1972 aircraft hijacking by Palestinian militants
The
hijacking
of
Lufthansa Flight 615
was an aircraft hijacking that occurred on 29 October 1972 and aimed at the liberation of the three surviving perpetrators of the
Munich massacre
from a
West German
prison.
When the
Lufthansa
airplane was seized by sympathisers of the
Black September Organization
during the
Beirut
-
Ankara
part of a multi-stopover flight from
Damascus
to
Frankfurt
, the West German authorities complied with the demand of having the prisoners released. They were handed over at
Zagreb Airport
, and the hijacked aircraft was flown to
Tripoli
, where all hostages were released.
[1]
The liberated Munich attackers were granted asylum by Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi
.
For its actions, the West German government was criticised by Israel and other parties.
[1]
Allegations were made that the hijacking had been staged or at least tolerated with theories of a secret agreement between the German government and Black September ? release of the surviving militants in exchange for assurances of no further attacks on Germany.
Background
[
edit
]
The Olympic hostage crisis
[
edit
]
On 5 September 1972, during the
Munich Summer Olympics
, eight members of the
Palestinian
group
Black September
took nine members of the
Israeli Olympic team
hostage, after killing two other Israeli athletes. During a shoot-out following a failed police rescue attempt at
Furstenfeldbruck Air Base
, all hostages were killed.
[2]
[3]
Five of the eight Palestinian militants were also killed. The three surviving perpetrators were Adnan Al-Gashey,
Jamal Al-Gashey
, and Mohammed Safady, who were arrested and held in
pre-trial custody
.
[2]
In the immediate aftermath of the Munich massacre, West German authorities were concerned over being drawn into the
Arab?Israeli conflict
. As foreign minister
Walter Scheel
put it in October 1972, one had to "defend against actions by both sides of the conflict".
[4]
In Israel, the ensuing German
appeasement politics
[4]
led to comparisons with the 1938
Munich Agreement
.
[5]
Indeed, since
Willy Brandt
had become chancellor in 1969, there had been a change of the West German attitude towards the Arab?Israeli conflict. The earlier conservative governments had been considered pointedly pro-Israel (especially during the mid-1960s with the
Six-Day War
), which had resulted in a number of Arab states breaking off diplomatic relations to West Germany.
[4]
With
Egypt
and
Tunisia
, these had only been restored shortly before the 1972 Olympics.
[4]
The West German authorities were aware of the high profile of the prisoners and the fact that the group had numerous sympathisers, so that acts aiming at the liberation of the Munich attackers were feared. Aircraft of (then) national airline
Lufthansa
or its Israeli counterpart
El Al
were identified as likely targets.
[4]
[6]
On 9 September, an anonymous letter was received claiming that such a hijacking was indeed imminent, which prompted the
Federal Ministry of the Interior
(then led by
Hans-Dietrich Genscher
) to consider whether citizens of Arab states should be denied boarding of Lufthansa flights.
[7]
Already during the Munich hostage crisis, it had become evident that the attackers were aware of possible liberation attempts in case of their arrest. Asked if he was afraid of being caught and put into a German prison, their leader
Luttif Afif
(who was later killed in the Furstenfeldbruck shoot-out) had responded that there was nothing to fear, because "there is
no death penalty in Germany
, and our brothers would liberate us."
[6]
The hijacking
[
edit
]
- Note: For consistency reasons, all times have been converted to
Central European Time
.
On 29 October 1972 (a Sunday), a Lufthansa
Boeing 727-100
was hijacked: Flight 615 on the
Damascus
-
Beirut
-
Ankara
-
Munich
-
Frankfurt
route.
[8]
[9]
The aircraft (
registered
D-ABIG)
[10]
had originated at
Damascus International Airport
in the early morning, with seven crew members but initially without any passengers. At the first stopover at
Beirut International Airport
, 13 people boarded the flight: nine citizens of unknown
Arab countries
, two Americans, one German, one Frenchman;
[6]
and a Spanish journalist who later penned an eyewitness account of the events.
[11]
[12]
Departure from Beirut was delayed by about one hour. Originally scheduled to depart at 05:45,
[9]
take-off took place at 06:01.
[8]
Less than 15 minutes later,
[8]
two Arab passengers threatened to blow up the aircraft using explosives that had been hidden in the first class cabin (and which likely had been smuggled there in Damascus).
[6]
They demanded the release of the members of
Black September
from German prison.
[8]
Following a fuel stop at
Nicosia International Airport
, the pilots were forced to fly towards
Munich-Riem Airport
, where the hijackers initially had intended the exchange to take place.
[7]
When the aircraft had arrived in Austrian airspace at around noon, it became evident to the hijackers that their demands could not be fulfilled in time.
[13]
The plan was changed, and the Lufthansa crew had to divert instead to
Zagreb
in what was then the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
, circling over
Zagreb Airport
until the
Black September
members had been brought there.
[7]
This put the Germans under a time crunch, as the aircraft would eventually run out of fuel.
Once word of the hijacking was received at the Lufthansa headquarters in
Cologne
, chairman
Herbert Culmann
boarded a corporate
Hawker Siddeley HS.125
, owned by then subsidiary
Condor
(registered D-CFCF)
[14]
and flew to Munich. He was then joined by mayor
Georg Kronawitter
and police chief
Manfred Schreiber
[
de
]
, as well as the Bavarian interior minister
Bruno Merk
[
de
]
at the local crisis committee.
[7]
[14]
The West German governmental response was coordinated by a crisis council in
Bonn
, which comprised vice chancellor, and foreign minister
Walter Scheel
and the ministers of the interior and of transportation,
Hans-Dietrich Genscher
and
Lauritz Lauritzen
.
[6]
[14]
Recalling the
failed rescue attempt during the Olympic hostage crisis
and the (then) lack of a special operations police unit such as the later
GSG 9
, the West German authorities quickly decided to comply with the demands of the hijackers. By 14:00, the three
Black September
members had been transported to Riem Airport.
[7]
Philipp Held
[
de
]
, the Bavarian minister for justice, ordered for the revocation of the
arrest warrant
[6]
and had the
Black September
members issued official emigration papers.
[8]
The three were brought on board the airplane Culmann had used to get to Munich and were joined by two plain clothes police officers.
[7]
Culmann decided to head to Zagreb in order to directly assist the negotiations there.
[15]
The airplane left Munich, but the pilot had been ordered to stay inside West German airspace.
[7]
The German negotiators asked that the hijacked Lufthansa jet be allowed to first land at Zagreb, but were unsuccessful in their attempts.
[7]
The situation tensed when the hijacked Lufthansa aircraft came dangerously close to the point of
fuel starvation
.
[15]
In what Culmann later called a "state of emergency," due to an alleged loss of communications with Munich, Culmann then personally ordered the pilot of the aircraft carrying the released Munich attackers to head towards and land at Zagreb Airport. This direction was against orders from higher authorities.
[7]
[15]
As a consequence, a legal investigation against Culmann was initiated,
[15]
but abandoned shortly thereafter.
[6]
Twenty minutes after the three
Black September
members had arrived at Zagreb Airport,
[15]
the hijacked Lufthansa jet also landed there and some time later, at 18:05, the transfer took place.
[16]
This happened without any reciprocal measures: The 18 hostages were not yet released.
[7]
Another critical situation unfolded when the Yugoslav authorities in charge of the airport complied with the demands of their counterparts in Bonn and prevented the Lufthansa jet from taking off again. Realizing that the plane would not be refueled, the hijackers again threatened to kill everyone on board.
[14]
The standoff was broken by
Kurt Laqueur
[
de
]
, the West German
consul
in Zagreb, who signed the refueling order without having been authorized to do so.
[14]
The Lufthansa jet departed at 18:50, this time heading for
Tripoli
.
[16]
At 21:03, it arrived at
Tripoli International Airport
, where the hostages were finally set free.
[16]
In Libya and other countries of the region, mass celebrations erupted,
[2]
with the Lufthansa hijackers and the liberated Munich perpetrators being treated as heroes.
[6]
[13]
Right after their arrival at the airport, a press conference was held, which was broadcast live around the world.
[8]
The Libyan government led by
Muammar Gaddafi
allowed the Munich attackers to take refuge and go into hiding, ignoring the demands of West German foreign minister Scheel to put them on trial.
[17]
In a large scale
covert operation
dubbed
Wrath of God
, Israel would subsequently aim at them being tracked down and killed.
[2]
Reactions
[
edit
]
German politicians of the then government parties (
Social Democrats
and
Liberals
) as well as the opposition (the conservative
Union parties
) generally praised the non-violent outcome of the hijacking. This reflected the
public opinion
that the release of the Munich attackers would reduce the risk of further attacks against German targets.
[6]
[18]
Criticism evolved around the lack of sufficient
airport security
to prevent explosives being smuggled into passenger airliners, and Lufthansa not employing
sky marshals
, which at that time were already common on certain flights by
El Al
,
Pan Am
,
Swissair
, and others.
[15]
Israel sharply condemned the release of the Munich perpetrators and accused West Germany of having "capitulated to terrorism".
[6]
Prime Minister
Golda Meir
stated on the following day: "We have been depressed since yesterday, aggrieved and I would say insulted, that the human spirit, so weak and helpless, has surrendered to brutal force."
[17]
Foreign Minister
Abba Eban
filed an official
protest note
with the West German government,
[13]
and the Israeli ambassador in Bonn was temporarily called back, officially due to consultations.
[17]
Allegations of West German government involvement
[
edit
]
In the immediate aftermath of the hijacking of Flight 615,
[6]
as well as on a number of later occasions,
[3]
[8]
[19]
concerns were voiced that the event might have been staged or at least tolerated by the West German government in order to "get rid of three murderers, which had become a security burden" (as
Amnon Rubinstein
wrote in Israeli newspaper
Haaretz
under the headline "Bonn's Disgrace" shortly after the prisoner release).
[17]
Arguments frequently made during such allegations are the "suspiciously"
[8]
[19]
low passenger number (there were only 13 male passengers on board the hijacked Boeing 727-100, an aircraft type with a seating capacity of 130?150), the "surprisingly"
[7]
[17]
quick decision to have the prisoners released, as well as purported contacts of the West German
Federal Intelligence Service
to the
Palestine Liberation Organization
.
[4]
[6]
The West German trade interests in Arab countries as well as the desire to be spared from future acts of terror were alleged as motives for a government involvement.
[4]
[5]
Shortly after the events surrounding Flight 615,
Haim Yosef Zadok
accused West Germany in a
Knesset
speech of having "used the opportunity to improve its relations to the Arab world."
[5]
In his 1999 autobiography,
Abu Daoud
(the mastermind behind the Munich massacre) claims that he had been offered $9 million by "the Germans" for faking the prisoner release. However, in later years, he refused to repeat or elaborate this allegation.
[8]
In a 2006 interview with
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
,
Zvi Zamir
, the head of
Mossad
from 1968 to 1974, states that he was certain that there had been some kind of an agreement between West Germany and
Black September
.
[6]
The
Oscar-winning
documentary film
One Day in September
(which was released in 1999 and covers the Munich massacre) supports the thesis that the hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 615 was "a set-up, organized by the German government in collusion with the militants,"
[20]
[21]
which corresponds to remarks by Jamal Al-Gashey about the aftermath of his liberation.
[2]
The film features an interview with
Ulrich Wegener
, a German counter-terrorism expert and founding commander of
GSG 9
, who calls such allegations "probably true".
[20]
Wegener is also quoted with the opinion that considerations of the West German authorities on how to deal with the hostage situation had likely been mainly driven by the desire to prevent the country from becoming the focus for further acts of terror.
[17]
In 2013,
investigative journalists
of German television programme
Report Munchen
[
de
]
cited a letter by the Munich police chief, which had been sent to the Bavarian interior ministry eleven days prior to the hijacking of Flight 615. It describes measures that had been taken in order to "accelerate the deportation" of the Munich attackers, rather than preparing for them to be put on trial.
[8]
A counter-argument to accusations of a pre-arranged prisoner release includes highlighting the lack of planning and communications that the German negotiators had during the hostage crisis.
[7]
The situation had been chaotic and confusing at times,
[2]
making it unlikely that negotiations were scripted.
LH 615 ? Operation Munchen
[
de
]
, a 1975 documentary feature produced by
Bayerischer Rundfunk
, attributes the non-violent outcome of the hijacking to Lufthansa chairman Culmann and consul Laqueur: They had acted on their own terms rather than obeying orders by governmental officials.
[14]
See also
[
edit
]
- El Al Flight 426
: A 1968 hijacking that had resulted in Israel releasing Arab prisoners in exchange for the hostages.
- Lufthansa Flight 649
: Another hijacking that had happened earlier in 1972 and concluded with the West German government paying a $5 million ransom.
- Lufthansa Flight 181
: A 1977 hijacking during which the West German government would not comply with the demand of having Palestinian militants released.
References
[
edit
]
- ^
a
b
Blumenau, Bernhard (2014).
The United Nations and Terrorism. Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s
. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 47?9.
ISBN
978-1-137-39196-4
.
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
Reeve, Simon
(2000).
One Day in September
. New York:
Arcade Publishing
.
ISBN
9781559705479
.
- ^
a
b
"Olympics Massacre: Munich ? The real story"
.
The Independent
. 22 January 2006
. Retrieved
16 October
2013
.
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
"1972 Olympics Massacre: Germany's Secret Contacts to Palestinian Terrorists"
.
Der Spiegel
. 28 August 2012
. Retrieved
31 July
2013
.
- ^
a
b
c
"Deutsche Feigheit"
.
Der Spiegel
(in German). 11 November 1972. Archived from
the original
on 19 October 2013
. Retrieved
26 July
2013
.
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
l
m
Sattar, Majid (9 November 2006).
"Folgen eines Anschlags"
[Consequences of an attack] (in German).
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
. Archived from
the original
on 10 December 2011
. Retrieved
16 October
2013
.
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
l
Dahlke, Matthias (2011).
Demokratischer Staat und transnationaler Terrorismus
[
Democratic State and Transnational Terrorism
] (in German). Oldenbourg scientific publisher. pp. 70?74.
ISBN
978-3-486-70466-2
. Retrieved
16 October
2013
.
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
"Wie die Olympia-Attentater unbestraft davonkamen"
[How the Olympic assassins got away with it].
Bayerischer Rundfunk
(Report Munchen)
(in German). 18 June 2013
. Retrieved
16 October
2013
.
- ^
a
b
"Lufthansa timetable"
. timetableimages.com:
Lufthansa
. 1 July 1972. p. 12
. Retrieved
30 July
2013
.
- ^
"Description of the Lufthansa hijacking on 29 October 1972"
.
Aviation Safety Network
. Retrieved
28 July
2013
.
- ^
Salazar Carrion, Salvador (31 October 1972).
"Relato de un testigo sobre las dramaticas horas del secuestro 1/2"
.
la Vanguardia
(in Spanish)
. Retrieved
16 March
2018
.
- ^
Salazar Carrion, Salvador (31 October 1972).
"Relato de un testigo sobre las dramaticas horas del secuestro 2/2"
.
la Vanguardia
(in Spanish)
. Retrieved
16 March
2018
.
- ^
a
b
c
"Terroristen befreit"
.
Die Zeit
(in German). 3 November 1972. p. 8
. Retrieved
31 July
2013
.
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
"Held des Tages"
[Luck of the Day].
Der Spiegel
(in German). 6 October 1975. Archived from
the original
on 16 October 2013
. Retrieved
16 October
2013
.
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
"
"Ganz sicher ist nur: Fliegen einstellen." Lufthansa-Chef Herbert Culmann uber Luftsicherheit"
.
Der Spiegel
(in German). 6 November 1972. Archived from
the original
on 16 October 2013
. Retrieved
30 July
2013
.
- ^
a
b
c
"Israel protestiert: Freigabe der Attentater eine schreckliche Tat".
Die Welt
(in German). 30 October 1972. pp. 1?2.
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
f
Greenfeter, Yael (4 November 2010).
"Israel in shock as Munich killers freed"
.
Haaretz
. Retrieved
10 October
2013
.
- ^
Gaus, Gunter (6 November 1972).
"Schlapper Staat?"
.
Der Spiegel
(in German). Archived from
the original
on 16 October 2013
. Retrieved
16 July
2013
.
- ^
a
b
Burke, Jason (26 March 2000).
"Bonn 'faked' hijack to free killers"
.
The Observer
. Retrieved
26 July
2013
.
- ^
a
b
Quotations taken from the documentary film
One Day in September
.
- ^
Blumenau, Bernhard (2014),
The United Nations and Terrorism: Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s
, Springer, p. 83,
ISBN
9781137391988
, citing
Broder, Henryk M. (6 September 2007).
"Olympia-Massaker 1972: Die schwierige Erinnerung"
.
Der Spiegel
.
and testimonies of
Ulrich Wegener
and
Hans-Jochen Vogel
at the end of the documentary film,
One Day in September
.
Further reading
[
edit
]
- Blumenau, Bernhard.
The United Nations and Terrorism. Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s
. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, ch.2, pp. 47?49.
ISBN
978-1-137-39196-4
|
---|
Within Israel
|
- Avivim school bus bombing
*
(May 22, 1970)
- Lod Airport massacre
(May 30, 1972)
- Kiryat Shmona massacre
*
(April 11, 1974)
- Ma'alot massacre
*
(May 15, 1974)
- Nahariya attack
*
(June 24?25, 1974)
- Beit She'an attack
(November 19, 1974)
- Savoy Hotel attack
*
(March 6, 1975)
- Kfar Yuval hostage crisis
*
(June 15, 1975)
- Zion Square refrigerator bombing
(July 4, 1975)
- Coastal Road massacre
*
(March 11, 1978)
- Nahariya massacre
*
(April 22, 1979)
|
---|
Within the Gaza Strip
| |
---|
Aircraft attacks and hijackings
|
- Swissair Flight 330
(February 21, 1970)
- Olympic Airways Flight 255 hijacking
(July 22, 1970)
- Dawson's Field hijackings
(September 6?13, 1970)
- Lufthansa Flight 649
(February 22?23, 1972)
- Sabena Flight 571
(May 8, 1972)
- Lufthansa Flight 615
(October 29, 1972)
- Rome airport attacks and hijacking
(December 17?18, 1973)
- TWA Flight 841
(September 8, 1974)
- Air France Flight 139
(June 27, 1976)
- Lufthansa Flight 181
(October 13?18, 1977)
|
---|
Worldwide
|
- Munich massacre
(September 5?6, 1972)
- Israeli Bangkok embassy hostage crisis
(December 28, 1972)
- Assassination of the Israeli attache in Washington
(July 1, 1973)
- Schoenau ultimatum
(September 28?29, 1973)
- Paris cafe attack
(September 15, 1974)
- Orly Airport attacks
(January, 1975)
- OPEC siege
(December 21, 1975)
- Ye?ilkoy airport attack
(August 11, 1976)
- Orly Airport attack
(May 20, 1978)
- London bus attack
(August 20, 1978)
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