The Existence of God
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The topic will be treated as follows:
As known through natural reason ("the God of the philosophers")
The problem stated
Formal anti-theism
Had the Theist merely to face a blank
Atheistic
denial of
God's
existence, his task would he comparatively a light one. Formal dogmatic
Atheism
is self-refuting, and has never
de facto
won the reasoned assent of any considerable number of
men
. Nor can
Polytheism
, however easily it may take hold of the popular
imagination
, ever satisfy the mind of a
philosopher
. But there are several varieties of what may be described as virtual
Atheism
which cannot be dismissed so summarily.
There is the
Agnosticism
, for instance, of Herbert Spencer, which, while admitting the rational necessity of postulating the
Absolute
or Unconditioned behind the relative and conditioned objects of our
knowledge
declares that Absolute to be altogether unknowable, to be in fact the Unknowable, about which without being guilty of contradiction we can predicate nothing at all, except perhaps that It exists; and there are other types of
Agnosticism
.
Then again there is
Pantheism
in an almost endless variety of forms, all of which, however, may be
logically
reduced to the three following types:
- the purely materialistic, which, making matter the only reality, would explain life by mechanics and chemistry, reduce abstract thought to the level of an organic process deny any higher ultimate moral value to the
Ten Commandments
than to Newton's law of gravitation, and, finally, identify
God
Himself with the
universe
thus interpreted (see
M
ATERIALISM
;
M
ONISM
);
- the purely idealistic, which, choosing the contrary alternative, would make mind the only reality, convert the material
universe
into an
idea
, and identify
God
with this all-embracing mind or
idea
, conceived as
eternally
evolving itself into passing phases or expressions of being and attaining self-consciousness in the
souls
of men; and
- the combined
materialistic
-
idealistic
, which tries to steer a middle course and without sacrificing mind to matter or matter to mind, would conceive the existing
universe
, with which
God
is identified, as some sort of "double-faced" single entity.
Thus to accomplish even the beginning of his task the Theist has to show, against
Agnostics
, that the
knowledge
of
God
attainable by rational inference however inadequate and imperfect it may be is as
true
and valid, as far as it goes, as any other piece of
knowledge
we possess; and against
Pantheists
that the
God
of reason is a supra-mundane personal
God
distinct both from matter and from the finite
human
mind
that neither we ourselves nor the earth we tread upon enter into the constitution of His being.
Types of theism
But passing from views that are formally anti-theistic, it is found that among Theists themselves certain differences exist which tend to complicate the problem, and increase the difficulty of stating it briefly and clearly. Some of these differences are brief and clear.
Some of these differences are merely formal and accidental and do not affect the substance of the theistic thesis, but others are of substantial importance, as, for instance, whether we can validly establish the
truth
of
God's
existence by the same kind of rational inference (e.g. from effect to cause) as we employ in other departments of
knowledge
, or whether, in order to justify our
belief
in this
truth
, we must not rather rely on some
transcendental
principle or axiom, superior and antecedent to
dialectical
reasoning; or on immediate
intuition
; or on some moral, sentimental, emotional, or æsthetic
instinct
or perception, which is
voluntary
rather than
intellectual
.
Kant
denied in the name of "pure reason" the inferential validity of the classical theistic
proofs
, while in the name of "practical reason" he postulated
God's
existence as an implicate of the moral law, and
Kant's
method has been followed or imitated by many Theists by some who fully agree with him in rejecting the classical arguments; by others, who, without going so far,
believe
in the apologetical expediency of trying to persuade rather than convince men to be Theists. A moderate reaction against the too rigidly mathematical intellectualism of
Descartes
was to be welcomed, but the
Kantian
reaction by its excesses has injured the cause of Theism and helped forward the cause of anti-theistic philosophy. Herbert Spencer, as is well known, borrowed most of his arguments for
Agnosticism
from
Hamilton
and Mansel, who had popularized
Kantian
criticism in
England
, while in trying to improve on
Kant's
reconstructive transcendentalism, his German disciples (Fichte, Schelling,
Hegel
) drifted into
Pantheism
.
Kant
also helped to prepare the way for the total disparagement of
human
reason
in relation to religious
truth
, which constitutes the negative side of
Traditionalism
, while the appeal of that system on the positive side to the common consent and tradition of
mankind
as the chief or sole criterion of
truth
and more especially of religious
truth
its authority as a criterion being traced ultimately to a positive
Divine revelation
is, like
Kant's
refuge in practical reason, merely an illogical attempt to escape from
Agnosticism
.
Again, though
Ontologism
like that of
Malebranche
(d. 1715) is older than
Kant
, its revival in the nineteenth century (by
Gioberti
,
Rosmini
, and others) has been inspired to some extent by
Kantian
influences. This system maintains that we have naturally some immediate consciousness, however dim at first, or some
intuitive
knowledge
of
God
not indeed that we see Him
in His essence face to face
but that we
know
Him in His relation to creatures by the same act of cognition according to
Rosmini
, as we become conscious of being in general and therefore that the
truth
of His existence is as much a datum of
philosophy
as is the abstract
idea
of being.
Finally, the philosophy of
Modernism
about which there has recently been such a stir is a somewhat complex medley of these various systems and tendencies; its main features as a system are:
- negatively, a thoroughgoing
intellectual
Agnosticism
, and
- positively, the assertion of an immediate sense or experience of
God
as immanent in the life of the
soul
an experience which is at first only subconscious, but which, when the requisite
moral
dispositions are present, becomes an object of conscious
certainty
.
Now all these varying types of Theism, in so far as they are opposed to the classical and traditional type, may be reduced to one or other of the two following propositions:
- that we have naturally an immediate consciousness or
intuition
of
God's
existence and may therefore dispense with any attempt to prove this
truth
inferentially;
- that, though we do not
know
this
truth
intuitively
and cannot prove it inferentially in such a way as to satisfy the speculative reason, we can, nevertheless, and must conscientiously believe it on other than strictly
intellectual
grounds.
But an appeal to experience, not to mention other objections, is sufficient to negative the first proposition and the second, which, as history has already made clear, is an illogical compromise with
Agnosticism
, is best refuted by a simple statement of the theistic Proofs. It is not the
proofs
that are found to be fallacious but the criticism which rejects them. It is
true
of course and no Theist denies it that for the proper
intellectual
appreciation of theistic
proofs
moral
dispositions are required, and that moral consciousness, the æsthetic faculty, and whatever other powers or capacities belong to man's spiritual nature, constitute or supply so many data on which to base inferential
proofs
. But this is very different from holding that we possess any faculty or power which assures us of
God's
existence and which is independent of, and superior to, the
intellectual
laws
that regulate our assent to
truth
in general that in the religious sphere we can transcend those
laws
without confessing our
belief
in
God
to be irrational. It is also
true
that a mere barren
intellectual
assent to the
truth
of
God's
existence and such an assent is conceivable falls very far short of what religious assent ought to be; that what is taught in
revealed
religion
about the worthlessness of
faith
uninformed by charity has its counterpart in natural religion; and that practical Theism, if it pretends to be adequate, must appeal not merely to the
intellect
but to the heart and
conscience
of
mankind
and be capable of winning the total allegiance of
rational
creatures. But here again we meet with exaggeration and confusion on the part of those Theists who would substitute for
intellectual
assent something that does not exclude but presupposes it and is only required to complement it. The
truth
and pertinency of these observations will be made clear by the following summary of the classical arguments for
God's
existence.
Theistic proofs
The arguments for
God's
existence are variously classified and entitled by different writers, but all agree in recognizing the distinction between
a priori
, or
deductive
, and
a posteriori
, or
inductive reasoning
in this connection. And while all admit the validity and sufficiency of the latter method, opinion is divided in regard to the former. Some maintain that a valid
a priori
proof
(usually called the ontological) is available; others deny this completely; while some others maintain an attitude of compromise or neutrality. This difference, it should be observed, applies only to the question of proving
God's
actual existence; for, His self-existence being admitted, it is
necessary
to employ
a priori
or
deductive
inference in order to arrive at a
knowledge
of His nature and attributes, and as it is impossible to develop the arguments for His existence without some working notion of His nature, it is
necessary
to some extent to anticipate the
deductive
stage and combine the
a priori
with the
a posteriori
method. But no strictly
a priori
conclusion need be more than hypothetically assumed at this stage.
A posteriori
argument
St. Thomas
(
Summa Theologica
I:2:3; Cont. Gent., I, xiii) and after him many scholastic writers advance the five following arguments to prove the existence of
God
:
- Motion, i.e. the passing from power to act, as it takes place in the
universe
implies a first unmoved Mover (
primum movens immobile
), who is
God
; else we should postulate an
infinite
series of movers, which is inconceivable.
- For the same reason efficient causes, as we see them operating in this world, imply the existence of a First Cause that is uncaused, i.e. that possesses in itself the sufficient reason for its existence; and this is
God
.
- The fact that contingent beings exist, i.e. beings whose non-existence is recognized as possible, implies the existence of a
necessary
being, who is
God
.
- The graduated perfections of being actually existing in the
universe
can be understood only by comparison with an absolute standard that is also actual, i.e., an
infinitely
perfect Being such as
God
.
- The wonderful order or evidence of intelligent design which the
universe
exhibits implies the existence of a supramundane Designer, who is no other than
God
Himself.
To these many Theists add other arguments:
- the common consent of
mankind
(usually described by
Catholic
writers as the
moral
argument),
- from the internal witness of
conscience
to the supremacy of the moral law, and, therefore, to the existence of a supreme Lawgiver (this may be called the
ethical
argument, or
- from the existence and perception of beauty in the
universe
(the
aesthetical
argument).
One might go on, indeed, almost indefinitely multiplying and distinguishing arguments; but to do so would only lead to confusion.
The various arguments mentioned and the same is
true
of others that might be added are not in reality distinct and independent arguments, but only so many partial statements of one and the same general argument, which is perhaps best described as the
cosmological
. This argument assumes the validity of the principle of
causality
or sufficient reason and, stated in its most comprehensive form, amounts to this: that it is impossible according to the
laws
of human thought to give any ultimate rational explanation of the phenomena of external experience and of internal consciousness in other words to synthesize the data which the actual
universe
as a whole supplies (and this is the recognized aim of
philosophy
) unless by admitting the existence of a self-sufficient and self-explanatory cause or ground of being and activity, to which all these phenomena may be ultimately referred.
It is, therefore, mainly a question of method and expediency what particular points one may select from the multitude available to illustrate and enforce the general
a posteriori
argument. For our purpose it will suffice to state as briefly as possible
- the general argument proving the self-existence of a First Cause,
- the special arguments proving the existence of an intelligent Designer and
- of a Supreme Moral Ruler, and
- the confirmatory argument from the general Consent of
mankind
.
(a) The general causality argument
We must start by assuming the objective
certainty
and validity of the principle of
causality
or sufficient reason an assumption upon which the value of the physical
sciences
and of
human
knowledge
generally is based. To question its objective
certainty
, as did
Kant
, and represent it as a mere
mental
a priori, or possessing only subjective validity, would open the door to subjectivism and universal scepticism. It is impossible to prove the principle of
causality
, just as it is impossible to prove the principle of contradiction; but it is not difficult to see that if the former is denied the latter may also be denied and the whole process of human reasoning declared fallacious. The principle states that whatever exists or happens must have a sufficient reason for its existence or occurrence either in itself or in something else; in other words that whatever does not exist of absolute necessity - whatever is not self-existent cannot exist without a proportionate cause external to itself; and if this principle is valid when employed by the scientist to explain the phenomena of physics it must be equally valid when employed by the
philosopher
for the ultimate explanation of the
universe
as a whole. In the
universe
we observe that certain things are effects, i.e. they depend for their existence on other things, and these again on others; but, however far back we may extend this series of effects and dependent causes, we must, if
human
reason
is to be satisfied, come ultimately to a cause that is not itself an effect, in other words to an uncaused cause or self-existent being which is the ground and cause of all being. And this conclusion, as thus stated, is virtually admitted by
agnostics
and
Pantheists
, all of whom are
obliged
to speak of an eternal something underlying the phenomenal
universe
, whether this something be the "Unknown", or the "Absolute", or the "Unconscious", or "Matter" itself, or the "Ego", or the "Idea" of being, or the "Will"; these are so many substitutes for the uncaused cause or self-existent being of Theism. What
anti-Theists
refuse to admit is not the existence of a First Cause in an indeterminate sense, but the existence of an intelligent and free First Cause, a personal
God
, distinct from the material
universe
and the
human
mind
. But the very same reason that compels us to postulate a First Cause at all requires that this cause should be a free and intelligent being. The spiritual world of
intellect
and
free will
must be recognized by the sane
philosopher
to be as real as the world of matter; man knows that he has a spiritual nature and performs spiritual acts as clearly and as certainly as he knows that he has eyes to see with and ears to hear with; and the phenomena of man's spiritual nature can only be explained in one way by attributing spirituality, i.e. intelligence and
free will
, to the First Cause, in other words by recognizing a personal
God
. For the cause in all cases must be proportionate to the effect, i.e. must contain somehow in itself every perfection of being that is realized in the effect.
The cogency of this argument becomes more apparent if account be taken of the fact that the human species had its origin at a comparatively late period in the history of the actual
universe
. There was a time when neither man nor any other living thing inhabited this globe of ours; and without pressing the point regarding the origin of life itself from inanimate matter or the evolution of man's body from lower organic types, it may be maintained with absolute confidence that no explanation of the origin of man's
soul
can be made out on evolutionary lines, and that recourse must be had to the creative power of a spiritual or personal First Cause. It might also be urged, as an inference from the physical theories commonly accepted by present-day scientists, that the actual organization of the material
universe
had a definite beginning in time. If it be
true
that the goal towards which physical evolution is tending is the uniform distribution of heat and other forms of energy, it would follow clearly that the existing process has not been going on from
eternity
; else the goal would have been reached long ago. And if the process had a beginning, how did it originate? If the primal mass was inert and uniform, it is impossible to conceive how motion and differentiation were introduced except from without, while if these are held to be coeval with matter, the cosmic process, which is
ex hypothesi
is temporal, would be eternal, unless it be granted that matter itself had a definite beginning in time.
But the argument, strictly speaking, is conclusive even if it be granted that the world may have existed from
eternity
, in the sense, that is, that, no matter how far back one may go, no point of time can be reached at which created being was not already in existence. In this sense
Aristotle
held matter to be eternal and
St. Thomas
, while denying the fact, admitted the possibility of its being so. But such relative
eternity
is nothing more in reality than
infinite
or indefinite temporal duration and is altogether different from the
eternity
we attribute to
God
. Hence to admit that the world might possibly be eternal in this sense implies no denial of the essentially finite and contingent character of its existence. On the contrary it helps to emphasize this
truth
, for the same relation of dependence upon a self-existing cause which is implied in the contingency of any single being is implied
a fortiori
in the existence of an
infinite
series of such beings, supposing such a series to be possible.
Nor can it be maintained with
Pantheists
that the world, whether of matter or of mind or of both, contains within itself the sufficient reason of its own existence. A self-existing world would exist of absolute necessity and would be
infinite
in every kind of perfection; but of nothing are we more certain than that the world as we
know
it, in its totality as well as in its parts, realizes only finite degrees of perfection. It is a mere contradiction in terms, however much one may try to cover up and conceal the contradiction by an ambiguous and confusing use of language, to predicate
infinity
of matter or of the
human
mind
, and one or the other or both must be held by the
Pantheist
to be
infinite
. In other words the distinction between the finite and the
infinite
must be abolished and the principle of contradiction denied. This criticism applies to every variety of
Pantheism
strictly so called, while crude, materialistic
Pantheism
involves so many additional and more obvious absurdities that hardly any
philosopher
deserving of the name will be found to maintain it in our day. On the other hand, as regards idealistic
Pantheism
, which enjoys a considerable vogue in our day, it is to be observed in the first place that in many cases this is a tendency rather than a formal
doctrine
, that it is in fact nothing more than a confused and perverted form of Theism, based especially upon an exaggerated and one-sided view of Divine immanence (see below, iii). And this confusion works to the advantage of
Pantheism
by enabling it to make a specious appeal to the very arguments which justify Theism. Indeed the whole strength of the
pantheistic
position as against
Atheism
lies in what it holds in common with Theism; while, on the other hand, its weakness as a world theory becomes evident as soon as it diverges from or contradicts Theism. Whereas Theism, for example, safeguards such primary
truths
as the reality of human
personality
, freedom, and moral responsibility,
Pantheism
is
obliged
to sacrifice all these, to deny the existence of
evil
, whether physical or moral, to destroy the rational basis of religion, and, under pretence of making man his own God, to rob him of nearly all his plain, common sense convictions and of all his highest incentives to good conduct. The philosophy which leads to such results cannot but be radically unsound.
(b) The argument from design
The special argument based on the existence of order or design in the
universe
(also called the
teleological argument
) proves immediately the existence of a supramundane mind of vast intelligence, and ultimately the existence of
God
. This argument is capable of being developed at great length, but it must be stated here very briefly. It has always been a favourite argument both with
philosophers
and with popular apologists of Theism; and though, during the earlier excesses of enthusiasm for or against Darwinianism, it was often asserted or admitted that the evolutionary hypothesis had overthrown the teleological argument, it is now recognized that the very opposite is
true
, and that the evidences of design which the
universe
exhibits are not less but more impressive when viewed from the evolutionary standpoint. To begin with particular examples of adaptation which may be appealed to in countless number the eye, for instance, as an organ of sight is a conspicuous embodiment of intelligent purpose and not less but more so when viewed as the product of an evolutionary process rather than the immediate handiwork of the Creator. There is no option in such cases between the hypothesis of a directing intelligence and that of blind chance, and the absurdity of supposing that the eye originated suddenly by a single blind chance is augmented a thousand-fold by suggesting that it may be the product of a progressive series of such chances. "Natural selection", "survival of the fittest", and similar terms merely describe certain phases in the supposed process of evolution without helping the least to explain it; and as opposed to teleology they mean nothing more than blind chance. The eye is only one of the countless examples of adaptation to particular ends discernible in every part of the
universe
, inorganic as well as organic; for the atom as well as the cell contributes to the evidence available. Nor is the argument weakened by our inability in many cases to explain the particular purpose of certain structures or organisms. Our
knowledge
of nature is too limited to be made the measure of nature's entire design, while as against our
ignorance
of some particular purposes we are entitled to maintain the presumption that if intelligence is anywhere apparent it is dominant everywhere. Moreover, in our search for particular instances of design we must not overlook the evidence supplied by the harmonious unity of nature as a whole. The
universe
as we
know
it is a cosmos, a vastly complex system of correlated and interdependent parts, each subject to particular
laws
and all together subject to a
common law
or a combination of
laws
as the result of which the pursuit of particular ends is made to contribute in a marvellous way to the attainment of a common purpose; and it is simply inconceivable that this cosmic unity should be the product of chance or accident. If it be objected that there is another side to the picture, that the
universe
abounds in imperfections maladjustments, failures, seemingly purposeless waste the reply is not far to seek. For it is not maintained that the existing world is the best possible, and it is only on the supposition of its being so that the imperfections referred to would be excluded. Admitting without exaggerating their reality admitting, that is, the existence of physical
evil
there still remains a large balance on the side of order and harmony, and to account for this there is required not only an intelligent mind but one that is good and benevolent, though so far as this special argument goes this mind might conceivably be finite. To prove the
infinity
of the world's Designer it is
necessary
to fall back on the general argument already explained and on the
deductive
argument to be explained below by which
infinity
is inferred from self-existence. Finally, by way of direct reply to the problem suggested by the objection, it is to be observed that, to appreciate fully the evidence for design, we must, in addition to particular instances of adaptation and to the cosmic unity observable in the world of today, consider the historical continuity of nature throughout indefinite ages in the past and indefinite ages to come. We do not and cannot comprehend the full scope of nature's design, for it is not a static
universe
we have to study but a
universe
that is progressively unfolding itself and moving towards the fulfilment of an ultimate purpose under the guidance of a master mind. And towards that purpose the imperfect as well as the perfect apparent
evil
and discord as well as obvious good order may contribute in ways which we can but dimly discern. The well-balanced
philosopher
, who realizes his own limitations in the presence of nature's Designer, so far from claiming that every detail of that Designer's purpose should at present be plain to his inferior intelligence, will be content to await the final solution of enigmas which the hereafter promises to furnish.
(c) The argument from conscience
To
Newman
and others the argument from
conscience
, or the sense of moral responsibility, has seemed the most intimately persuasive of all the arguments for
God's
existence, while to it alone
Kant
allowed an absolute value. But this is not an independent argument, although, properly understood, it serves to emphasize a point in the general a posteriori
proof
which is calculated to appeal with particular force to many
minds
. It is not that
conscience
, as such, contains a direct revelation or
intuition
of
God
as the author of the moral law, but that, taking man's sense of moral responsibility as a phenomenon to be explained, no ultimate explanation can be given except by supposing the existence of a Superior and Lawgiver whom man is bound to obey. And just as the argument from design brings out prominently the attribute of intelligence, so the argument from conscience brings out the attribute of
holiness
in the First Cause and self-existent Personal Being with whom we must ultimately identify the Designer and the Lawgiver.
(d) The argument from universal consent
The confirmatory argument based on the consent of
mankind
may be stated briefly as follows:
mankind
as a whole has at all times and everywhere believed and continues to
believe
in the existence of some superior being or beings on whom the material world and man himself are dependent, and this fact cannot be accounted for except by admitting that this
belief
is
true
or at least contains a germ of
truth
. It is admitted of course that
Polytheism
,
Dualism
,
Pantheism
, and other forms of
error
and
superstition
have mingled with and disfigured this universal
belief
of
mankind
, but this does not destroy the force of the argument we are considering. For at least the germinal
truth
which consists in the recognition of some kind of deity is common to every form of religion and can therefore claim in its support the universal consent of
mankind
. And how can this consent be explained except as a result of the perception by the minds of men of the evidence for the existence of deity? It is too large a subject to be entered upon here the discussion of the various theories that have been advanced to account in some other way for the origin and universality of religion; but it may safely be said that, abstracting from revelation, which need not be discussed at this stage, no other theory will stand the test of criticism. And, assuming that this is the best explanation philosophy has to offer, it may further be maintained that this consent of
mankind
tells ultimately in favour of Theism. For it is clear from history that religion is liable to degenerate, and has in many instances degenerated instead of progressing; and even if it be impossible to prove conclusively that
Monotheism
was the primitive historical religion, there is nevertheless a good deal of positive evidence adducible in support of this contention. And if this be the
true
reading of history, it is permissible to interpret the universality of religion as witnessing implicitly to the original
truth
which, however much obscured it may have become, in many cases could never be entirely obliterated. But even if the history of religion is to read as a record of progressive development one ought in all fairness, in accordance with a well-recognized principle, to seek its
true
meaning and significance not at the lowest but at the highest point of development; and it cannot be denied that Theism in the strict sense is the ultimate form which religion naturally tends to assume.
If there have been and are today
atheistic
philosophers
who oppose the common
belief
of
mankind
, these are comparatively few and their dissent only serves to emphasize more strongly the consent of normal humanity. Their existence is an abnormality to be accounted for as such things usually are. Could it be claimed on their behalf, individually or collectively, that in ability,
education
, character, or life they excel the
infinitely
larger number of cultured men who adhere on conviction to what the race at large has believed, then indeed it might be admitted that their opposition would be somewhat formidable. But no such claim can be made; on the contrary, if a comparison were called for it would be easy to make out an overwhelming case for the other side. Or again, if it were
true
that the progress of
knowledge
had brought to light any new and serious difficulties against religion, there would, especially in view of the modern vogue of
Agnosticism
, be some reason for alarm as to the soundness of the traditional
belief
. But so far is this from being the case that in the words of Professor Huxley an unsuspected witness "not a solitary problem presents itself to the
philosophical
Theist at the present day which has not existed from the time that
philosophers
began to think out the
logical
grounds and the
logical
consequences of Theism" (Life and Letters of Ch. Darwin by F. Darwin, II, p. 203). Substantially the same arguments as are used today were employed by old-time sceptical
Atheists
in the effort to overthrow man's
belief
in the existence of the Divine, and the fact that this
belief
has withstood repeated assaults during so many ages in the past is the best guarantee of its permanency in the future. It is too firmly implanted in the depths of man's
soul
for little surface storms to uproot it.
A priori
, or ontological, argument
This argument undertakes to deduce the existence of
God
from the
idea
of Him as the Infinite which is present to the
human
mind
; but as already stated, theistic
philosophers
are not agreed as to the
logical
validity of this deduction.
As stated by
St. Anselm
, the argument runs thus: The
idea
of
God
as the Infinite means the greatest Being that can be thought of, but unless actual existence outside the mind is included in this
idea
,
God
would not be the greatest conceivable Being since a Being that exists both in the mind as an object of thought, and outside the mind or objectively, would be greater than a Being that exists in the mind only; therefore
God
exists not only in the mind but outside of it.
Descartes
states the argument in a slightly different way as follows: Whatever is contained in a clear and distinct
idea
of a thing must be predicated of that thing; but a clear and distinct
idea
of an absolutely perfect Being contains the notion of actual existence; therefore since we have the
idea
of an absolutely perfect Being such a Being must really exist.
To mention a third form of statement,
Leibniz
would put the argument thus:
God
is at least possible since the concept of Him as the Infinite implies no contradiction; but if He is possible He must exist because the concept of Him involves existence. In St. Anselm's own day this argument was objected to by Gaunilo, who maintained as a
reductio ad absurdum
that were it valid one could prove by means of it the actual existence somewhere of an ideal island far surpassing in riches and delights the fabled Isles of the Blessed. But this criticism however smart it may seem is clearly unsound, for it overlooks the fact that the argument is not intended to apply to finite ideals but only to the strictly
infinite
; and if it is admitted that we possess a
true
idea
of the
infinite
, and that this
idea
is not self-contradictory, it does not seem possible to find any flaw in the argument. Actual existence is certainly included in any
true
concept of the Infinite, and the
person
who admits that he has a concept of an Infinite Being cannot deny that he conceives it as actually existing. But the difficulty is with regard to this preliminary admission, which if challenged as it is in fact challenged by
Agnostics
requires to be justified by recurring to the
a posteriori
argument, i.e. to the inference by way of
causality
from contingency to self-existence and thence by way of deduction to
infinity
. Hence the great majority of scholastic
philosophers
have rejected the ontological argument as propounded by
St. Anselm
and
Descartes
nor as put forward by Leibniz does it escape the difficulty that has been stated.
As known through faith ("the God of revelation")
Sacred Scriptures
Neither in the Old or
New Testament
do we find any elaborate argumentation devoted to proving that
God
exists. This
truth
is rather taken for granted, as being something, for example, that only the fool will deny in his heart [
Psalm 13:1
and
52:1
]; and argumentation, when resorted to, is directed chiefly against
polytheism
and
idolatry
. But in several passages we have a cursory appeal to some phase of the general
cosmological
argument: v.g.
Psalm 18:1
and
93:5 sqq.
,
Isaiah 41:26 sqq.
; II Mach., vii, 28, etc.; and in some few others Wis. xiii, 1-9; Rom., i, 18,20 the argument is presented in a
philosophical
way, and men who reason rightly are held to be inexcusable for failing to recognize and worship the
one true God
, the Author and Ruler of the
universe
.
These two latter texts merit more than passing attention. Wis., xiii, 1-9 reads:
But all men are vain in whom there is not the
knowledge
of
God
: and who by these good things that are seen, could not understand him that is, neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman: but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon, to be the gods that rule the world. With whose beauty, if they, being delighted, took them to be gods: let them
know
how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they: for the first author of beauty made all those things. Or if they admired their power and effects, let them understand by them that he that made them, is mightier than they: for by the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby. But yet as to these they are less to be blamed. For they perhaps
err
, seeking
God
, and desirous to find him. For being conversant among his works, they search: and they are persuaded that the things are good which are seen. But then again they are not to be pardoned. For if they were able to
know
so much as to make a judgment of the world: how did they not more easily find out the Lord thereof?
Here it is clearly taught
- that the phenomenal or contingent world the things that are seen requires a cause distinct from and greater than itself or any of its elements;
- that this cause who is
God
is not unknowable, but is known with
certainty
not only to exist but to possess in Himself, in a higher degree, whatever beauty, strength, or other perfections are realized in His works,
- that this conclusion is attainable by the right exercise of
human
reason
, without reference to
supernatural
revelation, and that
philosophers
, therefore, who are able to interpret the world philosophically, are inexcusable for their
ignorance
of the
true God
, their failure, it is implied, being due rather to lack of good will than to the incapacity of the
human
mind
.
Substantially the same
doctrine
is laid down more briefly by
St. Paul
in
Romans 1:18-20
:
For the wrath of
God
is revealed from
heaven
against all ungodliness and
injustice
of those men that detain the
truth
of
God
in
injustice
: because that which is known of
God
is manifest in them. For
God
hath manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, his eternal power also and divinity: so that they are inexcusable.
It is to be observed that the
pagans
of whom
St. Paul
is speaking are not blamed for their
ignorance
of
supernatural
revelation and the Mosaic law, but for failing to preserve or for corrupting that
knowledge
of
God
and of man's
duty
towards Him which nature itself ought to have taught them. Indeed it is not pure
ignorance
as such they are blamed for, but that wilful shirking of
truth
which renders
ignorance
culpable. Even under the corruptions of
paganism
St. Paul
recognized the indestructible permanency of germinal religious
truth
(cf.
Romans 2:14-15
).
It is clear from these passages that
Agnosticism
and
Pantheism
are condemned by revelation, while the validity of the general
proof
of
God's
existence given above is confirmed. It is also clear that the extreme form of
Traditionalism
, which would hold that no certain
knowledge
of
God's
existence or nature is attainable by
human
reason
without the aid of
supernatural
revelation, is condemned.
Church councils
What the author of Wisdom and
St. Paul
and after them the Fathers and
theologians
had constantly taught, has been solemnly defined by the
Vatican Council
. In the first place, as against
Agnosticism
and
Traditionalism
, the council teaches (cap. ii, De revelat.)
that
God
, the first cause (
principium
) and last end of all things, can, from created things, be known with
certainty
by the natural light of
human
reason
(Denz., 1785-old no. 1634)
and in the corresponding canon (can. i, De revelat.) it
anathematizes
anyone who would say
that the
one true God
our Creator and Lord, cannot, through the things that are made, be known with
certainty
by the natural light of
human
reason
(Denz., 1806-old no. 1653).
As against
Agnosticism
this definition needs no explanation. As against
Traditionalism
, it is to be observed that the definition is directed only against the extreme form of that theory, as held by
Lamennais
and others according to which taking
human
nature
as it is there would not, and could not, have been any
true
or certain
knowledge
of
God
, among men, had there not been at least a primitive
supernatural
revelation in other words, natural religion as such is an impossibility. There is no reference to milder forms of
Traditionalism
which hold social tradition and
education
to be
necessary
for the development of man's rational powers, and consequently deny, for example, that an individual cut off from human
society
from his infancy, and left entirely to himself, could ever attain a certain
knowledge
of
God
, or any strictly rational
knowledge
at all. That is a
psychological
problem on which the council has nothing to say. Neither does it deny that even in case of the
homo socialis
a certain degree of
education
and culture may be required in order that he may, by independent reasoning, arrive at a
knowledge
of
God
; but it merely affirms the broad principle that by the proper use of their natural reasoning power, applied to the phenomena of the
universe
, men are able to
know
God
with
certainty
.
In the next place, as against
Pantheism
, the council (cap. i, De Deo) teaches that
God
, "since He is one singular, altogether simple and incommutable spiritual substance, must be proclaimed to be really and essentially [re et essentia) distinct from the world most
happy
in and by Himself, and ineffably above and beyond all things, actual or possible, besides Himself" (
Denzinger
, 1782-old no. 1631); and in the corresponding canons (ii-iv, De Deo)
anathema
is pronounced against anyone who would say "that nothing exists but matter"; or "that the substance or essence of
God
and of all things is one and the same"; or "that finite things both corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the Divine substance; or that the Divine essence by a manifestation or evolution of itself becomes all things; or that
God
is universal or indefinite being, which by determining itself constitutes the
universe
of things distinguished into genera, species and
individuals
" (
Denzinger
, 1802-4; old no. 1648).
These definitions are framed so as to cover and exclude every type of the
pantheistic
theory, and nobody will deny that they are in harmony with Scriptural teaching. The
doctrine
of
creation
, for example, than which none is more clearly taught or more frequently emphasized in
Sacred Scripture
, is radically opposed to
Pantheism
creation as the sacred writers understand it being the
voluntary
act of a free agent bringing creatures into being out of nothingness.
The knowability of God
It will be observed that neither the Scriptural texts we have quoted nor the
conciliar
decrees say that
God's
existence can be
proved
or
demonstrated
; they merely affirm that it can be
known with
certainty
. Now one may, if one wishes, insist on the distinction between what is
knowable
and what is
demonstrable
, but in the present connection this distinction has little real import. It has never been claimed that
God's
existence can be
proved
mathematically, as a proposition in geometry is
proved
, and most Theists reject every form of the ontological or
deductive
proof
. But if the term
proof
or demonstration may be, as it often is, applied to
a posteriori
or
inductive
inference, by means of which
knowledge
that is not innate or
intuitive
is acquired by the exercise of reason, then it cannot fairly be denied that
Catholic teaching
virtually asserts that
God's
existence can be
proved
. Certain
knowledge
of
God
is declared to be attainable "by the light of
reason
", i.e. of the reasoning faculty as such
from
or
through
"the things that are made"; and this clearly implies an inferential process such as in other connections men do not hesitate to call
proof
.
Hence it is fair to conclude that the
Vatican Council
, following
Sacred Scripture
, has virtually condemned the Scepticism which rejects the
a posteriori
proof
. But it did not deal directly with
Ontologism
, although certain propositions of the
Ontologists
had already been condemned as unsafe (
tuto tradi non posse
) by a
decree
of the Holy Office (18 September, 1861), and among the propositions of
Rosmini
subsequently condemned (14 December, 1887) several reassert the ontologist principle. This condemnation by the Holy Office is quite sufficient to discredit
Ontologism
, regarding which it is enough to say here
- that, as already observed, experience contradicts the assumption that the
human
mind
has naturally or necessarily an immediate consciousness or
intuition
of the Divine,
- that such a theory obscures, and tends to do away with, the difference, on which
St. Paul
insists (
1 Corinthians 13:12
), between our earthly
knowledge
of
God
("through a glass in a dark manner") and the vision of Him which the blessed in
heaven
enjoy ("face to face") and seems irreconcilable with the
Catholic doctrine
, defined by the Council of Vienne, that, to be capable of the face to face or
intuitive vision of God
, the human
intellect
needs to be endowed with a special
supernatural
light, the
lumen gloriae
and
- finally that, in so far as it is clearly intelligible, the theory goes dangerously near to
Pantheism
.
In the
decree
"Lamentabili" (3 July, 1907) and the
Encyclical
"Pascendi" (7 September, 1907), issued by
Pope Pius X
, the
Catholic
position is once more reaffirmed and
theological
Agnosticism
condemned. In its bearing on our subject, this act of Church authority is merely a restatement of the teaching of
St. Paul
and of the
Vatican Council
, and a reassertion of the principle which has been always maintained, that
God
must be naturally knowable if
faith
in Him and His revelation is to be reasonable; and if a concrete example be needed to show how, of
logical
necessity, the substance of
Christianity
vanishes into thin air once the
agnostic
principle is adopted, one has only to point the finger at
Modernism
. Rational theism is a
necessary
logical
basis for
revealed
religion
; and that the natural
knowledge
of
God
and natural religion, which
Catholic teaching
holds to be possible, are not necessarily the result of grace, i.e. of a
supernatural
aid given directly by
God
Himself, follows from the condemnation by
Clement XI
of one of the propositions of
Quesnel
(prop. 41) in which the contrary is asserted (
Denzinger
, 1391; old no. 1256).
About this page
APA citation.
Toner, P.
(1909).
The Existence of God.
In
The Catholic Encyclopedia.
New York: Robert Appleton Company.
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608b.htm
MLA citation.
Toner, Patrick.
"The Existence of God."
The Catholic Encyclopedia.
Vol. 6.
New York: Robert Appleton Company,
1909.
<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608b.htm>.
Transcription.
This article was transcribed for New Advent by Tomas Hancil.
Ecclesiastical approbation.
Nihil Obstat.
September 1, 1909. Remy Lafort, Censor.
Imprimatur.
+John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York.
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