State that claims or seeks the right to intervene in the affairs of other states
Global policeman
(or
world police
[1]
) is an informal term for a
superpower
which seeks or claims the right to intervene in other
sovereign states
. It has been used, firstly for the
United Kingdom
and, since 1945, for the
United States
,
[2]
[3]
though it has been suggested that
China
has been seeking to take over the role in the 21st century.
[4]
[
better source needed
]
The two terms
hegemon
and
global policeman
are not identical in meaning. The former term defines capacity for dominant control anywhere on earth, whereas the latter may also include small or large areas
outside control
, along with monitoring and attempted enforcements, but does not define any level of effectiveness.
In international law
[
edit
]
No formal recognition of this position exists. Theoretically, in
international law
, all nations are equal; "
par in parem non habet imperium
", no authority between equals, is the principle applied, although, in reality some states are relatively
more powerful
than others. States are
"immortal" and cannot be indicted
.
[5]
Comparison with state policing
[
edit
]
Within
states
, law restrains and limits power; between states, the opposite is true.
[6]
The
Peelian principles
of policing include: the duty to prevent crime, keep the peace and uphold the law, with the consent of the public, and with minimal use of force and restraint; to act impartially; and not to usurp the powers of the judiciary.
[7]
The latter standard requires a
presumption of innocence
. Candidates for police recruitment and promotion are appointed on merit, whereas a 'global policeman' is self-appointed faute de mieux.
Within states, a
monopoly on violence
is the norm; the police may carry weapons, but few others do so (the US is an exception, prompting
Charles Lane
to ask if it is 'really a state'
[8]
) Internationally, a 'global policeman' is but one heavily armed state among two hundred others.
To confer the role of 'global policeman' on any self-interested, expansionary state implies a
conflict of interest
. States wage war with maximum force; engage in arms sales; form alliances and thus lack impartiality.
[9]
History
[
edit
]
The UK made efforts to end the
slave trade
through the
West Africa Squadron
.
[10]
In 1827, Britain, jointly with France and Russia, intervened on the side of
Greek independence
, destroying the Turkish fleet at the
Battle of Navarino
. In 1854, Britain, jointly with France, prevented Russia from destroying the
Ottoman Empire
. Russia had to withdraw from
Moldavia
and
Wallachia
, and
Sevastopol
was besieged in the
Crimean war
.
From 1914?1945 no one state was hegemonic, with
Britain's
power decreasing, but still very much a leading, world role, and with rising powers such as the United States, the
Empire of Japan
, and later
Nazi Germany
and the
Soviet Union
. In an era of
multipolarity
and
diffused responsibility
, fascist dictators arose and Europe sank into two world wars. According to
Richard J Evans
, "The authoritarian German challenge to democratic Britain then, is comparable to the authoritarian Chinese challenge to democratic America now.".
[11]
Between the years 1945 and 1990, the world trade was dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States in what was known to be the
Cold War
.
The
Truman Doctrine
of 1947 promised assistance to anti-communist allies. "The right of neutrality was abolished... it was an era of aggressive peacetime policy which marked the beginning of America's role as global policeman."
[12]
Since the end of the
Cold War
"The enemy is terrorism not communism".
[12]
But after a disastrous intervention in
Somalia
in 1993, the US was reluctant to engage in
humanitarian intervention
in
Bosnia
[13]
and
Rwanda
.
[14]
The US-led
Invasion of Iraq
, officially a policing mission to find
Weapons of Mass Destruction
, was, according to some, an illegal cover for ulterior, unethical motives: the need to secure US regional bases, oil supplies, and the loyalty of key allies.
[15]
[16]
Since then, serious doubts have been raised about the validity of US overseas intervention and destabilization in Iraq, Libya and Syria.
[17]
[18]
As the 21st century progresses, the morality of global policing itself is increasingly in question, with the inevitable loss of
self-determination
by nations in which intervention occurs.
[19]
Furthermore, with the advent of non-state threats to global security, prior legal justifications such as general "
laws of war
" are of questionable jurisdiction.
Modelski's long cycles theory
[
edit
]
George Modelski
defined global order as a 'management network centred on a lead unit and contenders for leadership, (pursuing) collective action at the global level'.
[20]
The system is allegedly cyclical. Each cycle is about 100 years' duration and a new hegemonic power appears each time:
- Portugal
1492?1580; in the
Age of Discovery
- The
Netherlands
1580?1688; beginning with the
Eighty Years' War, 1579?1588
- United Kingdom
(1) 1688?1792; beginning with the wars of
Louis XVI
- United Kingdom (2) 1792?1914; beginning with the
French Revolution
and Napoleonic wars
- The
United States
1914 to Present; beginning with
World War I
and two.
[21]
Each cycle has four phases:
- Global war, which a) involves almost all global powers, b) is 'characteristically naval'
[22]
c) is caused by a system breakdown, d) is extremely lethal, e) results in a new global leader, capable of tackling global problems.
[23]
The war is a 'decision process' analogous to a national election.
[24]
The
Thirty Years War
, though lasting and destructive, was not a 'global war'
[25]
- World Power, which lasts for 'about one generation'.
[26]
The new incumbent power 'prioritises global problems', mobilises a coalition, is decisive and innovative.
[27]
Pre-modern communities become dependent on the hegemonic power
[28]
- Delegitimation. This phase can last for 20?27 years; the hegemonic power falters, as rival powers assert new nationalistic policies.
[29]
- Deconcentration. The hegemony's problem-solving capacity declines. It yields to a
multipolar
order of warring rivals. Pre-modern communities become less dependent.
[30]
A challenger appears (successively, Spain, France, France, Germany, and the USSR)
[21]
and a new global war ensues.
The hegemonic nations tend to have: 'insular geography'; a stable, open society; a strong economy; strategic organisation, and strong political parties. By contrast, the 'challenger' nations have: closed systems; absolute rulers; domestic instability; and continental geographic locations.
[31]
The long cycle system is repetitive, but also evolutionary. According to Modelski, it originated in about 1493 through a) the decline of Venetian naval power, b) Chinese abandonment of naval exploration, and c) discovery of sea routes to India and the Americas.
[32]
It has developed in parallel with the growth of the nation-state, political parties, command of the sea, and 'dependency of pre-modern communities'.
[33]
The system is flawed, lacking in coherence, solidarity, and capacity to address the
North-South divide
.
[34]
Modelski speculates that US deconcentration might be replaced by a power based in the 'Pacific rim' or by an explicit coalition of nations, as 'co-operation is urgently required in respect of nuclear weapons'.
[35]
Modelski 'dismisses the idea that international relations are anarchic'. His research, influenced by
Immanuel Wallerstein
, was 'measured in decades... a major achievement' says
Peter J. Taylor
.
[36]
See also
[
edit
]
References
[
edit
]
- ^
"Team America, World Police: The Need for Accountability"
.
Harvard International Review
. 3 September 2020
. Retrieved
12 May
2022
.
- ^
Linda Colley
, 'Britain and the US once ran the world. Now they're all at sea',
The Guardian
, 14 June 2017.
- ^
Gideon Rachman
, 'The world would miss the American policeman',
Financial Times
, 2 September 2013.
- ^
Jonas Parello-Plesner
and
Parag Khanna
, 'Stop fretting about Beijing as a global policeman',
Financial Times
, 28 December 2011.
- ^
Martin Wight
,
Power Politics (Wight book)
, 1978, p 98- 109
- ^
Martin Wight, Power Politics, 1978 , p 102
- ^
Charles Reith
, A new study of police history, Oliver and Boyd, 1956, appendix.
- ^
'In the US, who has the monopoly on force?'
,
Washington Post
, 13 July 2016
- ^
Daniel L Davis
, 'What the 'world police' analogy gets wrong,'
The National Interest
, 2 October 2016
- ^
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk
>pdf>britain-and-the-trade.pdf
- ^
'Before the first world war: what can 1914 tell us about 2014?'
New Statesman
, 23 January 2014
- ^
a
b
Wendy McElroy
, 'How America became the World's Policeman',
Independent Institute
, 20 March 2015
- ^
Connor Murphy
, 'World Police Force?' psu.edu, 31 October 2013
- ^
Scott Baldauf
, 'Why the US didn't intervene in the Rwandan massacre',
Christian Science Monitor
7 April 2009.
- ^
Richard Norton-Taylor
, 'Top judge: US and UK acted as vigilantes in Iraq invasion, Guardian, 17 November 2008
- ^
David Usborne
, 'WMD just an excuse for war, admits Wolfowitz', Independent, 29 May 2003
- ^
Tariq Ali
, 'America's selective vigilantism will make as many enemies as friends',
The Guardian
, 6 September 2011
- ^
Nathan Gardels
and
Hans Blix
, 'America is not the world's policeman ? in Syria or Iraq',
Christian Science Monitor
, 27 August 2013
- ^
Daniel L Davis
, 'What the World Police Analogy gets wrong',
The National Interest
, 2 October 2016
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p8
- ^
a
b
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p40
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p101
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p43-6
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p36-7
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p45
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p157
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p14, 83, 93
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, chapter 8
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p40, p119
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p119-20, p207
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p90, p220-5, chapter 7
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p41-3, p95
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, chapters 6, 7, 8; p153
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p201
- ^
George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, University of Washington, 1987, p41-3, p230-33
- ^
Book reviews : Modelski, G. 1987: Long cycles in world politics. London: Macmillan. 244 pp. £29.50 cloth ? Peter J. Taylor, 1989 (sagepub.com)
Further reading
[
edit
]
- Bokat-Lindell, Spencer. "Is the United States Done Being the World’s Cop?
The New York Times
July 20, 2021
- Knotter, Lucas. "Contemporary Humanitarian Intervention: Beyond Rules-Based International Order."
Human Rights in War
(2020) pp: 1?22.
- Seybolt, Taylor B.
Humanitarian military intervention: the conditions for success and failure
(SIPRI Publication, 2007).
online
- Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy
(Harvard UP, 2020),focus on 1940?1945
- Wertheim, Stephen. "A solution from hell: the United States and the rise of humanitarian interventionism, 1991?2003"
Journal of Genocide Research
(2010) 12:3?4, 149?172, DOI: 10.1080/14623528.2010.522053