American philosopher
Peter van Inwagen
(
; born September 21, 1942) is an
American
analytic
philosopher
and the John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Notre Dame
. He is also a research professor of philosophy at
Duke University
each spring.
[2]
He previously taught at
Syracuse University
, earning his PhD from the
University of Rochester
in 1969
[3]
under the direction of
Richard Taylor
.
[4]
Van Inwagen is one of the leading figures in contemporary
metaphysics
,
philosophy of religion
, and
philosophy of action
. He was the president of the
Society of Christian Philosophers
from 2010 to 2013.
[5]
Career
[
edit
]
Van Inwagen's 1983
monograph
An Essay on Free Will
played an important role in rehabilitating
libertarianism
with respect to
free will
in mainstream
analytical philosophy
.
In the book, he introduces the term
incompatibilism
about free will and
determinism
, to stand in contrast to
compatibilism
?the view that free will is compatible with determinism.
[note 1]
Van Inwagen's central argument (the
consequence argument
) for this view is that "If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of those things (including our present acts) are not up to us."
[9]
Van Inwagen also added what he called the
Mind Argument
(after the philosophical journal
Mind
, where such arguments often appeared). "The
Mind
argument proceeds by identifying indeterminism with
chance
and by arguing that an act that occurs by chance, if an event that occurs by chance can be called an act, cannot be under the control of its alleged agent and hence cannot have been performed freely. Proponents of [this argument] conclude, therefore, that free will is not only compatible with determinism but entails determinism."
[10]
The
Consequence Argument
and the
Mind Argument
are the two horns in the classic dilemma and standard argument
against
free will.
[
citation needed
]
If determinism is true, our actions are not free. If indeterminism is true, our actions are influenced by randomness and our
will
cannot be
morally responsible
for them.
[11]
Van Inwagen concludes that "Free Will Remains a Mystery."
In an article written in the third person called "Van Inwagen on Free Will,"
he describes the problem with his incompatibilist free will if random
chance directly causes our actions
.
[14]
He imagines the universe reverting a thousand times to
exactly the same circumstances
[15]
it was in at some earlier time and observing all the "replays." If the agent's actions are random, she sometimes "would have agent-caused the crucial brain event and sometimes (in seventy percent of the replays, let us say) she would not have... I conclude that even if an episode of agent causation is among the causal antecedents of every voluntary human action, these episodes do nothing to undermine the prima facie impossibility of an undetermined free act."
In his book
Material Beings
,
[17]
Van Inwagen argues that all material objects are either elementary particles or living organisms. Every composite material object is made up of elementary particles, and the only such composite objects are living organisms. A consequence of this view is that everyday objects such as tables, chairs, cars, buildings, and clouds do not exist. While there seem to be such things, this is only because there are elementary particles arranged in specific ways. For example, where it seems that there is a chair, Van Inwagen says that there are only
elementary particles arranged chairwise.
These particles do not compose an object, any more than a swarm of bees composes an object. Like a swarm of bees, the particles we call a chair maintain a more or less stable arrangement for a while, which gives the impression of a single object. An individual bee, by contrast, has parts that are unified in the right way to constitute a single object (namely, a bee).
Van Inwagen gave the 2003
Gifford Lectures
; they are published in his
The Problem of Evil
.
[18]
There Van Inwagen argues that the
problem of evil
is a philosophical argument and, like most philosophical arguments, fails.
In recent years, Van Inwagen has shown an interest in the
afterlife
debate, particularly in relation to
resurrection of the body
. In his article "I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World to Come", he concludes that Christians must account for some sort of physical continuity in their account of existence of the same person after death. In particular, Van Inwagen notes, this is a problem for the
Christian materialist
, one who believes that human beings are physical substances.
Awards and honors
[
edit
]
He was elected to the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
in 2005,
[19]
and was President of the Central Division of the
American Philosophical Association
in 2008/09. He was the President of the
Society of Christian Philosophers
from 2010 to 2013.
[5]
He has delivered lectures including:
- The F.D. Maurice Lectures, three lectures delivered at the University of London in March 1999
- The Wilde Lectures on Natural Religion, eight lectures delivered at Oxford University in Trinity Term, 2000
- The Stewart Lectures: three lectures delivered at Princeton University, October 2002
- The
Gifford Lectures
, eight lectures delivered at the
University of St. Andrews
, May 2003
- The Jellema Lectures: two lectures delivered at
Calvin College
, March 2004
- The Munster Lectures in Philosophy, including a student colloquium at the University of Munster, November 2015
In May 2011 it was announced that he is to receive an
honorary doctorate
from the
University of St Andrews
,
Scotland
.
[20]
Books
[
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]
Personal life
[
edit
]
Van Inwagen lives in
Granger
, Indiana, with his wife Elisabeth. Van Inwagen converted to
Christianity
in 1980.
[
citation needed
]
See also
[
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]
Notes
[
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]
- ^
Indeed, some philosophers suggest free will must be compatible with determinism, otherwise we could not be responsible for our actions.
[8]
References
[
edit
]
- ^
Vihvelin, Kadri (September 18, 2017).
"Arguments for Incompatibilism"
.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University
. Retrieved
April 13,
2020
.
- ^
"Faculty | Department of Philosophy"
. Archived from
the original
on March 5, 2015
. Retrieved
July 2,
2015
.
- ^
"Prof. Peter van Inwagen"
.
faraday.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk
. Archived from
the original
on October 3, 2015
. Retrieved
October 3,
2015
.
- ^
Holmes, Steve (August 18, 2014).
"Peter van Inwagen"
.
The Gifford Lectures
. Retrieved
November 17,
2017
.
- ^
a
b
"SCP Officers and Committees"
. Society of Christian Philosophers. Archived from
the original
on August 2, 2012
. Retrieved
October 3,
2015
.
- ^
HOBART, R. E. (1934). "I.?Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It".
Mind
.
XLIII
(169): 1?27.
doi
:
10.1093/mind/XLIII.169.1
.
- ^
Essay
, v
- ^
Essay
, 16
- ^
Smart, J. J. C. (1961). "Free-Will, Praise and Blame".
Mind
.
70
(279): 291?306.
doi
:
10.1093/mind/LXX.279.291
.
ISSN
0026-4423
.
JSTOR
2251619
.
- ^
"Chance NOT the Direct Cause of Human Action"
.
Information Philosopher
. Retrieved
April 13,
2020
.
- ^
"Exactly The Same Circumstances"
.
Informationphilosopher.com
. Retrieved
November 17,
2017
.
- ^
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995)
- ^
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)
- ^
Dame, Marketing Communications: Web // University of Notre (April 26, 2005).
"Philosopher elected to American Academy of Arts and Sciences"
.
Notre Dame News
. Retrieved
April 13,
2020
.
- ^
Cook, Gayle (May 20, 2011).
"St Andrews to honour David Attenborough"
.
St Andrews
. Retrieved
April 13,
2020
.
Works cited
[
edit
]
- Kane, Robert (2005).
A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will
. Oxford University Press.
ISBN
978-0-19-514970-8
. Retrieved
April 13,
2020
.
- van Inwagen, Peter (1983).
An Essay on Free Will
. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ISBN
978-0-19-824924-5
.
- van Inwagen, Peter (2000).
"Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture"
.
Philosophical Perspectives
.
14
. Ridgeview Publishing Company
. Retrieved
April 13,
2020
.
- van Inwagen, Peter (2004). Campbell, Joseph Keim; O'Rourke, Michael; Shier, David (eds.).
Freedom and Determinism
. MIT Press. pp. 213?230.
ISBN
978-0-262-53257-0
. Retrieved
April 13,
2020
.
- van Inwagen, Peter (2017).
Thinking about Free Will
. Cambridge University Press.
ISBN
978-1-107-16650-9
. Retrieved
April 13,
2020
.
Sources
[
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]
External links
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]
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