From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Condition required for a semantic statement to be true
In
semantics
and
pragmatics
, a
truth condition
is the condition under which a
sentence
is
true
. For example, "It is snowing in
Nebraska
" is true precisely when it is snowing in Nebraska. Truth conditions of a sentence do not necessarily reflect current reality. They are merely the conditions under which the statement would be true.
[1]
More formally, a truth condition makes for the truth of a sentence in an
inductive definition
of truth (for details, see the
semantic theory of truth
). Understood this way, truth conditions are
theoretical entities
. To illustrate with an example: suppose that, in a particular truth theory
[2]
which is a theory of truth where truth is somehow made acceptable despite semantic terms as close as possible, the word "Nixon"
refers
to
Richard M. Nixon
, and "is alive" is associated with the
set
of currently living things. Then one way of representing the truth condition of "Nixon is alive" is as the
ordered pair
<Nixon, {x: x is alive}>. And we say that "Nixon is alive" is true if and only if the referent (or referent of) "Nixon" belongs to the set associated with "is alive", that is, if and only if Nixon is alive.
In semantics, the truth condition of a sentence is almost universally considered distinct from its
meaning
. The meaning of a sentence is conveyed if the truth conditions for the sentence are understood. Additionally, there are many sentences that are understood although their truth condition is
uncertain
. One popular argument for this view is that some sentences are
necessarily true
?that is, they are true whatever happens to obtain. All such sentences have the same truth conditions, but arguably do not thereby have the same meaning. Likewise, the sets {x: x is alive} and {x: x is alive and x is not a rock} are identical?they have precisely the same members?but presumably the sentences "Nixon is alive" and "Nixon is alive and is not a rock" have different meanings.
See also
[
edit
]
Notes and references
[
edit
]
- Iten, C. (2005). Linguistic meaning, truth conditions and relevance: The case of concessives. Basingstoke, Hampshire;New York;: Palgrave Macmillan.