June 4, 1946

Special to The New York Times

ASHINGTON, June 3 - Racial segregation of passengers on buses crossing State lines was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court by a six to one decision today.

In a majority opinion by Justice Stanley F. Reed, the tribunal struck down a Virginia statute forcing separation of white and Negro travelers on interstate buses.

Justice Harold H. Burton dissented, while Justices Hugo L. Black and Felix Frankfurter presented concurring opinions.

The Reed finding upset a decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Irene Morgan, a Negro, had been arrested and fined $10 when she refused to change seats on request of a bus driver. She was traveling from Gloucester County, Va., via the District of Columbia to Baltimore and was fined in the court at Middlesex County, Va.

Uniformity Held Necessary

Justice Reed based his decision on the conclusion that the Virginia law imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, where, he held, ``uniformity'' was necessary. The question of racial equality was not before the court.

Justice Burton, dissenting, denied that there existed a requirement for uniformity and declared that it was a fundamental concept of the Constitution that diversified treatment should match diversified needs.

The Supreme Court had been asked to rule (1) whether the Virginia law was repugnant to the Congressional power to regulate commerce between the States; (2) whether the powers reserved to the States allowed them to regulate segregation on interstate buses.

``As there is no Federal act dealing with the separation of races in interstate transportation,'' said Justice Reed, ``we must decide the validity of this Virginia statute on the challenge that it interferes with commerce, as a matter of balance between the exercise of the local police power and the need for national uniformity in the regulations for interstate travel.

Virginia Statute Invalidated

``It seems clear to us that seating arrangements for the different races in interstate motor travel require a single, uniform rule to promote and protect national travel. Consequently, we hold the Virginia statute in controversy invalid.''

Justice Reed thrust aside the Virginia court's argument that the law was passed ``to avoid friction between the races.''

In his dissent, Justice Burton said he did not consider the majority correct in assuming that ``there exists today a requirement of a single uniform rule on the subject.''

``It is a fundamental concept of our Constitution,'' he went on, ``that where conditions are diverse the solution of problems arising out of them may well come through the application of diversified treatment matching the diversified needs as determined by our local governments.''

Justice Burton said he thought the ``inaction of Congress is an important indication that, in the opinion of Congress, this issue is better met without nationally uniform affirmative regulation than with it.''

He declared that the ``fact that eighteen States have prohibited in some degree racial separation in public carriers is important progress in the direction of uniformity.'' Only Congress, he added, could supply ``affirmative national uniformity of action.''

Test Cases Expected

Justice Burton said that on the precedent of the Morgan case, the laws of ten States requiring segregation might be invalidated because they were not uniform; and contrastingly the laws of the eighteen States prohibiting segregation might be questioned because they were not similar. Twenty States, he noted, had not gone so far in either direction.

While the Irene Morgan decision was regarded as of the utmost importance, its impact upon the nine other States demanding racial segregation was not immediately clear. The opinion did not set forth which of these State laws applied the so-called ``Jim Crow'' laws to interstate travelers. Nevertheless, it was understood that test cases would be hastened wherever the precedent of the Irene Morgan case could be employed.

Justice Black, although concurring in the majority opinion, said he still believed that Congress and not the courts, could regulate interstate commerce. But he said that precedents of cases ``decided in recent years over my protest,'' by the Supreme Court, forced him to go along with the majority.

Justice Frankfurter concurred chiefly on the basis of a 70-year-old case.