US law on the control and management of nuclear technology
The
Atomic Energy Act of 1946
(
McMahon Act
) determined how the
United States
would control and manage the
nuclear technology
it had jointly developed with its
World War II
allies
, the
United Kingdom
and
Canada
. Most significantly, the Act ruled that
nuclear weapon
development and
nuclear power
management would be under
civilian
, rather than
military
control, and established the
United States Atomic Energy Commission
for this purpose.
It was sponsored by
Senator
Brien McMahon
, a
Democrat
from
Connecticut
, who chaired the United States Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy, and whose hearings in late 1945 and early 1946 led to the fine tuning and passing of the Act. The Senate passed the Act unanimously through
voice vote
, and it passed the
House of Representatives
265?79. Signed into law by
President
Harry S. Truman
on August 1, 1946, it went into effect on January 1, 1947, and the Atomic Energy Commission assumed responsibility for nuclear energy from the
wartime
Manhattan Project
.
The Act was subsequently amended to promote private development of nuclear energy under the
Eisenhower administration
's
Atoms for Peace
program in 1954. In restricting the access to nuclear information to other countries, it created a rift between the United States and its allies, particularly Britain and Canada, which had participated in the Manhattan Project. This resulted in cumbersome command and control arrangements, and in Britain developing its own nuclear weapons. The Act was amended in 1958 to allow the United States to share information with its close allies.
Origins
[
edit
]
Nuclear weapons
were developed during
World War II
by the
wartime
Manhattan Project
. Key scientists working on the project anticipated that their development would have wide-ranging implications. However the project director,
Major General
Leslie R. Groves Jr.
, was reluctant to spend project funds on activities beyond those required to win the war. Nonetheless,
Arthur Compton
of the Metallurgical Project in Chicago commissioned a report on post-war nuclear energy, and the Military Policy Committee, the Manhattan Project's governing body, commissioned a similar study by
Richard Tolman
. Both reports called for a comprehensive, government-supported nuclear energy program, with military, scientific, and industrial aspects.
[1]
In July 1944,
Vannevar Bush
,
James B. Conant
and Irvin Stewart produced a proposal for domestic legislation to control nuclear energy. Conant submitted this to the
Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson
in September 1944,
[2]
and then to the
Interim Committee
, a body created by
President
Harry S. Truman
in May 1945 to supervise, regulate and control nuclear energy until such a time as
Congress
created a permanent body to do so.
[3]
In June 1945, the Interim Committee asked
George L. Harrison
, an assistant to Stimson and a member of the committee, to prepare legislation.
[4]
Creation of the Act
[
edit
]
May?Johnson Bill
[
edit
]
Harrison brought in two experienced
Harvard Law School
-educated War Department lawyers,
Brigadier General
Kenneth Royall
and
William L. Marbury Jr.
, to take up the job of drafting the legislation. The legislation was based on Bush and Conant's proposal, and the organization that it proposed was based on the existing structure of the Manhattan Project. Their draft bill would have created a nine-person commission consisting of five civilian and four military members. It granted the commission broad powers to
acquire property
, operate facilities, conduct research, regulate all forms of nuclear energy, and administer its own security, administrative and audit regimes.
[6]
Royall and Marbury envisaged nuclear energy being controlled by experts, with a minimum of political interference. The commissioners would be appointed for indefinite terms, and the President's power to remove them would be limited. They would be supported by four advisory boards, for military applications, industrial uses, research and medicine, the membership of which would be restricted to those with technical qualifications. Day-to-day running of the organization would be in the hands of an administrator and his deputy. The Royall?Marbury Bill was reviewed by the Interim Committee at its July 19 meeting and revised in line with their suggestions. After the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
lifted the veil of secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project, Royall and Marbury were able to consult with the
Attorney General
, the
Judge Advocate General
and the
Office of Scientific Research and Development
.
[7]
The draft was sent to the President in August for circulation among, and comment from, affected government agencies. Only the
State Department
had objections, on the basis that it was still involved in trying to hammer out an international agreement on nuclear energy.
On October 3, 1945, the bill was introduced in the
House of Representatives
by Congressman
Andrew J. May
from
Kentucky
, the chairman of the
House Military Affairs Committee
, and in the
Senate
by Senator
Edwin C. Johnson
from Colorado, the
ranking member
of the
Senate Military Affairs Committee
. The bill was known as the May-Johnson Bill for its sponsors. May immediately had the bill referred to the Military Affairs Committee, which held hearings on October 9. Bush, Conant and Groves all testified before the committee. But in the Senate Military Affairs Committee, the bill was held up by Senator
Arthur H. Vandenberg
.
[10]
There was a storm of criticism from scientists, particularly those at the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago.
Leo Szilard
and
Harold Urey
were particularly notable critics. The bill created a powerful administrator and deputy administrator, and specifically stated that they might be members of the armed forces. It was feared that they would dominate the part-time commissioners. The fact that the bill emphasized that the administrator had to keep the deputy fully informed further aroused suspicion that the administrator would be an Army officer and the deputy a Navy officer.
The secrecy provisions also frightened many scientists; it contained severe penalties of up to ten years imprisonment and $10,000 in fines for security breaches.
The
Chicago Sun
headline accused the War Department of attempting to railroad the legislation through Congress.
[12]
Legislators found themselves in an unusual and uncomfortable situation. Nuclear weapons were terrifying, and the nature of nuclear energy was not widely understood. Because it was so new, there were no policies or precedents to guide legislators, and traditional party alignments were absent. The scientists who had developed the new technology had never been vocal before, but suddenly were now. The victorious conclusion of
World War II
gave the armed forces enormous prestige, but there still remained the long-standing American distrust of
standing armies
, and the tradition of
civilian control of the military
.
McMahon Bill
[
edit
]
On December 20, 1945, Senator
Brien McMahon
introduced an alternative bill on atomic energy, drafted by the Senate Military Affairs Committee, which quickly became known as the McMahon Bill.
This was initially a very liberal bill regarding the control of scientific research, and was broadly supported by scientists. McMahon framed the controversy as a question of military versus civilian control of atomic energy, although the May-Johnson Bill also provided for civilian control.
The McMahon Bill attempted to address the controversial aspects of the May-Johnson Bill. The number of commissioners was reduced to five, and they would serve full-time. No exemption was provided for serving military officers.
An amendment specified that they have staggered terms of five years.
[17]
While the bill was being debated, the news broke on February 16, 1946, of the defection of
Igor Gouzenko
in Canada, and the subsequent arrest of 22 people. The members of Congress debating the bill feared that "atomic secrets" were being systematically stolen by Soviet
atomic spies
. McMahon convened an
executive session
at which
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director
J. Edgar Hoover
,
Secretary of State
James F. Byrnes
and Groves were called to appear. Groves revealed that the British physicist
Alan Nunn May
had passed information about the Manhattan Project to Soviet agents.
[18]
The more conservative elements in Congress now moved to toughen the act. Section 10, which was formerly titled "Dissemination of Information", now became "Control of Information".
[19]
This new section contained the novel doctrine later described as "
born secret
" or "classified at birth". All information concerning the design, development and manufacture of nuclear weapons was "
restricted data
", and regardless of how it was derived or obtained, was considered classified unless it was specifically declassified. This restriction on free speech, covering an entire subject matter, is still enforced. The "wall of secrecy" set up by the Act meant that atomic energy research and development had to be conducted under the supervision of the Atomic Energy Commission.
[20]
Representative
Helen Gahagan Douglas
, who sponsored the McMahon Bill in the House,
[21]
vigorously defended the dissemination provisions of Section 10 against counterarguments. She dismissed objections that it would "give away the secret of the bomb",
[22]
asserting that America's advantage in nuclear weapons could only be temporary, whereas the bill could perpetuate its lead in scientific research.
[22]
An important addition, known as the Vandenberg Amendment, created a Military Liaison Committee to advise the commission on defense matters.
Section 2 of the Act also created a General Advisory Committee, and a new
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
to oversee the new organization.
[17]
The Senate passed the Act unanimously through
voice vote
on June 1, 1946.
[24]
Considerable political maneuvering was required before it was passed by the House 265?79 on July 20. A compromise bill was then agreed to by both houses on July 26.
[25]
Truman signed the compromise bill into law as the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 on August 1, 1946. When it went into effect at midnight on January 1, 1947, the newly created
Atomic Energy Commission
assumed responsibility for nuclear energy from the wartime Manhattan Project.
Amendment
[
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]
Private production of nuclear energy
[
edit
]
An important omission from the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was any mention of non-governmental use of nuclear energy, since military applications overshadowed all others at the time.
The restrictions of the act related to secrecy, the control of
fissile
materials, the ownership of patents and the operation of production facilities placed a number of legal roadblocks in the way of private nuclear power stations.
This was at odds with the
Eisenhower administration
's
Atoms for Peace
program, and resulted in pressure on federal officials to develop a civilian nuclear power industry that could help justify the government's considerable expenditures on the nuclear weapons program.
In 1953, the Atomic Energy Commission presented a set of draft amendments to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for consideration.
After some debate, this resulted in the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954
.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 proved insufficient in its objective of encouraging privately built and run nuclear reactors. A series of accidents with research reactors, including partial
core meltdowns
, made private companies cautious, and reluctant to become involved with nuclear energy without protection from liability. This led to the
Price?Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act
of 1957,
which capped private liability for nuclear accidents, while providing for adequate compensations for accident victims.
[32]
International relations
[
edit
]
Implementing the McMahon Act created a substantial rift between United States and Britain. The new control of "restricted data" prevented the United States' allies from receiving any information, despite the fact that the British and Canadian governments, before contributing technology and manpower to the
Manhattan Project
, had made agreements with the United States about the post-war sharing of nuclear technology. Those agreements had been formalized in the 1943
Quebec Agreement
. In the case of the United Kingdom, these were developed further in the 1944 Hyde Park Agreement, which was signed by
Winston Churchill
and
Franklin Roosevelt
.
[33]
The Hyde Park Agreement was lost in Roosevelt's papers after his death, and until the American copy of the document was found American officials were puzzled when the British mentioned it.
[33]
The Quebec Agreement was an
executive agreement
that only applied to the
Roosevelt administration
, and the Senate had not seen the document. McMahon told Churchill in 1952 that "If we had seen this Agreement, there would have been no McMahon Act."
The McMahon Act fueled resentment from British scientists and Churchill and led to Britain developing its own nuclear weapons.
Lewis Strauss
, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, proposed in January 1958 that the President should be able to share nuclear information with allies that were making "substantial and material contributions to the national defense and security". In addition to its own nuclear weapons, Britain had hosted American
Strategic Air Command
nuclear bombers since 1948. Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in June 1958, and America and Britain again began sharing nuclear research under the
1958 US?UK Mutual Defence Agreement
.
[37]
The stipulations contained in the Act caused significant controversy during debates over
NATO
's military command structure. Both
Striking Fleet Atlantic
and the
United States Sixth Fleet
have never been allowed to be placed anywhere but directly under American commanding officers?the
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
and Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Forces Southern Europe
?because the dominant legal interpretation of the McMahon Act has been that nuclear striking forces cannot be controlled by non-US commanders. This was the reason for the formation of Striking Fleet Atlantic as an independent entity, instead of being operationally subordinated to the UK Admiral serving as Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic, in October?November 1952.
This was also the reason why the Sixth Fleet, in its NATO guise as Naval Striking and Support Force, South, was placed under American control rather than Allied Forces Mediterranean when the European commands were agreed at the same time.
Case law
[
edit
]
A 2012 court decision concerning a state law attempting to shut down the
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant
affirmed that the Act gives the federal government exclusive authority over safety at nuclear power plants.
[40]
This allowed Vermont Yankee to continue operating until it was voluntarily shut down by the owner for economic reasons in 2014.
[41]
Notes
[
edit
]
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, pp. 324?325.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, pp. 325?326.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, p. 345.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, p. 360.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, pp. 408?415.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, pp. 408?416.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, pp. 428?429.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, p. 431.
- ^
a
b
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, p. 511.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, p. 501.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, p. 512.
- ^
Morland 2004
, pp. 1401?1402.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, p. 510.
- ^
a
b
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, p. 524.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, p. 516.
- ^
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, pp. 528?530.
- ^
"Fact Sheet on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief Funds"
.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
. Archived from
the original
on July 2, 2013
. Retrieved
December 12,
2013
.
- ^
a
b
Hewlett & Anderson 1962
, pp. 457?458.
- ^
"Public Law 85-479"
(PDF)
.
US Government Printing Office
. July 2, 1958
. Retrieved
December 12,
2013
.
- ^
Wald, Matthew L. (August 14, 2013).
"Appeals Court Blocks Attempt by Vermont to Close a Nuclear Plant"
.
New York Times
. Retrieved
June 11,
2018
.
- ^
Abel, David; Ailworth, Erin (August 28, 2013).
"Vermont nuclear power plant to close in 2014 ? Energy prices spell the end"
.
Boston Globe
. Archived from
the original
on June 12, 2018
. Retrieved
June 11,
2018
.
References
[
edit
]
- Byrne, John; Hoffman, Steven M. (1996).
Governing the Atom: The Politics of Risk
. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
ISBN
978-1560008347
.
OCLC
34321338
.
- Calder, Ritchie (17 October 1953). "Cost of Atomic Secrecy: Anglo-US Rivalry".
The Nation
.
177
(16): 303?306.
ISSN
0027-8378
.
- Canleton, Philip L.; Hewlett, Richard G.; Williams, Robert C., eds. (1991).
The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the Present
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ISBN
978-0-8122-1354-6
.
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; Anderson, Oscar E. (1962).
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(PDF)
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ISBN
0-520-07186-7
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637004643
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.
- Hewlett, Richard G.
; Holl, Jack M. (1989).
Atoms for Peace and War, Volume III, 1953?1961 Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission
(PDF)
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ISBN
0-520-06018-0
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. Retrieved
31 May
2017
.
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39
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doi
:
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.
ISSN
1468-2346
.
JSTOR
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.
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Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb
(PDF)
. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History.
OCLC
10913875
. Archived from
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. Retrieved
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.
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(Ph.D.).
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.
- Miller, Byron S. (1948).
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.
The University of Chicago Law Review
.
15
(4): 799?821.
doi
:
10.2307/1597968
.
ISSN
0041-9494
.
JSTOR
1597968
.
- Morland, Howard
(2004).
"Born Secret"
(PDF)
.
Cardozo Law Review
.
26
(4): 1401?1408.
ISSN
0270-5192
. Retrieved
March 4,
2012
.
- Ruebhausen, Oscar M; von Mehren, Robert B. (June 1953). "The Atomic Energy Act and the Private Production of Atomic Power".
Harvard Law Review
.
66
(8): 1450?1496.
doi
:
10.2307/1336868
.
ISSN
0017-811X
.
JSTOR
1336868
.
- Sovacool, Benjamin K.
(2008). "The costs of failure: A preliminary assessment of major energy accidents, 1907?2007".
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36
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:
2008EnPol..36.1802S
.
doi
:
10.1016/j.enpol.2008.01.040
.
ISSN
1873-6777
.
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