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Contexts
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Technologies
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Counter-Force
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Source
Material
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The research currently being conducted into missile defence technology stretches the frontiers of scientific proof and engages in areas of political and scientific controversy. It also generates significant demands on public finances.
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Through our work in this field at CDISS, it is clear that the direction and extent of achievement and planning in this area has yet to percolate through to a broader cross-section of informed opinion from those relatively small communities in the U.S., UK and elsewhere in the West who are absorbed in this work. Consequently, we believe, neither the extent to which defences are catching up with the threat, nor what can be done to counterbalance the threat, are sufficiently understood.
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We recognise that missile defences are only one part of a spectrum of measures to counter the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles. These measures include political and diplomatic steps, arms control regimes (including the Missile Technology Control Regime - MTCR), military measures (threatened retaliation and pre-emptive strikes), interception and diversion, and passive defences. Thus we believe that it is now important to review the full range of missile defences that are currently available, as well as the additional defences that will be available in the next few years.
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Additional material for inclusion in this section is under preparation. See
In the Pipeline
for details.
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