The
Radio Reconnaissance Platoon
is a specially trained
Marine Corps Intelligence
element of a
United States Marine Corps
Radio Battalion
. A Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) was assigned as the tactical
signals intelligence
collection element for the
Marine Corps Special Operations Command, Detachment One
.
[1]
Regular RRTs also participate in SOC operations during
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
, or MEU(SOC), deployments.
Mission
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The mission of the Radio Reconnaissance Platoon is to conduct tactical
signals intelligence
and
electronic warfare
operations in support of the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) commander during advance force, pre-assault, and deep post-assault operations, as well as maritime special purpose operations.
The RRT is used when the use of conventionally-trained
radio battalion
elements is inappropriate or not feasible.
While deployed with a
MEU
(SOC)
, the Radio Reconnaissance Team is also a part of the
Maritime Special Purpose Force
(MSPF) as a unit of the
Reconnaissance & Surveillance Element
(MSPF). The MSPF is a sub-element of the
MEU(SOC)
, as a whole, and is responsible for performing specialized maritime missions. These missions include, but are not limited to:
Capabilities
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SIGINT
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- Foreign languages
- Morse Code
intercept (>20 GPM)
- Analysis and reporting
Training
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RRP begins with completion of
Army Airborne School
, which is followed by the
Basic Reconnaissance Course
,
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape
(SERE), and the Radio Reconnaissance Indoctrination Program.
[2]
Radio Reconnaissance Instruction Program
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The Radio Reconnaissance Instruction Program (RRIP) is the in-house technical training tool used by the RRP to ensure that its Marines are not only tactically proficient in basic reconnaissance skills but technically adept in their respective areas of expertise. The RRIP has a duration of several days that can be dynamically determined to suit the needs of the
platoon
and its deployment tempo. During the RRIP, an RRP candidate can expect very long and strenuous days. The RRIP culminates in a series of
field training exercises
(FTX's) from 24 to 72 hours in length.
Advanced training
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Advanced training may include:
Organization
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There are currently three
Radio Battalions
, two with their own RRPs. 1st Radio Battalion,
I Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF), is located at
Camp Pendleton
,
California
. 2nd Radio Battalion,
II MEF
, is located at
Camp Lejeune
,
North Carolina
.
[3]
Owing to a restructuring of the entire Radio Battalion organization, the former 1st Radio Battalion, with its RRP, moved from
Marine Corps Base Hawaii
in
K?ne?ohe Bay
to
Camp Pendleton
in October 2004. The RRP has since been reestablished in 3rd Radio Battalion, Kaneohe HI. The RRTs of 1st and 3rd Radio Battalions still deploy in support of
III MEF's
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit
Alpha and Bravo cycles based in
Okinawa
. 1st Radio Battalion also deploys RRT's in support of I MEF's rotating
11th
,
13th
and
15th Marine Expeditionary Units
.
A six-man Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT) is typically composed of a Team Leader (
Staff Sergeant
or
Sergeant
), Assistant Team Leader (Sergeant or
Corporal
),
Point Man
,
Navigator
,
Radio-Telegraph
Operator (RTO), and Assistant RTO.
History
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Lt. General Alfred M. Gray, Jr.
, Commanding General of
Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
(FMFLant) and future
Commandant of the Marine Corps
, and Lt. Col. Bill Keller, Commanding Officer of 2nd
Radio Battalion
,
FMFLant
, met at
Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point
in the spring of 1984 to welcome home the returning members of the 2nd
Radio Battalion
Detachment from
Beirut
,
Lebanon
. The
Marines
of 2nd
Radio Battalion
had conducted tactical
cryptologic
operations in support of the entire deployment of the
US peacekeeping force
in
Beirut
since the initial landings at
Beirut International Airport
.
During the wait,
Gray
and Keller were discussing the various problems faced by the
Radio Battalion
detachment. Both agreed that the most significant problem was the lack of a tactical
cryptologic
database available from national and theater assets prior to the
Marines
' landing in
Beirut
. Equally significant were the unconventional aspects of the communications networks used by the various factions in
Beirut
. Those that posed the greatest threat to the
Marines
did not abide by standard military communications procedures, nor did they follow set frequencies or
call signs
.
Because the detachment had received no intelligence from the
National Security Agency
prior to deployment, they were forced to start from scratch upon arrival in
Beirut
.
General Gray
wanted to integrate a
Force Reconnaissance
team with attached
Radio Battalion
cryptologists
, selected and trained for
terrestrial reconnaissance
and special operations. He directed Lt. Col. Keller to coordinate with
2nd Force Reconnaissance Company
to test this idea.
Keller coordinated with the Commanding Officer of
2nd Force Reconnaissance Company
, Maj. Joe Crockett. Their initial step was to attach a
Radio Battalion
Marine, equipped with an AN/GRR-8 receiver to a
Force Recon
Team during an exercise and see if he could keep up and do something worthwhile. The experiment did not go well, and the concept was tabled until that summer, when Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Gallina became Commanding Officer (CO) of 2nd
Radio Bn.
General Gray
discussed the idea with Gallina, who became a major proponent of the concept.
In December 1984,
Captain
E.L. Gillespie, a J2 SIGINT Operations Officer in
Joint Special Operations Command
, arrived at
Radio Battalion
to develop a concept of operations to integrate
Radio Battalion
Marines with
Force Recon
teams for independent advance force operations.
Captain Gillespie submitted a draft "Talking Paper" contending that integration with a four-man
Force Recon
team was not viable due to conflicting missions. He suggested that a separate six-man
Radio Bn
team be trained in selected airborne and seaborne insertion/extraction techniques, terrestrial reconnaissance, and survival skills.
The original mission statement for the team was, "To conduct limited
communications intelligence
and specified
electronic warfare
operations in support of Force Reconnaissance operations during advance force or special operations missions.
The initial list of titles for this proposed group was:
- Force Reconnaissance Support Team (FRST)
- Radio Search Team (RST)
- Signal Search Team (SST)
- Special Search Team (SST)
- Radio Research Team (RRT)
- Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT)
General Gray
got the list and personally circled the Radio Reconnaissance Team as the official name for the teams. He then directed the CO of
Radio Battalion
to screen, select, and train the required personnel to deploy two six-man RRT's for a
proof of concept
operational deployment during the advance force operational phase of Exercise Solid Shield-85.
He also ensured that the CO of
2nd Force Reconnaissance Company
would assist in the personnel selection, training and equipping, and that
II MEF's
Solid Shield-85 OPLANS, OPORDERS, and Annexes would adequately reflect the integration of the RRT.
Captain Gillespie was directed to immediately commence screening of 2nd
Radio Battalion
personnel. However, most
Radio Battalion
Marines did not share the officers' enthusiasm for the project. There was also resistance by Company Commanders, who did not want to allow their best Marines to be assigned to the task. With the exception of the
Senior non-commissioned officers
and
Sergeants
, the majority of the Marines provided to form the initial RRT's were "malcontents" waiting to be
discharged
.
At this time, Major Carrick insisted that all of the RRT candidates must go through the 2nd
Force Reconnaissance
Company
Indoctrination Process (Indoc)
. Carrick later admitted that the only reason that he insisted on this issue was that he felt that all or most of the
Radio Battalion
Marines would either quit or fail the
Indoc
and the project would be put to rest once and for all.
However, all of the RRT candidates passed the
Indoc
. Captain Gillespie later talked to the
Indoc
instructors, who indicated that they had done everything that they could think of to make the RRT Marines quit, but they wouldn't.
After the
Indoc
, one RRT was sent to
Army Airborne School
at
Fort Benning
,
Georgia
, while the other Marines prepared and trained for Solid Shield-85. The exercise went well, and by all accounts, the
Radio Reconnaissance
proof of concept
was an unqualified success.
In 1987,
1st Radio Battalion
at
MCB Hawaii
officially created a Radio Reconnaissance Platoon. Prior to 1987, the
battalion
had shied away from designating the unit as "Radio Reconnaissance" for fear of dividing vital resources and creating a separatist culture within the ranks of MEU(SOC) deploying
Radio Battalion
detachments. 1st RRP Marines trained with Alpha Company,
3rd Reconnaissance Battalion
in the initial stages and attended various multi-service schools to perfect their skills. During its first two years, 1st
Radio Battalion's
RRIP consisted of 4?6 months of training, formal schools, and exercises prior to a Marine achieving certification and being assigned to a team.
Between 1986 and 1989, RRT's were deployed as an element of the
Marine Expeditionary Unit
(
Special Operations Capable
)
Radio Battalion
Detachment assigned to each of the rotating
11th
,
13th
,
15th
,
22nd
,
24th
, and
26th MEU(SOC)
deployments.
Captain Gillespie was assigned as the officer in charge of the 2nd
Radio Battalion
Detachment, 24th MEU(SOC) in 1986, which was the first
Radio Battalion
detachment to conduct real-world operations during
Operation Earnest Will
(a
Kuwaiti
oil tanker
escort operation). The 24th MEU(SOC) RRT reinforced by members of 1st RRP with specific linguist skills, was involved in significant cryptologic operations in the
Persian Gulf
and provided intelligence support for several
combat actions against
Iranian forces
, including the seizure of the Iranian mine-laying vessel,
Iran Ajr
and the
incident at Middle Shoals Light
. Other RRT personnel were involved in actions in
Panama
leading to and during
Operation Just Cause
, the invasion of
Panama
.
In the
Pacific
Theater, the first certified RRT to participate in real-world operations deployed in 1988?89 as part of the 13th MEU(SOC)
Radio Battalion
Detachment commanded by
First Lieutenant
Kirk Kicklighter.
Staff Sergeant
Scott Laasanen and Sergeant Daniel Stinson served as team leaders during collection missions in support of
Australian forces
intervening in
civil war
in
Papua New Guinea
, as well as intelligence operations against rebel forces seeking to
overthrow
the newly installed government of
President
Corazon Aquino
in the Republic of the
Philippines
.
[4]
See also
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References
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Further reading
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External links
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