Finland-Soviet Union war, 1939?1940
The
background of the Winter War
covers the period before the outbreak of the
Winter War
between
Finland
and the
Soviet Union
(1939?1940), which stretches from the
Finnish Declaration of Independence
in 1917 to the Soviet-Finnish negotiations in 1938?1939.
Before its independence, Finland had been an
autonomous
grand duchy
within
Imperial Russia
.
[1]
During the ensuing
Finnish Civil War
, the
Red Guards
, supported by the Russian
Bolsheviks
, were defeated. Fearful of Soviet designs, in the 1920s and the 1930s, the Finns were constantly attempting to align themselves with
Scandinavian
neutrality, particularly regarding to
Sweden
.
[2]
Furthermore, the Finns engaged in
secret military co-operation
with
Estonia
in the 1930s.
[3]
During the late 1920s and the early 1930s, relations with the Soviet Union had normalized to a degree, but in 1938, the Soviets feared that Finland could be used as a springboard for an invasion and so started negotiations to conclude a military agreement. Meanwhile, Soviet leader
Joseph Stalin
's
revanchism
to recover the territories of the
Russian Empire
that had been lost during its break up as result of the
Bolshevik Revolution
and the
Russian Civil War
made Finland an obvious target.
[4]
The nature of the Soviet demands, which included the installation of Soviet military facilities on Finnish soil, made them go nowhere.
[5]
In August 1939, the Soviet Union and
Nazi Germany
signed the
Molotov?Ribbentrop Pact
in which Eastern Europe was divided into
spheres of interest
. Finland belonged to the Soviet sphere of interest. In September and October 1939, the Baltic states agreed to Soviet demands that included the
establishment of Soviet military bases
within those countries. Stalin then turned his sights on Finland, and was confident of control being gained without great effort.
[6]
The Soviet Union demanded territories on the
Karelian Isthmus
, the islands of the
Gulf of Finland
, a military base near the Finnish capital, and the destruction of all defensive fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.
[7]
Helsinki
again refused, and the
Red Army
attacked on 30 November 1939. Simultaneously, Stalin set up a
puppet government
for the
Finnish Democratic Republic
, headed by the Finnish communist
Otto Wille Kuusinen
.
[8]
Prewar Finland
[
edit
]
First steps of republic
[
edit
]
Finland had been the eastern part of the
Swedish Empire
for centuries until 1809, during the
Napoleonic Wars
, when the
Russian Empire
conquered and converted it to an
autonomous
buffer state
in Russia to protect
Saint Petersburg
, the Russian capital. Finland enjoyed wide autonomy and its own
Senate
until the turn of the century, when Russia began
attempts to assimilate Finland
as part of a general policy to strengthen central government and unify the Empire by
Russification
. The attempts ruined relations and increased the support of Finnish movements vying for
self-determination
.
[1]
The outbreak of the
First World War
gave Finland a window of opportunity to achieve independence. The Finns sought aid from both the
German Empire
and the
Bolsheviks
to that end, and on 6 December 1917, the Finnish Senate
declared the country's independence
. The new Bolshevik government was weak in Russia, and soon the
Russian Civil War
would break out. The Bolshevik leader,
Vladimir Lenin
, could spare no troops or attention for Finland, and so
Soviet Russia
recognised the new Finnish government just three weeks after it had declared its independence. In 1918, the Finns fought a
short civil war
in which the Bolshevik
Red Guards
were armed by 7,000 to 10,000 Russian troops stationed in Finland.
[9]
After the First World War, an intergovernmental organisation, the
League of Nations
, was founded, whose goals included preventing war through
collective security
and settling disputes between countries through negotiations and diplomacy. Finland joined the League in 1920.
[10]
In the 1920s and the 1930s, Finland was politically diverse. The
Communist Party of Finland
was declared illegal in 1931, and the far-right
Patriotic People's Movement
(IKL) had won up to 14 seats in the 200-seat Finnish Parliament. The middle ground, occupied by
Conservatives
,
Liberals
,
Agrarians
, and the
Swedish People's Party
, tended to cluster with the
Social Democratic Party
, whose leader,
Vaino Tanner
, was a strong proponent of the
parliamentary system
.
[11]
By the late 1930s, country had its export-oriented economy growing, had solved most of its "right-wing problem", and was preparing for the
1940 Summer Olympics
.
[10]
Finnish?German relations
[
edit
]
During the closing stages of the First World War, German-trained
Finnish Jager troops
played a key role in the
Finnish Civil War
. The German
Baltic Sea Division
also intervened late in the civil war. Jager troops were volunteers from German-influenced circles, such as university students. That participation in the Finnish struggle for independence created close ties with Germany, but after the German defeat, Scandinavian relations became more important and the main goal of Finland's foreign policy.
[12]
Finnish?German relations cooled after the
National Socialist Party
rose to power in Germany in 1933. Finns admired Imperial Germany, but not the radical and antidemocratic Nazi regime. Finnish conservatives did not accept the Nazis'
state violence
and
antireligious policies
. Still, there was sympathy for German aims to revise the
Treaty of Versailles
, but the official Finnish policy was reserved, especially after the
German invasion of Czechoslovakia
. Finland even recalled its ambassador for a short period.
Finnish Nazis and
ultranationalist
parties such as the Patriotic People's Movement achieved only minor support in several elections, especially in the aftermath of the failed
Mantsala rebellion
in 1932.
[12]
[13]
Finnish?Swedish relations
[
edit
]
After Finland had achieved independence and ended the civil war, the other
Scandinavian countries
were the best candidates for a
political alliance
. Swedish?Finnish cooperation represented a rich vein of shared history in the culture of both nations, and the
Swedish-speaking Finns
had a common language with Sweden. During the civil war, however, Sweden
briefly occupied
Aland
and then supported the local movement that wanted to secede from Finland and join the islands to Sweden. The dispute was resolved by the League of Nations in 1921, and the Aland Islands remained Finnish but were granted autonomy. Other obstacles to closer relations were the ongoing
language strife
on the status of the
Swedish language
in Finland. Sweden had also opposed the upper-class resistance movement against Russification. As a result, young Finnish men received their military training in Germany, which generated the movement. Nevertheless, relations had considerably improved before the Winter War.
[14]
Finland sought security guarantees from the League of Nations, but did not have high expectations. Sweden was one of the founding members of the League and so framed its military policies based on the League's principles of disarmament and sanctions.
[14]
In the mid-1920s, the Finns established a special planning committee, the Erich Committee, which was named after its chairman,
Rafael Erich
, and had top politicians and officers aiming to explore possible military collaboration of Finland with other nations. The prime goal was co-operation with the Scandinavian countries, of which Sweden was the most important prospective partner.
[14]
The Finnish and Swedish militaries engaged in wide-ranging co-operation, but it was more focused on the exchange of information and defence planning for the Aland Islands than on
military exercises
or
materiel
. The Finnish objective was to commit the Swedes by establishing a military-political joint venture in the Aland Islands. If the Swedes undertook to assist Finland in fortifying the islands, an important and useful precedent might be set.
[2]
The
Government of Sweden
was aware of the military co-operation, but carefully avoided committing itself to Finnish foreign policy.
[14]
Secret military co-operation with Estonia
[
edit
]
Finnish?Estonian relations were closest diplomatically after the
Estonian War of Independence
in the 1920s. Although they cooled afterwards, military relations remained close. The Finns considered their close relations with Estonia not to exclude the Scandinavian neutrality policy, but the
military relations
were
top secret
. The countries held joint military exercises, the central aim being to prevent the Soviet
Baltic Fleet
from freely using its strength in the
Gulf of Finland
against either country.
Estonia also sought public security guarantees and signed the
Baltic Entente
in 1934 with
Latvia
and
Lithuania
.
[3]
Relations with the United Kingdom and France
[
edit
]
After the collapse of Imperial Germany in November 1918, the Finns sought new political partners. The
United Kingdom
had been a significant trading partner since the 18th century, and the Finns worked to improve their relations for the next two decades. In the 1930s Finland purchased
Thornycroft
torpedo boats
from the United Kingdom and refrained from buying bomber aircraft from Germany because of British protests. They instead purchased modern
Bristol Blenheims
, which would serve successfully during the Winter War.
[15]
Relations with
France
were important after the First World War and in the 1920s as France played a leading role in the new European security arrangements. In the 1930s, France started to fear the rise of Germany and initiated a
rapprochement with the Soviet Union
, which strained Franco?Finnish relations. However, during the Winter War, France was one of the most important suppliers of military materiel.
[15]
Finnish defence plans
[
edit
]
The
Finnish Defence Forces
called their
military operation plan
against the Soviet Union
Venajan keskitys
("Russian Concentration") in the 1920s. In the last plan in 1934, the Finns saw two possible scenarios. In the VK1 scenario, the Soviets would mobilise all along their western border and deploy only limited forces against Finland. In that case, the Finns would make counterattacks across the border. The VK2 scenario envisaged a much more unfavourable situation. The main defense line would be on the
Karelian Isthmus
; the Finnish forces would repel Soviet attacks in favourable positions and destroy the enemy by
counterattacks
. In the Winter War, the VK2 scenario was flexible, with its basis proved to be correct, but the Finnish general staff badly underestimated the numerical superiority of the
Red Army
.
[16]
Finland had a limited
defence budget
after its independence, especially in the 1930s. Therefore, the Finnish Defence Forces lacked military
materiel
in almost all branches. Much of the military's materiel was outdated and proved to be unsuitable for the field during the Winter War. The material situation then improved but still lagged behind the more modern and well-equipped Red Army.
[17]
Prewar Soviet Union
[
edit
]
One of the main targets of Stalin's
Great Terror
of the 1930s was the large-scale repression of the Red Army leadership,
resulting in 82,000 executions and many more imprisonments and torture; the army lost 80% of its officers. Some were rehabilitated following the disastrous Winter War, as the Soviet leadership realised the Red Army needed skilled commanders.
[20]
Finnish?Soviet relations
[
edit
]
Diplomatic relations
[
edit
]
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland had been tense from the legacy of the two periods of
Russification
at the turn of the century; the failed
Finnish Civil War
and incursions by groups of Finnish nationalists; and the
Viena expedition
in 1918 and the
Aunus expedition
of 1919 into Russian
East Karelia
.
[9]
On 14 October 1920, Finland and
Soviet Russia
signed the
Treaty of Tartu
, which confirmed the new Finnish?Soviet border as the old border between the autonomous
Grand Duchy of Finland
and
Imperial Russia
proper. In addition, Finland received
Petsamo
, with its
ice-free harbour
on the
Arctic Ocean
. The treaty did not prevent the Finnish government from allowing volunteers to cross the border to support the
East Karelian Uprising
in 1921 or expatriate
Finnish communists
from causing
disturbances
in Finland. In 1923, both countries signed the Border Peace Agreement, which normalised the border.
[21]
In 1928, the Soviet Union began
collectivization
in
Ingria
. During the collectivization and the
ethnic cleansing
, the Soviets
captured, killed and deported
Ingrian peasants, which provoked widespread criticism by the Finnish media in 1930. Two years later, the nationalist
Lapua Movement
attempted to overthrow the Finnish government during the
Mantsala rebellion
.
[21]
Nevertheless, in the 1930s, the diplomatic climate between Finland and the Soviet Union gradually improved. In the 1920s, the Soviet Union had offered different non-aggression pacts with Finland, but they were all rejected. The offer was renewed as part of a series of agreements with countries on the Soviets' western border. In 1932, the Soviet Union signed a
non-aggression pact with Finland
, which was reaffirmed in 1934 for ten years.
[21]
Relations between the two countries remained largely distant, however. Foreign trade in Finland was
booming
, but less than 1% was with the Soviet Union.
[22]
In 1934, the Soviet Union joined the
League of Nations
and later accepted other "progressive forces" besides
communist parties
. That change in Soviet attitudes, as well as Finnish internal politics, enabled a short thaw in relations in 1937.
[21]
Stalin and protection of Leningrad
[
edit
]
After the
Russian Civil War
,
Joseph Stalin
was disappointed at the Soviet Union's inability to foment a successful revolution in Finland
[23]
and at the Bolsheviks struggle against national sentiments in the Soviet Union. In 1923, Stalin proclaimed that the main danger in national relations was Great Russian chauvinism. He started the policy of
korenizatsiya
(indigenisation) to promote national communist cadres for every nationality.
[24]
However, in 1937, Stalin encouraged Russian chauvinism, which implied Russians to be politically and culturally superior.
[25]
[26]
The Soviet diplomacy turned towards the recovery of the territories of the Russian Empire. The Soviet Union used the
Communist International
to announce a doctrine in which
bourgeoisie
equalled
fascism
and that
communism
was the natural agency of the
proletariat
. In practice, this meant that anything other than communism would be considered anti-Soviet and fascist.
[23]
The Soviet foreign policy was a mixture of the ideology of
world revolution
and the traditional concerns of Russian national security.
[27]
Under
Stalinism
, the Soviet agriculture production collapsed, which caused
famines in 1932?1933
. Official output numbers of industrial production were used as propaganda to portray the Soviet Union as an economic miracle. The propaganda also used cross-border comparisons with Finland to represent it as a "vicious and reactionary Fascist clique". Finnish Marshal Mannerheim and the leader of the Finnish Social Democrat Party leader,
Vaino Tanner
, were particular hate figures in propaganda.
[28]
Stalin gained nearly-absolute power in 1935?1936, which left only the army as self-governing,
[29]
but even that changed when its officers became the target of the
Great Purge
in 1937?1938.
[30]
In the late 1930s, the Soviet Union was no longer satisfied with the
status quo
in its relations with Finland. This came as a result of a change in Soviet foreign policy, which now pursued the aim of recovering the provinces of the Russian Empire that had been lost during the chaos of the Bolshevik Revolution and the
Russian Civil War
. The Soviets considered that the empire had obtained an optimal balance of security and territory, and their thoughts were shaped by a historical precedent: the 1721
Treaty of Nystad
, which was intended to protect
Saint Petersburg
from the Swedes. They used that precedent to demand the reacquisition of Finland, which would protect the Bolsheviks in
Leningrad
from the rising power of Germany.
[4]
In 1938, Sweden was no longer a major threat to Russia, but the Soviets had not forgotten the role that the Finnish-controlled Aland islands had played as a base of operations for the
German Expeditionary Force
helping the Whites during the Finnish Civil War.
[2]
Finnish?Soviet negotiations
[
edit
]
From 1938 to early 1939
[
edit
]
In April 1938, a junior diplomatic official,
Boris Yartsev
, contacted Finnish Foreign Minister
Rudolf Holsti
and Prime Minister
Aimo Cajander
and stated that the Soviets did not trust Germany and that war was considered to be possible between the two countries in which Germany might use Finland as a base for operations against the Soviet Union. The Red Army would not wait passively behind the border but would rather "advance to meet the enemy".
If Finland fought against Germany, the Soviet Union would offer all possible economic and military assistance. The Soviets would also accept the fortification of Aland islands but demanded "positive guarantees" on Finland's position.
[31]
[32]
[33]
The Finns assured Yartsev that Finland was committed to a policy of neutrality and that they would resist any armed incursion. Yartsev was not satisfied with the reply because of Finland's military weakness. He suggested that Finland could either cede or lease some islands in the
Gulf of Finland
along the seaward approaches to
Leningrad
, which Finland rejected.
[33]
In the mid-1930s, the Soviet ambassador in Helsinki,
Eric Assmus
,
[34]
and the Leningrad Bolshevik Party leader
Andrei Zhdanov
[35]
had presented a similar proposal.
[32]
Negotiations continued in autumn 1938. The Soviets reduced their demands: a
Red Army
operation was no longer an option, and the focus was shifted on securing the
Gulf of Finland
. The Soviets wanted to be informed of key elements of the
Finnish?Estonian Gulf blockade
, the secret military plan against the
Baltic Fleet
. Furthermore, Yartsev suggested for the Finns to fortify
Suursaari
Island but for the Soviets would take care of the island's defence. During the negotiations,
Rudolf Holsti
resigned as foreign minister but not because of the negotiations, and his place was taken by
Eljas Erkko
. Holsti was rather anti-German and so the resignation set off rumours that he had been forced to resign by a Finnish government that was sympathetic to the Germans, which were quickly quelled by the Finnish government.
The Finns attempted to appear impartial, and the interior ministry issued an order banning the far-right IKL. The ban was reversed by the Finnish courts as being unconstitutional. Many years later, the minister then in charge,
Urho Kekkonen
, admitted that it had been a simple gesture to suggest to Moscow that Finland did not harbour a German
fifth column
.
[36]
By the winter of 1939, the Soviets further reduced their demands and sent
Boris Stein
to negotiate. Stein and Erkko met five times. Erkko rejected the Soviet proposals by saying that the Soviet demands would mean the end of Finnish neutrality and displease the Germans. When the chairman of the Finnish Defence Council,
Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim
, was informed of the negotiations, he said that Finland should give up the Suursaari Islands because their defense would be impossible, but his arguments did not persuade the majority of the Finnish government.
[37]
Stein departed Helsinki empty-handed on 6 April.
[5]
The Finns had many reasons to turn down the Soviet offer since they had started negotiations for a military co-operation with Sweden. The Finns had great hopes for the joint Finnish?Swedish defence of the Alands islands and did not want to jeopardise their negotiations. In addition, the violent collectivisation, the
Great Purge
, the
show trials
and the executions in the Soviet Union had given the country a very bad reputation. Furthermore, most Finnish communist leaders in the Soviet Union had been executed during the purge and so the Soviets did not seem to be reliable.
[37]
The Soviet envoys sent to negotiate with Finns were officially of a relatively low rank, but as Vaino Tanner stated, the Finns assumed rightly that they represented some higher state organ of state, probably the Soviet secret police, the
NKVD
.
[31]
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact
[
edit
]
On 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the
Molotov?Ribbentrop Pact
. Publicly, it was a
non-aggression pact
, but it included a secret protocol to divide Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland
and
Romania
into
spheres of interest
, with Finland falling into the Soviet sphere.
[6]
In the immediate aftermath of the pact, the Scandinavian countries and Finland were relieved. The Germans and Soviets were now allies and so there was no German threat against the Soviet Union. However, shortly afterward, Germany
invaded Poland
and so Britain and France declared war against Germany. The Soviets then
invaded Poland
and requested for the
Baltic states
allow the establishment of Soviet military bases and the stationing of troops on their soil. The government of Estonia accepted the
ultimatum
by signing the corresponding agreement in September, and Latvia and Lithuania followed suit in October.
[38]
Soviet demands in late 1939
[
edit
]
On 5 October, the Soviet Union invited Finland to negotiations in Moscow. The Finnish government did not hasten to comply, like the Estonian government earlier. Unlike the Baltic countries, the Finns started a gradual
mobilisation
under the guise of "additional
refresher training
". The Finnish government sent its ambassador in Stockholm,
Juho Kusti Paasikivi
, instead of its foreign minister, Eljas Erkko, to limit his powers as a negotiator. In Moscow, Paasikivi met Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov
and General Secretary Stalin.
[38]
The Soviets demanded for the frontier between the Soviet Union and Finland on the Karelian Isthmus to be moved westward to only 30 kilometres (19 mi) east of
Viipuri
, Finland's second-largest city, to the line between
Koivisto
and
Lipola
. In addition, the Finns would have to destroy all existing fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. Finland also had to cede to the Soviet Union the islands of
Suursaari
,
Tytarsaari
and Koivisto in the Gulf of Finland. In the north, the Soviets demanded the
Kalastajansaarento Peninsula
. The Finns were to lease the
Hanko Peninsula
to the Soviets for 30 years and to permit the Soviets to establish a
military base
there. In exchange, the Soviets would cede
Repola
and
Porajarvi
from
Eastern Karelia
, an area twice as large as the territory demanded from the Finns.
[38]
[40]
The Soviet offer divided the Finnish government. Foreign Minister Eljas Erkko and Defence Minister
Juho Niukkanen
rejected the offer and were backed by President
Kyosti Kallio
. However, Paasikivi and Mannerheim, along with Vaino Tanner, who was later appointed as one of the Finnish negotiators, wanted to accept the Soviet offer.
[27]
[38]
The Finns counted on military assistance from Sweden, and Erkko took part in the Stockholm assembly of Scandinavian leaders on 19 October. There, Erkko privately met Swedish Foreign Minister
Rickard Sandler
, who assured him that he would persuade the Swedish government to assist Finland during a possible war. During the actual war, however, Sandler failed in that task and so resigned.
[41]
Finland was totally isolated by a German and Soviet blockade and attempted in October to obtain arms and ammunition in absolute secrecy by enlisting the German arms dealer
Josef Veltjens
.
[42]
On 31 October, Molotov announced the Soviet demands in public during a session of the
Supreme Soviet
. The Finns made two counteroffers: one on 23 October and another on 3 November. In both offers, Finland would cede the
Terijoki
area to the Soviet Union, which was far less than the Soviets had demanded. The Finnish delegation returned home on 13 November and took for granted that negotiations would continue later.
[41]
Beginning of war
[
edit
]
Military preparations
[
edit
]
The Soviet Union had started an intensive rearmament near the Finnish border in 1938 and 1939. Finnish students and volunteers had spent the late summer of 1939 improving the defensive structures across the Karelian Isthmus. On the Soviet side of the border,
penal labour
worked hard to add some density to sparse road and rail networks.
[43]
In the summer of 1939, an important phase of Soviet planning occurred as told by
Aleksandr Vasilevsky
and
Kirill Meretskov
in their memoirs. The Supreme Council of War ordered the Commander of Leningrad Military District Merestkov to draft an invasion plan, instead of Chief of Staff
Boris Shaposhnikov
. The plan was adopted in July.
[44]
The necessary assault troop deployments and commands were not initiated until October 1939, but operational plans made in September called for the invasion to start in November. Stalin, however, was certain that the Finns would change their minds under Soviet pressure and cede the demanded territories.
[45]
The invasion plans were laid down by the Soviet General Staff under Boris Shaposhnikov and
Aleksandr Vasilevsky
. The Soviet timetable was clearly and rigidly defined, with little or no margin for error. The key date was 21 December, Stalin's 60th birthday. By then, the Finnish capital Helsinki would be "freed of the Fascist oppression".
Andrei Zhdanov
had already commissioned a celebratory piece from
Dmitri Shostakovich
,
Suite on Finnish Themes
, to be performed as the marching bands of the Red Army would parade through Helsinki.
[46]
On 26 November, the Soviets staged the
shelling of Mainila
, an incident in which Soviet artillery shelled an area near the Russian village of Mainila and announced that a Finnish artillery attack had killed Soviet soldiers.
[47]
The Soviet Union demanded that the Finns apologise for the incident and move their forces 20?25 km from the border. The Finns denied any responsibility for the attack, rejected the demands and called for a joint Finnish?Soviet commission to examine the incident. The Soviet Union claimed that the Finnish response was hostile and used it as an excuse to withdraw from the non-aggression pact.
[48]
Red Army assaults
[
edit
]
On 30 November, Soviet forces invaded Finland with 27 divisions, totalling 630,000 men,
bombed civilian boroughs of Helsinki
and quickly reached the
Mannerheim Line
. The shelling of Mainila was a
casus belli
of the Soviet Union as it had withdrawn from non-aggression pacts on 28 November. Germany had staged a
similar incident
to have an excuse to start war against Poland.
[49]
The Soviet Union would later use the
Orzeł incident
to challenge the neutrality of Estonia.
Later, the Finnish statesman Paasikivi commented that the Soviet attack, without a
declaration of war
, violated three non-aggression pacts: the Treaty of Tartu of 1920; the Non-aggression Pact between Finland and the Soviet Union, which was signed 1932 and again in 1934; and the Charter of the League of Nations.
[48]
The invasion was judged illegal by the League of Nations, which expelled the Soviet Union on December 14.
[50]
After the Soviet attack, Mannerheim was appointed as commander-in-chief of the Finnish Defence Forces. Furthermore, the Finnish government changed, with
Risto Ryti
appointed as new prime minister and Vaino Tanner as foreign minister.
[51]
On 1 December, the Soviet Union created a new government for Finland, to be called the
Finnish Democratic Republic
. It was a
puppet regime
headed by
Otto Wille Kuusinen
and became known as the "Terijoki government" since the village of
Terijoki
was the first place to be "liberated" by the Red Army.
[52]
The puppet regime was unsuccessful, and it was quietly discarded during the winter of 1940.
Contrary to Soviet expectations, from the beginning of the conflict, nearly all
working-class
Finns stood behind the legal government.
[53]
That national unity against the Soviet invasion was later called the "
spirit of the Winter War
".
[54]
See also
[
edit
]
References
[
edit
]
- ^
a
b
Trotter 2002
, pp. 3?5
- ^
a
b
c
Edwards 2006
, pp. 36?38
- ^
a
b
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 33?34.
- ^
a
b
Edwards 2006
, pp. 28?29
- ^
a
b
Edwards 2006
, p. 55
- ^
a
b
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 35?37.
- ^
"Soviet Demands October 1939"
(PDF)
. histdoc.net
. Retrieved
2 December
2021
.
- ^
Chubaryan; Shukman 2002
, p. xxi
- ^
a
b
Trotter 2002
, pp. 5?6
- ^
a
b
Edwards 2006
, p. 18
- ^
Edwards 2006
, pp. 26?27
- ^
a
b
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 27?29.
- ^
"Parliamentary elections: 1927?2003"
. Statistics Finland. Archived from
the original
on 2012-05-26
. Retrieved
11 August
2009
.
- ^
a
b
c
d
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 21?24.
- ^
a
b
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 29?30.
- ^
Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Puolustussuunnittelmat 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 65?69.
- ^
Palokangas, Markku (1999). "Suomalaisjoukkojen aseistus ja varustus". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 299?335.
- ^
Tabarovsky, Izabella (Fall 2020).
"RUSSIA'S LOST WAR"
.
The Wilson Quarterly
.
44
(4). THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS.
ISSN
0363-3276
.
OCLC
743409751
. Retrieved
29 April
2021
.
Stalin purged the Red Army officer corps in the years before the war, destroying some 80 percent of officers of all ranks, […] Stalin's onslaught resulted in a total of 82,000 executions […] Soviet leaders released him from prison in March 1940, following the disastrous Soviet attempt to take over Finland. That catastrophe brought home to Soviet leaders that the Red Army needed skilled commanders
- ^
a
b
c
d
e
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 30?33.
- ^
Edwards 2006
, p. 23
- ^
a
b
Edwards 2006
, pp. 43?46
- ^
Timo Vihavainen:
Nationalism and Internationalism. How did the Bolsheviks Cope with National Sentiments?
in
Chulos and Piirainen 2000
, p. 79
- ^
Rayfield 2005
, pp. 253?254
- ^
Timo Vihavainen:
Nationalism and Internationalism. How did the Bolsheviks Cope with National Sentiments?
in
Chulos and Piirainen 2000
, p. 85
- ^
a
b
Chubaryan; Shukman 2002
, pp. xv?xvi
- ^
Edwards 2006
, pp. 32?33
- ^
Rayfield 2005
, pp. 280?281
- ^
Rayfield 2005
, pp. 315?316
- ^
a
b
Edwards 2006
, pp. 41?42
- ^
a
b
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 32?33.
- ^
a
b
Trotter 2002
, pp. 12?13
- ^
Polvinen 1992
, p. 399.
Eric Assmus met Finnish Prime Minister
Toivo Kivimaki
in private on 15 June 1935 stating that "in case of a military conflict in the Mainland Europe, the Soviet Union could be forced to occupy some parts of Finland".
- ^
Polvinen 1992
, pp. 432?433.
Andrei Zhdanov made a public speech at the end of November 1936 stating that Finland should not be a base for the Germans. In that case, Finland would be target of the Red Army assault. The threat was similar than the earlier by Eric Assmus, but this time, it was published in Soviet newspapers.
- ^
Edwards 2006
, pp. 48?51
- ^
a
b
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 34?35.
- ^
a
b
c
d
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 38?41.
- ^
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. p. 41.
- ^
Trotter 2002
, pp. 14?16
- ^
a
b
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 41?43.
- ^
Veltjens 2009
- ^
Edwards 2006
, p. 97
- ^
Manninen 1994
, p. 107
- ^
Manninen, Ohto (1999). "Neuvostoliiton tavoitteet ennen talvisotaa ja sen aikana". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 141?148.
- ^
Edwards 2006
, p. 98
- ^
Tanner 1950
- ^
a
b
Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvalinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. pp. 44?45.
- ^
Edwards 2006
, p. 105
- ^
Minus a Member
at Time magazine on Monday, December 25, 1939
- ^
Trotter 2002
, p. 51
- ^
Trotter 2002
, p. 58
- ^
Trotter 2002
, p. 61
- ^
Soikkanen, Timo (1999). "Talvisodan henki". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
. p. 235.
Sources
[
edit
]
- Conquest, Robert (2008) [1990].
The Great Terror: A Reassessment
. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ISBN
978-0-19-531700-8
.
- Courtois, Stephane
(1999).
The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression
. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
ISBN
978-0-674-07608-2
.
- Chubaryan, Alexander O.; Shukman, Harold (2002).
Stalin and the Soviet?Finnish war 1939?40
. London: Frank Cass.
ISBN
0-7146-5203-2
.
- Chulos, Chris J.; Piirainen, Timo, eds. (2000).
The Fall of an Empire, the Birth of a Nation
. Helsinki: Ashgate.
ISBN
1-85521-902-6
.
- Edwards, Robert (2006).
White Death: Russia's War on Finland 1939?40
. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
ISBN
978-0-297-84630-7
.
- Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti, eds. (1999).
Talvisodan pikkujattilainen
(in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Soderstrom Osakeyhtio. p. 976.
ISBN
951-0-23536-9
.
- Manninen, Ohto
(1994).
Talvisodan salatut taustat
(in Finnish). Porvoo: Kirjaneuvos.
ISBN
952-9052-51-0
.
- Polvinen, Tuomo; Heikkila, Hannu; Immonen, Hannu (1992).
J. K. Paasikivi. Valtiomiehen elamantyo 2 : 1918?1939
(in Finnish). Porvoo, Helsinki, Juva: WSOY.
ISBN
951-0-18122-6
.
- Rayfield, Donald
(2005) [2004].
Stalin and His Hangmen
. Penguin books.
ISBN
978-0-14-100375-7
.
- Tanner, Vaino
(1950).
The Winter War: Finland against Russia 1939-1940
(1st ed.). California: Stanford University Press.
ISBN
9780804704823
.
- Trotter, William R.
(2002) [1991].
The Winter war: The Russo?Finno War of 1939?40
(5th ed.). New York (Great Britain: London): Workman Publishing Company (Great Britain: Aurum Press).
ISBN
1-85410-881-6
.
First published in the United States under the title A Frozen Hell: The Russo?Finnish Winter War of 1939?40
- Veltjens, Klaus (2009).
Seppl: a step ahead of politics
. CreateSpace.
ISBN
978-1-4421-4582-5
.
|
---|
|
|
|
---|
By scale
| |
---|
By source
| |
---|
By topic
| |
---|
|
|
|
|
By country or region
|
---|
Africa
| |
---|
Americas
|
|
---|
Eurasia
|
|
---|
Oceania
| |
---|
|
|
|
|
|
Organizations, publications
|
---|
|
|
|
|