit. I took off and managed to locate
Brigadier Abdullah Malik who was moving on his jeep on road
Moel-Chamb. He read and remarked ?Bhai men ne to abhi
command sambhali nahin hai?. I took off, after crossing Phagla
Ridge I had
bird eye view of
the fire fight
across Tawi. I
managed to locate Brigade HQ of 2 Independent Armoured Brigade, landed
close to it, saw the BM, Major Rehman Jarral who told me that
his Commander was
located
in Chamb Rest House. I borrowed a
jeep
from
him and drove to the
Rest House, and conveyed GOCs order to Brigadier
Sardar. He was not happy
about
these orders, for good reasons. Having seen
the situation on ground, I
also
felt that time was too short for launching of the intended Operation. On
return, I reported the same to GOC.
h.
General Iftikhar Janjua worked exceedingly hard, and
prepared and motivated his force for the very important task
assigned to him ? capture of
Akhnoor.
In the process he laid down his life, in a helicopter crash near the front
line. I
had the opportunity
of seeing him many times during the conduct of war. The
last time I saw him was in Chamb Rest House, night
before his fateful crash. I
was
the first one to arrive for the ?O? Group he had summoned. The burden
of
responsibility for having
not been able to cross Tawi yet, was writ large on his
face. It is a pity that 23 Division Group could not achieve its
mission. It did
capture the Chamb Salient but could not cross Tawi, having
made three or
four practical
attempts.
This operation has been thoroughly discussed in Army
from many angles. In my opinion, based on what I saw and experienced, one
of the main reasons for not having been able to achieve the mission
was launching (or hurling) troops in battle without sufficient
preparations, in other words, the effort to achieve SPEED actually turned
into HASTE. The launch of 4 AK Bde across Tawi in the later part of ni 4/5
Dec is a clear example. Home bank of Tawi had not been secured and enemy
was holding on to Mandiala South and part of Mandiala North. This was
personally seen by the R Gp of 4 AK Bde from the
very front line at Mandiala North which had just been taken
by 4 Punjab. The
time was
about 1600 hrs. Brig Ahmad Jamal and each one of us evaluated this
situation. We also knew that the troops who were way behind
would not be
able to
build
up in time for the
attack. It was suggested to the GOC to
postpone the attack to the next day. He did not agree. What was
feared
happened. One of the two
battalions of 4 AK could not reach FUP. 13 AK did, they assaulted
without even their company commanders having had the
opportunity of seeing their
objectives. The brigade attack did not succeed. The
balance of the main force
of
the Division was lost. It took some time before it could be regained
Among the preparations of war, I had made
arrangements for the dispatch of
bodies
of our Shaheeds to their homes, as most of them belonged to the
adjoining areas. Wooden boxes had been prepared and
kept in A-2/B Echelon.
The RM
performed this function successfully. After the war, I paid a visit to
the family of each one of our Shaheeds.
In 1971 War, Tanks Troops were commanded by officers.
Their performance was excellent, a distinct improvement to 1965 War
performance when these
were
commanded by JCOs
There were very touching moments that I experienced.
The news of fall of
Dhaka and
separation of East Pakistan was devastating. I almost cried and was
morose for quite some time. ALD Akram was my batman
before war. He was
a very
fine individual
and
was like member of our family. He embraced
Shahadat. I was
grieved,
a bit more for him than others. After the
war, his
uncle came to
collect his body. I conveyed my condolence to him and asked him to convey
my sympathies to his mother. He replied, ?SAHAB, US NOON APNE PUTTER DE
SHAHEED HONEY
DA
ITNA GHAM NAIN JITNA EAST PAKISTAN DE ALEHDA HONEY DA HOYA AYE ?
(She,
the mother, is
more grieved for
the
separation of
East Pakistan
than the Shahadat of her son). In
my
heart I saluted to the AZMAT
of
this uneducated
?lady? from
this
small village of Sangoi in Jhelum Distt.
Please tell us something about your service
profile from 1971 till 1977 ?
In July 1972 I was posted from 26 Cavalry to command
the
Probyn's Horse. Took over
the Regiment at Bahawalnagar. I think I was the first non-Probynite to
command the Regiment since Independence. I had no problem because of this
situation. The Regiment has rich history and traditions, and has a
character of its own. All Ranks were of high standard. I had the pleasure
of working with a fine set of officers, namely Maj (later Brig) Hifz ur
Rehman 21C; Maj (later Maj Gen) Saeed uz Zaman Janjua HQ Sqn; Maj (later
Lt Col) Maqsood Ali Khan, OC A Sqn; Capt (later Lt Gen) S.M. Amjad, OC B
Sqn ; Capt (later Senator) Mukhtar, OC C Sqn; Capt (later Diplomat) Tariq
Azizuddin, Adjutant.
During
my
command Regiment remained in forward areas and returned to peace location
in Multan Cantt in the beginning of 1973. Training activities, especially
firing and Troop/Squadron exercises at the new Tamewali Ranges
were main activities.
I was
promoted to the rank of Colonel in June 1973 and appointed Col Staff 1
Armoured Division at Multan; GOC Maj Gen M Zia ul Haq. Gen
Zia and I knew each other very well, being from same
Regiment. After my commission when I
joined The Guides Cavalry FF, I was posted to B Sqn, commanded
by then Capt M. Zia ul Haq. Apart from normal peace time activity 1
Armd Div provided aid to civil power in very serious flood calamity of
1973 in which almost the
whole
Div was deployed. Another noteworthy event for me personally was attending
a CENTO Seminar held at Ankara, Turkey in early 1974. I had the
pleasure of
Col (later Lt
Gen) Shamim
Ahmed Khan's
company at this Seminar. Lt
Gen
Akbar was
Pakistan?s
Permanent
Representative with
CENTO HQs. The experience was illuminating.
I was Promoted Brigadier in June 1974 and appointed
Commander 9 Armd Brigade in 6 Armd Div at Kharian. GOC was Maj Gen S.
Wajahat Hussain, Guides Cavalry. Colonel Shaikh Nusratullah was Col Staff.
Everyone knew each other well. Apart from normal training activities two
events deserve mention. First, Installation of Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the
then Prime Minister of Pakistan, as Colonel-in-Chief of Armoured Corps. A
fairly controversial decision, the ceremonies of which were conducted,
unfortunately, in equally controversial manner. I was lucky that my
Brigade was not involved in various social and
ceremonial events. It was given the task of arranging
live Fire Power Demonstration at Tilla Ranges in the context of an
attack by an Armoured Regiment, supported by Artillery, Infantry and Air.
Mr Bhutto was given the opportunity
to
fire a Tank gun.
The second event was task of flood relief in area
between Tarbela Dam and Attock Bridge. Full Brigade was moved into the
area with Engineer support. One may recall that a couple of water tunnels
of Tarbela
Dam developed
serious faults in 1974 or 1975. There was a fear that, as a result, the
Dam itself may burst, letting loose an avalanche of water which will sweep
everything in its way. With the help of Dam Engineers various
eventualities were forecast and plans made to provide flood relief in
each. One dreadful eventuality was that the rush of water will be very
massive. The narrow width at Attock Bridge will create a devastating force
which will completely sweep the bridge. Thank ALLAH, the Dam did not
burst. Towards later part of my tenure, Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Fazle Haq
took over command of 6 Armd Div, another Guides Officer.
In July 1975 I was selected to do National Defence
Course at NDC Rawalpindi. This one year was very educative. Got a
chance to
listen to very
eminent speakers on practically all national affairs. It also provided a
chance to inter-act with student colleagues from Air Force, Navy and civil
services. I must say the environment created in the NDC was very conducive
for such studies. In his lecture,
Mr
Agha Shahi, the then Foreign Secretary,
was interrupted, during his lecture
by a tele message, that Shaikh Mujib ur Rehman, Prime Minister of
Bangladesh, had been assassinated. It is a coincident that Lt Col Farooq,
who allegedly had taken part in this action was a young fellow in Cherat
when I was posted
in second
tenure.
His father, Maj Rahman, was OC CMH. We had good family
relations with them. Farooq was
commissioned
from PMA and joined 13 Lancers, I think, when my dear friend late Rana
Abbas was CO.
Now back to NDC.
Most interesting part of this course were visits to
Provincial Governments and major industrial outfits in Pakistan,
and visit to foreign countries. I was
put in the Group which went to China. This was most interesting
visit inspite of
the fact
that Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution was in progress.
After NDC course I was posted to command 3 Indp
Armoured Brigade Group in Lahore, part of 4 Corps, then commanded by Lt
Gen Iqbal, another Guides, Infantry. The command of 3 IAB Gp was a bit of
honour; when I joined Guides in 1953, it was part of this Brigade, the
only armoured formation in Army at that time. In my tenure of less than a
year there were two noteworthy activities. First, Brigade Exercise with
Troops in area Cholistan. This was at the end of a comprehensive Sqn/Regt
outdoor training and tank firing. The second activity was non-military. I
was ex-officio Vice President Lahore Defence Housing Society. It was in
serious trouble in those days. MSIRs were full of complaints that officers
had paid money for the plots, no allotments had been made. Main hindrance
was litigation with the owners of various bits of land. We were able to
overcome this litigation, also got land from the Army, and had proper town
planning carried out by a professional firm. They also chalked out plots
in various Blocks. When this Town Planning was presented to the Corps
Commander, he was not happy on three counts. Firstly, lot of land had been
wasted in keeping the width of the main approach road to 200 ft. Secondly,
money spent in Town Planning was a bit of waste. Thirdly, without this
elaborate town planning the number of plots would have been more. It took
quite an effort on the part of Town Planner and us, to justify what had
been done. Fortunately, it could not be reversed. Thanks to the
professional town planning done at that time Lahore Defence Society is a
housing scheme without serious problems for its inhabitants.
You made an observation that the act of making Mr
Bhutto as Colonel in Chief of Armoured Corps was controversial. If it was
so why in your opinion was it done?
I think it was intended to seek his attention and
support for the betterment of the Armoured Corps. A legitimate purpose.
Personally I was not in favour of adopting such means to achieve
legitimate ends.
You also served as Director General Coast Guard.
How was this experience?
This was
a surprise posting because I had no experience of having served in a Civil
Armed Force. This Force had recently been raised (1973) by Brig Sajjad,
who had done a fine job of establishing its infrastructure at the HQs and
in its area of responsibility. This covered
the entire Coast of
Pakistan
to a depth of about 30 miles, including Road Uthal-Turbat- Mand.
Accommodation for Headquarters, Officers/ORs, Officer Mess at Karachi, and
for posts at Pasni, Jiwani and Gwadar are note-worthy. Two battalions, an
Intelligence Section, Marine Company (Indigenous wooden boats, two small
hovercrafts) and
normal
logistic support troops was the composition of the Force. A Deputy
Collector of Customs was also posted in the HQs. Officers were posted on
secondment
from the Army
and JCOs/ORs were recruited directly. As the area of operation was
extended and with little road communication one helicopter was also
provided. Apart from the security of the coast line, the principle
function of Coast Guard was anti-smuggling. For day to day functioning as
a Civil Armed Forces, Coast Guards was under Ministry of Interior. For
operational role it was to come under command 5 Corps.
For the performance of their
anti-smuggling functions the officers of Coast Guards
were given necessary Police/Customs Powers. ie powers to raid,
search and seize allegedly smuggled goods, arrest alleged smugglers, their
prosecution, and confiscation of seized goods after due process under the
Customs Act. The general pattern of activity was: receipt of information
through Informer, (who, mostly were smugglers themselves)
raid and search; seizure of goods, arrest of smugglers (rather
infrequent) lodging of
F.I.R
(each post of Coast Guard was a Police Station for anti smuggling
functions) confiscation
of
smuggled goods by the Deputy Collector of Customs followed by their
disposal
under the rules.
Reward Money, for which allocation was made in the annual budget of Coast
Guards, was given proportionately to the seizing party, the Informer and
to the Welfare Fund of Coast Guard. The achievements of battalions and
indeed of Coast Guard, was measured in the worth of smuggled good seized.
Few interesting and major anti-smuggling cases, that
I recollect
are:-
a. Seizure and confiscation of one launch full of
liquor.
b. Capture of launches off and on, full of goods ?
cloth, electronic items, sometime
vehicles.
Noteworthy were two very big launches, the worth of goods, at
that time, was approximately Rs Three Crores.
c. Various quantities of
Narcotics off and on.
d. One ship at Gadani, imported for breaking was
seized and confiscated by Coast Guard, for having violated customs law.
This was before my taking over. The owner's appeal was pending in Sind
High Court. A period of two to three years had passed. The ship was being
eaten up due to rust and a detachment of Coast Guards personnel was tied
up. High Court had accepted our plea that the ship be auctioned and
proceeds be kept under its control for disposal in accordance with the
final
decision. In the first
attempt by the Nazir of the High Court the highest bid came to
Rs 28 lacs. Coast Guards objected and were allowed to auction the
ship. The highest bid came to Rs 78 lacs, close to the market price. The
decaying ship was disposed of.
Some of the improvements introduced:-
a. Coast Guards needed additional manpower resources,
vehicles and high speed
boats.
We got one additional battalion, two Italian built high speed, armed
boats, some vehicles, wireless equipment and heavy infantry weapons. The
additional battalion was assigned part of Baluchistan with HQ at
Uthal.
b. On disbandment of FSF (Federal Security Force)
their assets were distributed among all the Civil Armed Forces. Coast
Guards got approximately 500 men
and
their land at Korangi, 75 acres.
c. Permanent accommodation were built for posts on
Pak-Iran border, at Gwadar,
Ormara,
Uthal for Bn HQ, and at
Korangi
for Bn HQ.
d. The seized/confiscated vehicles ? cars, jeeps,
wagons, trucks ? were stored in
the open, exposed to weather causing serious deterioration. To me
it was a national wastage. If it was to be confiscated, state loss, if
not, loss to the individual Pakistani. We got garages built for such
vehicles and arrangements made for their
regular maintenance.
e. In litigation of major cases the accused
party would engage very senior lawyers
because they could afford to pay their heavy fee. Coast Guards,
usually were represented by the Legal Adviser which was a great
handicap. We
started to
engage lawyers of matching ability and status. This proved to be more
effective and cost effective.
Relations with Pakistan Navy:--
On raising of Coast Guards in 1973 as an Army
force, Pakistan Navy were very sore, for good reason. All over the
world Coast Guards are Naval outfits. On taking over in 1977. I decided to
try and establish working relationship with Navy. With kindness of Admiral
Sharif, CNS, relationship improved. We were honoured to have a visit from
him. We were able to get two regular naval officers (Lt Cdrs) seconded to
Coast Guards, one to command Marine Company and the other, to provide
technical support. The Navy also agreed to provide maintenance and repair
facilities to the high speed boats. Rear Admiral (later Admiral) Niazi
decided to build a make-shift jetty on self-help basis at Gwadar for Naval
Gun Boats. Coast Guards actively helped in building this jetty. Throughout
my tenure, we had very good relation with Pakistan Navy.
It was necessary to have cordial relations with Sindh
and Baluchistan Provincial Governments, as we were operating
in these two provinces. There were usual complaints by residents,
of harassment by Coast Guards personnel. Some were genuine and some not.
This was a real problem but, luckily did not attain serious proportions.
Relations with Customs also remained cordial. Frankly, one reason was
Martial Law declared in July 1977.
Coast Guards made a major contribution for the
re-start of the noble game of Polo in Karachi. After shifting of Pakistan
Bodyguards to Rawalpindi, Polo in Karachi had almost died down. It was
being played once or twice a week 2/3 a side. It was kept alive by the
keenness and resilience of Brig Hesky Baig; Cols Nasrullah, Irshad Rashid,
M.A.R.Beg (my inspiring elders) the young blood, Mr Naeem Malik, Mr Javed
Rizvi, and the Karachi Police led by Mr Salim Vahidy and Mr Babar Khatak
with their staff. With
the
entry of redoubtable Jaja Mian, the great trainer of youngsters in riding
and Polo, stage was set to revive this game. Coast Guards were willing and
able to provide the logistic support and additional players with horses.
Army Remounts Detachment also chipped in. The dusty polo ground inside the
old Race Course behind
Cantt Railway Station was prepared and maintained to
the extent possible for the daily polo games. Karachi Polo Club was
revived.
Brig A.S. Nasir and
Brig Jafar from Malir also participated regularly. Soon, this club started
to have a weekly sponsored match over the week-ends which became a regular
social event in Karachi. At one time Karachi Polo Club had highest number
of playing members, possibly second only to Lahore Polo Club. Karachi has
an advantage; due to mild weather the game can be played
throughout the year, unlike
other
cities in the north where it is
played
only in winter. With the efforts of everyone involved polo flourished in
Karachi for about ten years. More on Polo later.
I had a very unhappy and discouraging experience
during my command of Pakistan Coast Guards. Its anti-smuggling operations
described above exposed its personnel, to corruption. It was very easy to
let go smuggled consignments, in part
or the whole, for consideration of money. The smugglers are very
adept at making such
arrangements
with the personnel of all anti-smuggling agencies. I was aware of this
malady and hazard on taking over command, and was quite concerned
about it. To curb this problem I relied basically on the chain of
command, COs, Company
Commanders and so on; also on the intelligence resources
available in the Force. After a few months I started to receive reports
that Coast Guard personnel were
involved.
I would discuss this problem with COs and staff officers at HQs
very
frequently. They
generally sounded quite confident that their officers
and men
were not
involved in these corrupt practices, at least to the extent reported,
conceding
that there may be few ?black sheep? indulging in minor
cases. They also conveyed
that
the ?enemies? of Coast Guards, mainly smugglers, some
members of district/provincial governments and to some extent,
other anti-smuggling agencies, could be
spreading these rumours to bring
bad name to our Force, especially the Army Officers. A very likely
reason in the days of Martial Law. Used to a very
honest, and
honourable
professional dealings within the chain of
command of the
Army, I
also
felt loyalty to my
subordinates to protect the honour of
the honest. However, I remained concerned and vigilant
about this malady. Meanwhile, I receive a report to the effect that
a
launch full smuggled
goods was likely to land in a particular area and an officer of
Coast Guard was expected to help
in safe passage of its goods, instead of seizing
them. I decided to ascertain this information by personally
conducting an operation.
It
all came to be
true, I did
find
an officer red handed. He was put under arrest. What followed
next is a long story.
Suffice
it to say that as a result of the unprecedented action that I took,
involvement of a large number of officers, JCOs and ORs was established.
Disciplinary action
was
taken in
which approximately 18 officers and about 35
JCOs and ORs were either dismissed, or retired with fault or
otherwise. This action shook the Force which helped in re-juvinating it.
GHQ posted better category of officers. The effect of
this action lasted for quite some time, NOT for ever!!
This episode was very painful for me personally. I
had to take action which resulted
in
severe punishment to officers, whom I had considered to be ?my
officers?, in the usual Army tradition. Secondly,
in the process, my personal honour was likely to be tarnished by
an unwise, to say the least, action by Army High Command. I fought
back and with Allah's grace, I
managed
to save my honour and dignity. I may also mention that on imposition of
Martial Law in July 1977, the ML Authorities entrusted few
inquiries to me involving some dignitaries. I had very sensible and
able assistance from Cdr (later Vice Adm) Khalid Mir. The inquiries
pertained to Mid East Hospital, Begum Husna Shaikh and allotment of
railway land for construction of a 5-Star Hotel near Clifton Bridge. It
was alleged that undue and large scale favours had been done to certain
dignitaries by the PPP Government in violation of rules. The inquiries
were conducted as judiciously as possible and submitted to ML Authorities
for actions deemed fit.
We understand that you played a long innings in
the PIA. How was this stint?
After completing four years as DG Coast Guards, I was
posted to PIA on secondment as Director Administration. I served in PIA
physically until Oct 1989 and
on
paper until Oct 1990. My first five years with PIA were on secondment
until Oct 1985 when I retired from the Army. Subsequent 5 years were on
contract.
After watching
the
performance of PIA for about three years (1977-1980) the ML High Command
had reached the conclusion that PIA, the National Carrier, was in a Mess
and extraordinary measures were required to retrieve it. These measures
included change of PIA top management and to provide the Corporation
necessary
means and support
to be able to run the airline efficiently. I was posted as part of the new
management. This was another new and challenging job which required a
great deal of hard work, patience and ingenuity. It was rather a heavy
burden. Apart from
running/supervising
the complex administration of PIA in Pakistan and aboard, I was expected
to implement the policy of removing
from
service the employees who were not only unproductive but also trouble
makers and who had really hamstrung the PIA management. This was
considered necessary to enable the management to run the Airline on
corporate lines. A very
unpleasant
but very responsible job. I was all the time concerned
that an innocent
person should not be affected. It was not possible for me, or
for that matter for anyone, to perform these unusual, and usual corporate
tasks without cooperation of PIA employees. I soon discovered that bulk of
the PIA employees were dedicated professionals. The trouble makers were
not in large number. I was able to establish necessary rapport with PIA
Directors and down to a loader which
helped a great deal.
When I joined PIA in March 1981, the hijacking
episode of its aircraft was in progress. The aircraft was at Kabul Airport
under the control of the hijackers. I recall that Capt Qazi, Director
Flight Operations PIA, did an excellent job of negotiating with the
hijackers and contribute a great deal in resolving this tragic episode.
To start with, PIA administration was to be run under
its existing policies, rules and regulations. The Employees Associations
and Labour Unions were in existence and active. Interacting with them gave
me a chance to understand them. It did not take long for me to find that
the PIA administration was in serious disorder. It took me almost two
months to know the exact number of employees on the pay role of the
Airline. It came out to be
over
22,000 permanent and about 2,500 on daily wages. In addition, overtimes to
the tune of Rs two Crores was being disbursed per month. Personal records
were in disarray. Rules and Regulations were generally not followed in the
posting, transfer and promotion of employees. The process of disciplinary
proceedings was ineffective. Management and CBA/Associations either blamed
each other for this disorder or considered it to be good enough system of
working.
I found that the CBA did work for the welfare of
their electorate, the PIA employees, but had far exceeded their
role and functions assigned to them in the IRO 69, (Industrial Relations
Ordnance 1969). They interfered in recruitment, postings, transfers and
even promotions of not only the unionized staff but also in case of
officers. A very limited number were excused duty for the performance of
their CBA functions. The number who actually did not perform their duties
was in hundreds. They acquired excessive facilities. They did not hesitate
to use physical violence against officers, even to the rank of General
Managers, if they did not conform to their wishes. No disciplinary action
was taken against culprits. I made a number of attempts to advise CBA to
conform to their functions and privileges as given in the IRO 69. I
offered assurance that I will establish mechanism, and shall personally
see that
legitimate
grievances of employees are removed. This was of no avail. I did make one
thing very clear that physical violence against officers, or any other
employee, will not be tolerated. In case of any such occurrence, due
disciplinary action will be taken.
Another disturbing discovery was existence of
unhealthy
groupings and
tussle on ethnic and provincial lines as well as between major
professional entities i.e. Pilots, Engineers, Marketing and Traffic etc.
It was also very clear that political interference in
the running of the Airline had been rampant, either directly or through
the Unions. With over 22,000 permanent employees and 2,500 Daily Wagers,
the Airline was grossly overstaffed in the light of various standards
usually followed in the airline industry. Each department had more
employees than the work load. In addition, a number of activities such as
Janitorial Services, Canteens, Motor Transport etc, which are normally
hired, were performed by engaging permanent employees.
After lengthy deliberations Government finally
decided to impose Martial Law Regulation 52 in June 1981. Under the
Regulation, all Associations and Unions were banned. Mechanism was
provided to take expeditious disciplinary action against the employees who
had indulged in malpractices or violation of rules and regulations. It was
also provided to dispense with the services of employees, no longer
required by the Airline. Tough measures indeed. Every effort was made to
implement them judiciously. There was marked effect on the performance of
employees soon after the imposition of MLR 52. Daily
attendance went up from about 60% to 95%, the staff performed their
individual functions well and the supervisors became effective. Although
it was being propagated that if Associations and Unions were
banned, the Airline will be brought to stand still. Nothing of the
sort happened. Efficiency of the Airline and service to passenger improved
a great deal. After about six months of imposition of MLR 52 a survey
indicated (1) Reduction of
Permanent
Staff strength from 22,000 to approximately 18,000; Daily Wagers
from 2,500 to about 200. (2) Reduction of Overtime from Rs 2 Crores
to about Rs 20 Lacs per month. (3) Increase of employees
productivity by about 10% (4) Incidence of malpractices dropped.
MLR 52 provided for action against those whose
service were not required, in three ways. Firstly, those whose functions
had been eliminated and contracted
out.
These were Janitorial Services and Canteens. Such employees were given
compensation. Approximately 820 were retired under this category.
Secondly, those who were found to be disciplinary cases. These
individuals were issued
show-cause
notices, their replies were processed and considered
and verdict in each case was given by the Chairman. Approximately
267 went out under this provision.
Thirdly,
those employees who were unproductive, allegedly trouble makers, or
indulged in malpractices. Approximately 975 went out in this category. A
total of
approx 2,062
employees were sent out; NOT thousands, as was propagated in those days.
Great and meticulous care was taken to decide such cases. Lists were
provided by Departments, which were fairly long. The Intelligence
Agencies, provided their Lists. A criteria was formulated; each individual
was examined in the light of the criteria. His service record was seen
(this, I might mention, was not much help because of lack of its
credibility). His case was discussed with his Manager, General Manager and
Director. In case of any doubt the name was deleted. Final prooning was
done by a Committee in Ministry of Defence, headed by the Joint Secretary,
it included Director Administration PIA, a Director each from ISI and IB.
This Committee made recommendation to the Chairman, who after due
consideration gave the approval for dispensation of services of the
employee, a loader or a General Manager.
Disciplinary action against a top office-bearer of
CBA, before imposition of
MLR
52. A test case. He committed physical violence against a Manager in his
office whose
tooth was
broken. This was done after the advice and warning given specifically
against such crime. It took a long time and effort, but this employee was
eventually dismissed from service under PIA rules and awarded one
year R.I. by a Summary Military Court. It was unheard of that disciplinary
action could be taken
against
a paltry functionary member of Union, to take action
against a top office- bearer
of
CBA was inconceivable. To my absolute dismay this individual was
re-instated by HQ MLA at Karachi. I took up case with CMLA HQ and had the
re-instatement cancelled. This one action by the management put an end to
the abhorrent practice of physical violence against officers. By the way
this individual visited me at my house before and after his conviction. We
had tea together.
In performance of my functions as Director
Administration and in implementation of MLR 52, I received inspiring
support and guidance from Maj Gen (Retd) A Rahim Khan, Chairman PIA and
Secretary General Defence. He was like a rock and protected us against
interference from Government High Ups. Aviation
Division of Ministry headed by Mr Aitezaz uddin Ahmad (later
Federal Secretary) provided full cooperation. I also received full support
and guidance
from Mr M.M.
Saleem MD.
Similarly, the
higher management of PIA was equally supportive. Col Hatim Zaidi, Col
Mirza, Col Zaka and Gp Capt
Shah,
who had also been posted on secondment, provided valuable assistance. As I
have said I received full cooperation from all the PIA staff, mention must
be made of Mr Mehmood Alam GM Legal, Mr Ali Hasan GM (P), Mr Farooq Raja
Manager (IR).
Normalcy was restored after implementation of MLR-52.
The Board of
Directors and
the Management of PIA went about in earnest to restore PIA's financial
health, improve service to passengers and to look after the welfare of the
employees. Maj Gen Rahim called the Board meeting every month so that
major corporate matters were attended to expeditiously. PIA Management
worked smoothly and was responsive to the needs and demands of passengers.
Some of the interesting events:-
a. Engagement of
foreign consultants, Booz Allen and Hamilton, to seek their
expert advice on two
major
issues. Firstly, Corporate Structure of the Airline.
Secondly, Route Structure for PIA. Their recommendations on
Corporate Structure were implemented with some modifications. With regard
to Route
Structure, in a
nutshell, they
recommended
that PIA be made into a regional
airline. The PIA Management vehemently disagreed. Consultants
recommendations were not implemented. After this whole exercise I
was of
the view that what Consultants performed
at
a cost
could have been done in-house.
b. A small number of armed forces officers were
inducted into the airline. This caused resentment. Most of the inductions
were into Departments where armed forces
officers could genuinely contribute, like administration, security
services, aircraft stores (Air Force). But, unfortunately, one induction
of an Air Cdre
as GM in
New York did a great deal of damage to the credibility of ML Regime.
c. Air Marshal Viqar Azim was appointed MD in the
beginning of 1982, until 1986. A very energetic and imaginative officer.
One of his first passions was
to
introduce computerization in the Airline, long overdue requirement which
he successfully achieved. Unfortunately his energy and zeal got dissipated
because he could not establish healthy working relationship with Chairman,
as well as with most of his Directors. Like an excellent pilot one got the
impression that he attempted to run the airline like
a
fighter aircraft. It
is a pity that a number of controversies arose during his
tenure which eventually landed him in trouble.
d. Air Marshal M.A.Daudpota took over in 1986. A
perfect gentleman and a pleasant person. He received
everyone
in his office
by standing up, as a mark of respect for him. A very unusual but a
fine gesture. On the whole he
ran the Airline well. It was during his tenure that PPP Government
was installed at the Centre (1988). The actions taken by ML Regime were
undone
with vengeance. All
the employees who had been removed under MLR-52
were re-instated, most of them with back benefits. To my mind it
was a reckless and a very unwise action. It may have achieved a political
gain but
laid down the
grounds for deterioration and
wrecking
of the Airline, which, eventually it did. If the Government felt that
injustice was done to these
individuals,
their cases could have been reviewed judiciously and final
decision taken. The responsible people of the Airline had commented
all
along that 5% to
10% of the removed individuals may be in gray areas, 90%
to 95% deserved to be removed because they were unproductive, were
trouble makers, indulged in various malpractices
and
even crimes.
e. Ordinarily my contract service with PIA was
expected to be terminated after the change of Government in 1988 but it
did not, possibly, thanks to some friends in the right place. In Oct 1989
I was sent on leave with pay and full benefits until the end of my
contract Oct 1990.
Although I had to work very hard in PIA and was
required to deal with some very complicated matters, I thoroughly enjoyed
my stay. Nine years service in the National Airline was very satisfying
and rewarding. I learnt a great deal. The handling of
complex
management
matters of this major Corporation was a great experience; so was
interaction with Federal Government, with foreign airlines, with
international organizations like IATA. I also got an opportunity to travel
extensively.
PIA was a great help to me and my family in dealing
with a medical crisis. In 1986 my daughter, Samira, age 15, had renal
failure. She needed kidney transplant. Medical facilities for transplant
in Pakistan in those days were rudimentary. PIA facilitated this treatment
abroad. By the grace of Allah, the transplant successfully took place at
Cromwell Hospital London, donor being her father.
With further grace of Allah, Samira completed her studies Matric
and F Sc in Pakistan, BA in USA. She worked for 3 years in an investment
management company in Karachi and converted to IT. Got married in 1999 to
Omer Masood. They have a lovely and extraordinarily friendly son Zaid, age
6 months. Allah be praised.
PIA has been the top supporter and developer of
sports in Pakistan, especially Cricket, Hockey and Squash. I introduced
Polo as well, at affordable cost. Horses, the major cost, were acquired
from the Army as boarders on payment of a yearly fee against the names of
Army officers serving in the Airline. Few Desi and inexpensive horses were
bought. In a short time PIA organized its own Polo team which participated
in various tournaments in the country, being National Champions twice. PIA
team also visited abroad and played friendly matches. Like other sports,
Polo contributed to the publicity of the Airline. One young colt, Sattar
Niazi, was developed into a 4 goal handicap player, the highest level
Pakistanis have been reaching for the last many years. One of the keen
Polo Players was Capt Siraj ul Malik
of
Chitral. With his
efforts PIA
team
played in Chitral against the
local teams under local game rules which really is ?free for
all?. This visit to Chitral was possibly the first of its kind. Polo
also made specific professional contributions during the following visits
abroad :- (1) PIA polo team visited Brunie twice, on the recommendation of
Pakistan Ambassador, Brig Mir Abad Hussain. We played few games in which
Prince Jeffry, younger brother of the Sultan,
participated. Brunie Airline was in his care. The Ambassador
arranged a meeting in which we both called on the Prince. As a result PIA
got business of training Brunie Airline technicians in Brunie as well as
in PIA Training Centre. (2) PIA polo team also visited Jordan and
played friendly matches in which H.R.H Prince Hasan Bin Talal, a keen polo
player, took part. This visit was utilized to make recovery of about USD 2
million from Royal Jordan Airline which was stuck up for a long time. Kind
intervention of H.R.H the Prince was a decisive factor. (3) PIA polo team
also visited China in 1983 during their October Festival at Hou Hot,
capital of
Inner Mongolia.
This was perhaps the first time a foreign polo team visited China. This
visit created great excitement in that region. As many as 10,000 people
came to
watch the final game.
The value of great publicity in China and contribution to the exemplary
friendly relationship of our two countries was very valuable. Raza Kuli
Khan, a well-known name in Pakistan polo accompanied us at his own
expense. Next year, PIA invited Chinese team to Pakistan. They played
matches in Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi. They were provided all the
courtesy by Polo Clubs in these cities.
In each foreign visit horses and local courtesy
was provided by the hosts requiring minimum PIA expenses.
Unfortunately there was negative reaction from a small section of Press,
and from some of the then legislators who asked questions on the floor of
the Senate. Their criticism being that PIA's sponsorship of
Polo was at great expense and it was meant for the pleasure of few
employees. All questions were duly answered. Those who played this game in
PIA deserve a mention. They were Capt Azhar Ali, Capt Sirajul Malik, a
Pilot, Capt Imran Aziz, another pilot, Mr Bony Bornshin and Sattar Niazi.
We also coopted Javed Mawaz and Aamir Noon, leading polo players at that
time, off and on to participate in tournaments of higher handicaps.
What were your impressions about General Zia as a
man and as a soldier?
As a man General Zia can be considered as close to
perfection. As a soldier better than Average. As Head of Government
unsuccessful.
What were the effects of Zia?s long one man rule
on the qualitative efficiency of the Pakistan Army?
I cannot really authoritatively comment on it because
during this period I was away from the Army and it has not been put to
test. However exposure to non-army activities of soldiers, however small
in numbers will have an adverse effect.
Please tell us about people who Persons who
influenced your development or you remember any noteworthy thing about
them?
My parents. My father, Khawaja Ghulam Yasin, was a
very decent gentleman. I got some of these qualities from him. My mother
gave me everything that a mother provides to her children. In addition. I
learnt from her patience, quiet courage and ability to withstand crises
and hardships with cheer and equanimity.
My Uncle Shaikh Abdul Hameed. In my young days he was
my ideal. I learnt from him values of life especially in context of Islam
and as conveyed by Allama Iqbal. He had great pleasure in entertaining
guests to delicious Kashmiri meals cooked by his wife, and to Mangoes. He
was a passionate mango connoisseur. During the season he maintained stock
of choicest qualities in different stages of ripeness. One would dispute
his knowledge on the subject of mangoes to his peril. Your Managing Editor
knows it very well.
Khawaja Ahmed Hasan Manto. A family elder. A Senior
Advocate of Rawalpindi who took active part in struggle for creation of
Pakistan. I made it point to spend some time with him in his office on
College Road in 50s whenever I came on leave. In 1956 when I was selected
for a course in USA I proudly informed him. He was happy but made a deep
remark to this effect. This American Military Aid is the second
unfortunate thing which has happened to our country. First one was Evacuee
property. Acquisitions without effort will breed corruption and take the
nation away from self- reliance. How right he was. Such patriotic wisdom
was available to us at that time. It is available to us even now. It is a
pity we have been unable to allow it to be effective.
Major Mahmood Kamal. A dear friend, from East
Pakistan. We served together in Guides and in SSG. His father was a senior
CSP officer. His marriage, to Rehana, daughter of Professor Mahmood Husain,
Vice Chancellor Raj Shahi University, was a manifestation of profound
nation-building feelings, in the two friends one Bengali and the other
non-Bengali. One factor in this marriage was that it will contribute
towards strengthening of bonds between the two wings of Pakistan. I think
recalling such instances is a poignant reminder that Pakistan?s nation
building is not yet strong enough.
Colonel Pir Abdullah Shah. A remarkable person in
many ways. Very well-known in Armoured Corps and in the Army. He was my CO
in Guides in 50s. I learnt a great deal from him especially in human
relationship and creating espirit-de-corps. He excelled in taking keen
interest in development of young officers and took care of them when in
trouble as a family elder. His patience and courage displayed on the
Shahadat of his son, Captain Husain Shah, was exemplary. He was very fond
of Zia ud Din Abbasi, and kept contact with his family to his last days.
Major
Zia ud Din Abbasi, Shaheed. My dear friend and a brother officer of Guides
Cavalry. He was a competent and a serious professional. A sensitive person
with all the fine qualities which goodness demands. His sense of humour
was characteristic and unmatched. Whatever be the company (of Senior or
Juniors) and whatever be the mood his remarks and conversation would
create his characteristic humour, and even hilarity. Those who knew him
yearned for his company. His unprintable TAKIA KALAM was inadvertently
acquired by most, including some seniors. He was equally good in humorous
writing. It is a joy to read the Newsletter written by him. Before 1965
War we both happened to be in Quetta. I was doing staff course, he was
posted as Instructor in Infantry School. The High event of that time was
his marriage in early part of the year. He got family accommodation. My
wife Farida and his wife Shakira happened to have been college-mates.
Farida helped him set up the house before arrival of Shakira. ZU was
looking forward to calm family life after a long bachelor?s life of
almost fourteen years. He had hardly started to taste it when Rann of
Kachh operation took place. He was posted to Guides Cavalry in Cone Area
Gujranwala. He had a few days leave in Karachi (or Quetta) before the
start of 1965 War and never returned.
Major General A.O.Mitha. He raised the Special
Service Group in 1957 and commanded it for about 6 years thereafter. The
infrastructure, the training concepts and standards he laid down have
served as a firm foundation for this Elite force. He focused on Physical
fitness development of initiative and unconventional approach for military
skills in All Ranks, especially officers. He was very successful in
creating the required espirit-de-corps and high mark of confidence in
every member of SSG. He read extensively and believed vehemently in simple
living and high ideals. I learnt a great deal from him.
Please tell us something about your post
retirement life and ties with the army ?
I remain in fairly close touch with all the elements
in the Army that I have been associated with. I try to attend all the
Reunions, Annual Days etc. It really gives me great and genuine pleasure.
In 1993 I was appointed Colonel of 26 Cavalry. A
singular honour for which I am grateful to the then officers serving in
the Regiment. Before me, this honour rightly belonged to Brig Akram
Hussain Syed, who raised this Regiment. He laid firm foundation and
established fine traditions.
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