The first tentative efforts to comprehend the meaning and consequences of
modern warfare
began during the initial phases of
World War I
; this process continued throughout and after the
end of hostilities
, and is still underway more than a century later. Teaching World War I has presented special challenges. When compared with
World War II
, the First World War is often thought to be "a wrong war fought for the wrong reasons"; it lacks the
metanarrative
of
good versus evil
that characterizes retellings of the Second World War. Lacking recognizable heroes and villains, it is often taught thematically, invoking
tropes
like the wastefulness of war, the folly of generals and the innocence of soldiers. The complexity of the conflict is mostly obscured by these oversimplifications.
[1]
George Kennan
referred to the war as the "seminal catastrophe of the 20th century".
[2]
Historian Heather Jones argues that the
historiography
has been reinvigorated by a cultural turn in the 21st century. Scholars have raised entirely new questions regarding
military occupation
,
radicalisation
of politics,
race
,
medical science
,
gender
and
mental health
. Among the major subjects that historians have long debated regarding the war include:
Why the war began
; why the
Allies
won; whether generals were responsible for
high casualty rates
; how soldiers endured the poor conditions of
trench warfare
; and to what extent the civilian
home front
accepted and endorsed the war effort.
[3]
[4]
Causes of the war
[
edit
]
The identification of the
causes of World War I
remains a debated issue.
World War I
began in the
Balkans
on July 28, 1914, and hostilities
ended on November 11, 1918
, leaving
17 million dead and 25 million wounded
. Moreover, the
Russian Civil War
can in many ways be considered a continuation of World War I, as can various other conflicts in the direct aftermath of 1918.
Scholars looking at the long term seek to explain why two rival sets of powers (the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire, France, and the British Empire) came into conflict by the start of 1914. They look at such factors as political, territorial and economic competition;
militarism
, a complex web of alliances and alignments;
imperialism
, the growth of
nationalism
; and the power vacuum created by the
decline of the Ottoman Empire
. Other important long-term or structural factors that are often studied include unresolved
territorial disputes
, the perceived breakdown of the European
balance of power
,
[5]
[6]
convoluted and fragmented
governance
,
arms races
and
security dilemmas
,
[7]
[8]
a
cult of the offensive
,
[5]
[9]
[8]
and
military planning
.
[10]
Scholars seeking short-term analysis focus on the summer of 1914 and ask whether the conflict could have been stopped, or instead whether deeper causes made it inevitable. Among the immediate causes were the decisions made by statesmen and generals during the
July Crisis
, which was triggered by the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria
by the
Bosnian Serb
nationalist
Gavrilo Princip
, who had been supported by a nationalist organization in
Serbia
.
[11]
The crisis escalated as the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was joined by their allies Russia, Germany, France, and ultimately
Belgium
and the United Kingdom. Other factors that came into play during the diplomatic crisis leading up to the war included misperceptions of intent (such as the German belief that Britain would remain neutral), the fatalistic belief that war was inevitable, and the speed with which the crisis escalated, partly due to delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications.
The crisis followed a series of diplomatic clashes among the
Great Powers
(
Italy
,
France
,
Germany
,
United Kingdom
,
Austria-Hungary
and
Russia
) over European and
colonial issues
in the decades before 1914 that had left tensions high. And the cause of the public clashes can be traced to changes in the balance of power in Europe that had been taking place since 1867.
[12]
Consensus on the origins of the war
remains elusive
, since historians disagree on key factors and place differing emphasis on a variety of factors. That is compounded by
historical arguments changing over time
, particularly as classified historical archives become available, and as perspectives and ideologies of historians have changed. The deepest division among historians is between those who see Germany and Austria-Hungary as having driven events and those who focus on power dynamics among a wider set of actors and circumstances. Secondary fault lines exist between those who believe that Germany deliberately planned a European war, those who believe that the war was largely unplanned but was still caused principally by Germany and Austria-Hungary taking risks, and those who believe that some or all of the other powers (Russia, France, Serbia, United Kingdom) played a more significant role in causing the war than has been traditionally suggested.
"Web of alliances" narratives
[
edit
]
Although general narratives of the war tend to emphasize the importance of
alliances
in binding the major powers to act in the event of a crisis such as the July Crisis, historians such as
Margaret MacMillan
warn against the argument that alliances forced the Great Powers to act as they did: "What we tend to think of as fixed alliances before the First World War were nothing of the sort. They were much more loose, much more porous, much more capable of change."
[13]
The most important alliances in Europe required participants to agree to collective defence if they were attacked. Some represented formal alliances, but the Triple Entente represented only a frame of mind:
There are three notable exceptions that demonstrate that alliances did not in themselves force the great powers to act:
- The
Entente Cordiale
between Britain and France in 1905 included a secret agreement that left the northern coast of France and the
English Channel
to be defended by the British
Royal Navy
, and the separate "
entente
" between Britain and Russia (1907) formed the so-called
Triple Entente
. However, the Triple Entente did not, in fact, force Britain to mobilise because it was not a military treaty.
- Moreover, general narratives of the war regularly misstate that Russia was allied to Serbia.
Clive Ponting
noted: "Russia had no treaty of alliance with Serbia and was under no obligation to support it diplomatically, let alone go to its defence."
- Italy, despite being part of the
Triple Alliance
, did not enter the war to defend the Triple Alliance partners.
Cultural memory in the United Kingdom
[
edit
]
World War I had a lasting impact on
collective memory
of the United Kingdom. It was seen by many in Britain as signalling the end of an era of stability stretching back to the
Victorian period
, and across Europe many regarded it as a watershed.
[15]
Historian
Samuel Hynes
explained:
A generation of innocent young men, their heads full of high abstractions like Honour, Glory and England, went off to war to make the world safe for democracy. They were slaughtered in stupid battles planned by stupid generals. Those who survived were shocked, disillusioned and embittered by their war experiences, and saw that their real enemies were not the Germans, but the old men at home who had lied to them. They rejected the values of the society that had sent them to war, and in doing so separated their own generation from the past and from their cultural inheritance.
[16]
This has become the most common perception of World War I, perpetuated by the art, cinema, poems, and stories published subsequently. Films such as
All Quiet on the Western Front
,
Paths of Glory
and
King and Country
have perpetuated the idea, while war-time films including
Camrades
,
Poppies of Flanders
, and
Shoulder Arms
indicate that the most contemporary views of the war were overall far more positive.
Likewise, the art of
Paul Nash
,
John Nash
,
Christopher Nevinson
, and
Henry Tonks
in Britain painted a negative view of the conflict in keeping with the growing perception, while popular war-time artists such as
Muirhead Bone
painted more serene and pleasant interpretations subsequently rejected as inaccurate.
[16]
Several historians like
John Terraine
,
Niall Ferguson
and
Gary Sheffield
have challenged these interpretations as partial and
polemical
views:
These beliefs did not become widely shared because they offered the only accurate interpretation of wartime events. In every respect, the war was much more complicated than they suggest. In recent years, historians have argued persuasively against almost every popular cliche of World War
I. It has been pointed out that, although the losses were devastating, their greatest impact was socially and geographically limited. The many emotions other than horror experienced by soldiers in and out of the front line, including comradeship, boredom, and even enjoyment, have been recognised. The war is not now seen as a 'fight about nothing', but as a war of ideals, a struggle between aggressive militarism and more or less liberal democracy. It has been acknowledged that British generals were often capable men facing difficult challenges and that it was under their command that the British army played a major part in the defeat of the Germans in 1918: a great forgotten victory.
Though these views have been discounted as "myths",
[16]
[18]
they are common. They have dynamically changed according to contemporary influences, reflecting in the 1950s perceptions of the war as "aimless" following the contrasting Second World War and emphasising conflict within the ranks during times of class conflict in the 1960s. The majority of additions to the contrary are often rejected.
Writers such as
Ernest Hemingway
wrote many stories on the experiences of
veterans
after the war, such as the short story
Soldier's Home
, about young veteran Harold Krebs trying to integrate back into society.
[19]
Discontent in Germany and Austria
[
edit
]
The rise of
Nazism
and
fascism
included a revival of the nationalist spirit and a rejection of many post-war changes. Similarly, the popularity of the
stab-in-the-back legend
(German:
Dolchstoßlegende
) was a testament to the psychological state of defeated
Germany
, and was a rejection of responsibility for the conflict. This
conspiracy theory
of the betrayal of the German war effort by Jews became common, and the German populace came to see themselves as victims. The widespread acceptance of the "stab-in-the-back" myth delegitimised the
Weimar government
and destabilised the system, opening it to extremes of right and left. The same occurred in
Austria
, which did not consider itself responsible for the outbreak of the war, and claimed not to have suffered a military defeat.
[20]
Enabling the rise of totalitarianism
[
edit
]
Communist
and
fascist
movements around Europe drew strength from the societal upheaval caused by the war, and enjoyed new levels of popularity. These feelings were most pronounced in areas directly or harshly affected by the war where centuries-old royal dynasties were toppled, such as the
Weimar Republic
(1918-1933),
Russian Civil War
(1917-1923), and the
successor states of Austria-Hungary
.
Adolf Hitler
was able to gain popularity by using German discontent with the still controversial
Treaty of Versailles
.
[21]
World War
II was, in part, a continuation of the power struggle never fully resolved by World War
I. Furthermore, it was common for Germans in the 1930s to justify acts of aggression due to perceived injustices imposed by the victors of World War
I.
[24]
American historian
William Rubinstein
wrote that:
The 'Age of Totalitarianism' included nearly all the infamous examples of genocide in modern history, headed by the Jewish
Holocaust
, but also comprising the mass murders and purges of the Communist world, other mass killings carried out by Nazi Germany and its allies, and also the
Armenian Genocide
of 1915. All these slaughters, it is argued here, had a common origin, the collapse of the elite structure and normal modes of government of much of central, eastern and southern Europe as a result of World War
I, without which surely neither Communism nor Fascism would have existed except in the minds of unknown agitators and crackpots.
[25]
Social trauma
[
edit
]
The social trauma caused by unprecedented rates of casualties manifested itself in different ways, which have been the subject of subsequent historical debate.
Over 8 million Europeans died in the war. Millions suffered permanent disabilities. The war gave birth to
fascism
and
Bolshevism
and destroyed the centuries-old dynasties that had ruled the
Ottoman
,
Habsburg
,
Russian
and
German Empires
.
[1]
The
optimism
of
la belle epoque
was destroyed, and those who had fought in the war were referred to as the
Lost Generation
.
For years afterward, people mourned the dead, the missing, and the many disabled.
Many soldiers returned with severe trauma, suffering from
shell shock
(also called neurasthenia, a condition related to
post-traumatic stress disorder
).
Many more returned home with few after-effects; however, their silence about the war contributed to the conflict's growing mythological status. Though many participants did not share in the experiences of combat or spend any significant time at the front, or had positive memories of their service, the images of suffering and trauma became the widely shared perception. Such historians as Dan Todman,
Paul Fussell
, and Samuel Heyns have all published works since the 1990s arguing that these common perceptions of the war are factually incorrect.
See also
[
edit
]
References
[
edit
]
- ^
a
b
Neiberg, Michael (2007).
The World War I Reader
. p. 1.
- ^
"The intro the outbreak of the First World War"
.
Cambridge Blog
. 2014
. Retrieved
17 November
2022
.
- ^
Jones, Heather (2013).
"As the centenary approaches: the regeneration of First World War historiography"
.
Historical Journal
.
56
(3): 857?878 [858].
doi
:
10.1017/S0018246X13000216
.
- ^
see Christoph Cornelissen, and Arndt Weinrich, eds.
Writing the Great War ? The Historiography of World War I from 1918 to the Present
(2020)
free download
Archived
29 November 2020 at the
Wayback Machine
; full coverage for major countries.
- ^
a
b
Van Evera, Stephen (Summer 1984). "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War".
International Security
.
9
(1): 58?107.
doi
:
10.2307/2538636
.
JSTOR
2538636
.
- ^
Fischer, Fritz (1975).
War of illusions: German policies from 1911 to 1914
. Chatto and Windus. p. 69.
ISBN
978-0-3930-5480-4
.
- ^
Snyder, Glenn H. (1984).
"The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"
.
World Politics
.
36
(4): 461?495.
doi
:
10.2307/2010183
.
ISSN
0043-8871
.
JSTOR
2010183
.
S2CID
154759602
.
- ^
a
b
Jervis, Robert (1978).
"Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"
.
World Politics
.
30
(2): 167?214.
doi
:
10.2307/2009958
.
hdl
:
2027/uc1.31158011478350
.
ISSN
0043-8871
.
JSTOR
2009958
.
S2CID
154923423
.
- ^
Snyder, Jack (1984).
"Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984"
.
International Security
.
9
(1): 108?146.
doi
:
10.2307/2538637
.
ISSN
0162-2889
.
JSTOR
2538637
.
S2CID
55976453
.
- ^
Sagan, Scott D. (Fall 1986). "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability".
International Security
.
11
(2): 151?175.
doi
:
10.2307/2538961
.
JSTOR
2538961
.
S2CID
153783717
.
- ^
Henig, Ruth
(2006).
The Origins of the First World War
. Routledge.
ISBN
978-1-134-85200-0
.
- ^
Lieven, D. C. B.
(1983).
Russia and the Origins of the First World War
. St. Martin's Press.
ISBN
978-0-312-69611-5
.
- ^
Explaining the Outbreak of the First World War ? Closing Conference Geneve Histoire et Cite 2015;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uWDJfraJWf0
See13:50
- ^
Sheftall, Mark David (2010).
Altered Memories of the Great War: Divergent Narratives of Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada
. London: I. B. Tauris.
ISBN
978-1-84511-883-9
.
- ^
a
b
c
Hynes, Samuel Lynn
(1991).
A war imagined: the First World War and English culture
. Atheneum. pp. i?xii.
ISBN
978-0-689-12128-9
.
- ^
Fussell, Paul (2000).
The Great War and modern memory
. Oxford University Press. pp. 1?78.
ISBN
978-0-19-513332-5
. Retrieved
18 May
2010
.
- ^
"In Our Time Soldier's Home Summary & Analysis"
.
SparkNotes
. Retrieved
2023-06-24
.
- ^
Cole, Laurence (2012). "Geteiltes Land und getrennte Erzahlungen. Erinnerungskulturen des Ersten Weltkrieges in den Nachfolgeregionen des Kronlandes Tirol". In Obermair, Hannes (ed.).
Regionale Zivilgesellschaft in Bewegung ? Cittadini innanzi tutto. Festschrift fur Hans Heiss
. Vienna-Bozen: Folio Verlag. pp. 502?531.
ISBN
978-3-85256-618-4
.
OCLC
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.
- ^
Kitchen, Martin.
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. BBC.
Archived
from the original on 18 July 2008
. Retrieved
11 March
2008
.
- ^
"World War II"
.
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.
Archived
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. Retrieved
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.
- ^
Rubinstein, W.D. (2004).
Genocide: a history
. Pearson Education. p. 7.
ISBN
978-0-582-50601-5
.
Bibliography
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]
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