This is a personal recall of Major (later Major General) C K Karumbaya, SM who had participated in India Pakistan 1971 war for liberation of Bangladesh.
A proud Moment
It was a proud moment for us when Maj Gen M S Barar, PVSM, the GOC presented a bottle of Scotch to the “5th Royals” (5th Maratha Light Infantry) which he had promised during the heat of the war. The occasion was the gala victory dinner for the officers of the “Red Eagle Division” (4th Mountain Division) at Jessore (in East Pakistan during 1971 Indo- Pak Bangladesh liberation war). Here is how we earned it.
Change of Command and Link Up
I took over the command of the “Fifth Royal” after our CO Col J P Trophy, VSM, was wounded at the battle of Elangi on 6th December 1971 and was evacuated. . Thereafter we were ordered to switch axis, link up with 41 Mountain Brigade at Jhenda and lead the advance of 4 Mt Div. The link-up was difficult as the bridges enroute has been destroyed by withdrawing Pak forces and the move had to be cross country.
I reached Jhenida at about 100 hours on 8 Dec 1971with B coy commanded by Maj P K Chatterjee, Vr C, D coy commanded by Maj Shri Ram Singh and A squadron less two troops of 45 Cavalry (PT 76 Tanks) commanded by Maj Batra. The rest of te Bn with a coy of 7 Punjab (SKOT APC’s) was trailing behind as APC’s had problems traversing swampy areas.
Mission with a bait
Jhenida was still being mopped up by troops of 41 Mt Bde when the commander Brig A H E Michigan, MVC, briefed me on tactical situation. Pak after loosing Jhenida was carrying out orderly withdrawal towards Magura which was 30 kms away where the HQ of Pak 57 Bde (Pak 9 Div) was located. Magura was a medium size town connected by a tarmac road. It was an important communication center. Brig Rajinder Nath our Bde Cdr (62 Mtn Bde) while ordering me to lead the advance of the brigade, instructed me to be cautious and take all precaution. Maj Gen M S Brar, who was also present during the briefing said halh in jest “Karumbaya, 50 (I) Para Bde is also advancing towards Magura from Jessore and if your Bn can secure it before them, I shall present you with a bottle of Scotch!” I was willing to take up this challenge because the morale of the Pak army was in their boots due to series of setbacks they had received earlier on. Our psychological advantage had to be fully exploited.
Calculated risk but unorthodox formation
I took a calculated risk. I decided to use 8 tanks at my disposal aggressively and unconventionally. I put them in a road formation with 100-159 yard intervals, made D company, R Gp and part of B Coy piggy-back and drive full speed towards Magura. I ordered other coys to follow with what evervehicles they could muster and the balance to march on foot and catch up. Maj Shri ram Singh was in the second tank with Sqn 2IC Capt Mehta and I was in the fourth tank with Maj Batra and the FCO of the medium regt. I instructed Maj Shri Ram to keep watching the area in front and engage suspected delaying positions with prophylactic fire while on the move. He was not to be bogged down dealing with small batches of enemy stranglers who would be taken care of by the follow-up troops. I kept a careful watch myself so that we don’t fall into a trap. As a commander, I realized that I should mix audacity with caution. The occasion called for more audacity.
Advance turns rout
The advance (or pursuit) commenced at 1300 hours and progress was very rapid. After covering 10 kms or so, I realized I should contact my Bgd Cdr to request him to send me the affiliated light regiment quickly forward and deploy (it), so as to support our anticipated attack on Magura. He promised to do so, but again advised me not to be rash and take all precautions. On the way we saw a group of stragglers running away from the main axis, but we pressed on relentlessly till we reached the outskirts of Magura at 1515 hrs. Infantry and tanks quickly got into assault formations and attacked. The enemy was taken completely by surprise. I was just as much surprised when II (2) corps commander, Lt Gen T N Raina, MVC, (later COAS) with GOC and Bde Cdr appeared on the scene to give us a pat on the back, but as the enemy started shelling us, they had to leave. In the shelling, our Arty OP was directly hit and all in his jeep were killed. To our great releief A and C Coys and SKOT APC’s (with their deadly machine gun fire) also arrived while we commenced the attack. The enemy was in total disarray ? they fled leaving behind their Bde OP Room complete with maps, kotes full of weapons, ammunition dump (about 300 truck loads) and ordinance stores intact. They had started to make preparations to blow up their ammunition dump with a 6 hour delay fuse which would have been devastating had we delayed. We had assumed that enemy did not know the presence of 4 Mtn Div and its ORBAT as we were inducted in great secrecy with 9 Mtn Div signs. However the enemy’s map markings showed complete details of our ORBAT and locations.
Pursuit continues till last light.
Not content, we of the “Fifth Royal” continued the pursuit the next day at first light. The PT-76 tanks and the APC’s had to be left behind after sometime because of the demolished bridges over sharp banks; but the Btn in true Patton style, continued the advance on foot at light infantry speed. We reached Kamarkhali Ferry area (Majai) on the banks of Madhumati River which was about 300 ft wide and 30 ft deep, at 1130 hrs. The tanks and APC’s caught up with us.
Preparation for river crossing
Pak troops had taken hasty defences on the east bank of the river. Thanks to our superb training, especially in crossing river obstacles, we did not consider it much of a hurdle. We sent patrols on either flanks to find a suitable crossing places and look for country boats. The patrol led by Nb Sub Ramachandra Jatap found a place ion north at Nakul, which I found the most suitable. We planned to cross and establish a bridgehead with the help of country boats and PT-76 tanks which could swim over water obstacles. The PT-7 had arrived by then.
Disappointment
However, to our great disappointment our Tanks (and armored cars) were withdrawn that night to reinforce 22 Rajput which had met with a setback at Khustia sector. We were ordered to firm in and not to cross the Madhumati River. Thus our long pursuit ended on the banks of Madhumati River. I felt than instead of pulling out troops from us, if the higher ups had only reinforced us and exploited our success, the II (2) Corps Ops would have been much more speedy and spectacular.
Secret of Speed
I hold the view that for any formation, unit or sub-unit to move fast in combat conditions, the commanders have to lead from the front and there should be equally strong men with sticks at the back to make the tail catch up with the head. We were lucky in having our Adjutant in Capt (later Col) S S Dhilon who ensured soldiers, ammunition and food moved up so that we never had to look back.
A war record?
I have turned the pages of the post-independence military history books in vain to find out whether any other Indian Army unit had carried as rapid pursuit operation as we had done. Perhaps circumstances were favorable to us, or the Scotch bottle promised by the GOC was too tempting for anyone to resist, but the fact remains that we in the “Fifth Royal” were proud of what we achieved.
The above is a excerpt from the book A “Royal Tribute” - A history of of the 5th Battalion, The Maratha Light Infantry, 1800 - 2005 by Major General (Retd) E D’Souza, PVSM.
By special arrangement for Frontier India Defence and Strategic News Service
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