HyperWar: The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940 [Chapter VI]
CHAPTER
VI
THE COUNTER-ATTACK AT ARRAS
21st
May, 1940
Before completing the story of what was
happening at the
higher level it will be best to record the fighting which took place on
May the 21st.
There was at the time, and there
still is, some confusion of
ideas about what is commonly known as the British 'counter-attack' at
Arras.
Lord Gort's original intention, the role of
Frankforce as
set out in an order given to General Franklyn early on May the 20th,
was to 'support the garrison in Arras and to block the roads south of
Arras, thus cutting off the German communications [via Arras] from the
east'. He was 'to occupy the line of the Scarpe on the east of Arras'
and establish touch 'by patrols' with the French.[1] Nothing was said
about a counter-attack or any larger objective, nor was there any
suggestion that the French would be associated in the operation.
After this order had been issued Sir Edmund Ironside arrived
at Lord Gort's Command Post with the Cabinet's Order A (page
83
). Lord
Gort explained the situation and convinced the C.I.G.S. that while it
was clear that the gap must be closed if disaster were to be avoided
this must depend chiefly on the French.[2] Already his only two
available divisions had been ordered to operate south of Arras on the
following day; all other divisions were already committed on the main
front.
Sir Edmund Ironside and General Pownall then
went to see
General Billotte at his headquarters in Lens. They urged the importance
of an immediate attempt to close the gap and hold of the action being
taken by the two British divisions on the 21st. General Billotte agreed
that the French would attack with two divisions towards Cambrai on the
same day: they would concert plans with General Franklyn.[3]
Imperceptibly
General Franklyn's operation now began to be
thought of at Lord Gort's Command Post as a preliminary move in the
projected attempt to close the gap,[4] but no fresh orders were issued
to General Franklyn, who was not told that his operation was now
regarded as related to a bigger counter-attack in which the French were
involved.
--87--
Meanwhile, General Franklyn visited
General Prioux,
commanding the French Cavalry Corps, whose patrols were on the Scarpe.
He found the General in conference with General Blanchard (First Army),
General Altmayer (V Corps); while he was there General Billotte came in
for a time. The French general were discussing the 'project' of a
counter-attack southwards, directed in the first phase towards Bapaume
and Cambrai; they asked if General Franklyn could cooperate by
attacking towards Bapaume on the following day (21st). General Franklyn
explained that he could not undertake more than the operation which he
had already been ordered to carry out. For this operation he proposed
to General Prioux that Frankforce should 'occupy the line of Scarpe on
the east of Arras' and be responsible for its defence between Arras and
Biache, and that the French cavalry, on being relieved, should move to
the west of Arras and watch that flank. General Prioux offered to do
more; he would arrange for part of a mechanised cavalry division to
operate on the outer flank of the British force in their action on the
21st.[5] This promise of French cooperation was duly honoured when the
time came.
Later in the day the French found that
they could not launch
their attack towards Cambrai before the 22nd, and they informed General
Franklyn of their decision during the night.[6] When this was learned
at Lord Gort's headquarters, where by now the separate British and
French operations were though of as related parts in the first stage of
a bigger counter-attack southwards, it was felt that a French
undertaking to cooperation with Frankforce on the 21st had been
unfulfilled. But General Franklyn had no such feeling.[7] His plans
were unaffected for the operation he had been ordered to carry out did
not depend on any further French collaboration than he was being given
by General Prioux.
The fact that 'the British
counter-attack at Arras' was not
planned as a 'counter-attack' but as a large-scale mopping-up operation
designed to support the garrison of Arras in blocking German
communications from the east, explains why the major part of the two
divisions was used to strengthen the defence of Arras on the Scarpe and
only a minor part was directly employed to clear the surrounding
country to the south. What is less clear is why the German forces in
the area were so badly underestimated. In two Frankforce orders which
General Franklyn issued on the morning of the 21st it was said that an
enemy column of light and heavy tanks had attacked Arras on the 20th;
enemy tanks had been seen west of Arras between the
Arras–Doullens road and the Arras–St Pol road (that is
between our troops and the 'start-line' set for the operation on the
21st); tanks had also been seen passing through Avesnes and approaching
St Pol; and strong columns of infantry with tanks; had been
seen
leaving
--88--
Cambrai
by the road to Arras
on the evening of the 20th–that is,
moving towards the area into which the operation on the 21st was
directed.[8]
A later Frankforce order said that at 10.20 on that morning (the 21st)
concentrations of enemy lorries and tanks were reported on the
Arras–St Pol road (which is well to the north of the ordered
start-line); a column of enemy motor transport was also reported moving
north-west from Doullens. Notwithstanding the fact that all this
information was given in Frankforce operation orders, the operation
order of the 151st Brigade, which was the 1st Army Tank Brigade was to
carry out the mopping-up operations, says that infantry and tanks were
'known to be operating south and south-west of Arras', but 'in numbers
no believed to be great'.[9]
The British
'counter-attack' at Arras is frequently referred to as
having been made by the 1st Army Tank Brigade and two infantry
divisions, but a much smaller force was actually engaged in the opening
fighting on May the 21st. In the first place, the selected
divisions—the 5th and the 50th—had each at this time only
two infantry brigades instead of the usual three. Of these, the 5th
Division sent one brigade (the 13th) to relieve the 23rd Division and
the French cavalry on the Scarpe in order that the latter might be
freed to take part in the action.[10] Its other brigade (the 17th) was
to be held in reserve till the first phase of the operation had been
completed. Only the 50th Division was to be used in the opening phase.
Of this division one brigade (the 150th) was sent to strengthen the
Arras garrison and to hold the Scarpe immediately to the east of the
town. Thus at the beginning of the operation only the 50th Division's
second brigade (the 151st) was employed in the clearing-up action, and
of this brigade's three infantry battalions one was kept back in
support of the attacking troops. The attacking infantry on May the 21st
were thus not two
divisions
but two
battalions
.
In the second place, the 1st Army Tank Brigade had covered very long
tank distances by road with few opportunities for maintenance and it
was by now much reduced in strength through mechanical breakdown.
Fifty-eight Mark I and sixteen Mark II tanks were all it could muster
that day, and many of them were in urgent need of thorough
overhaul.[11] (The Mark I tank was the first infantry tank—very
slow and, though protected by heavy armour, equipped with only one
7·9-mm. machine gun. The Mark II was a much bigger heavy
infantry tank with one 2-pounder gun and one 7·9-mm machine
gun.) To the attacking force was added artillery and a motor-cycle
battalion.
It will be remembered that on the night
of the 19th the 70th
Brigade of the 23rd Division had been ordered to occupy the line of the
Arras–Doullens road to Saulty. General Franklyn may have had this
in mind when he fixed that road as the start-line for the planned
operation. News of the calamity which overtook the 70th Brigade
en
--89--
route
may have not
reached him, and though the 12th Lancers, scouting on the west of
Arras, reported the approach of the enemy, it may not have been
realised that the latter were already far beyond the Doullens road. Be
that as it may, the fact remains that the right flank of the forces
engaged in the operation fought its way forward for several miles and
ye the infantry never reached the 'start-line'.
It
seems clear that the enemy forces in the area were much
under-estimated, for Major-General G. le Q. Martel, who had been given
command of the attacking troops, was issued more detailed orders for
the first phase of the operation requiring him to 'clear and capture
the area south of the River Scarpe from inclusive southern outskirts of
Arras including Pelves and Monchy (about five miles to the west),
thence line of Cojeul river as far as road Arras–Bapaume'.[12] It
would have needed a much bigger force to clear and capture and to mop
up any enemy met in an area which covered over forty squadron miles.
In the first phase a composite forces starting from the west
of
the town was to sweep round to the Cojeul river. In the second phase
the 13th Brigade of the 5th Division was to follow this up by advancing
south from its river-front position on the east of Arras to join up
with troops of the 151st Brigade employed in the first phase.
General Martel planned the opening operation as an advance by
two
mobile columns, each to consist of a tank battalion, an infantry
battalion from the 151st Brigade, a battery of field artillery,
a
battery of anti-tank guns, with a company of motor-cyclists for
reconnaissance. The following troops were detailed:
- Right Column
- 7th Royal Tank Regiment
8th Durham Light Infantry
365th Battery, 92nd Field Regiment, R.A.
260th Battery, 65th Anti-Tank Regiment, R.A.
One platoon 151st Brigade Anti-Tank Company
One scout platoon 4th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (Motor-cycle)
- Left Column
- 4th Royal Tank Regiment
6th Durham Light Infantry
368th Battery, 92nd Field Regiment, R.A.
206th Battery, 52nd Anti-Tank Regiment, R.A.
One platoon, 151st Brigade Anti-Tank Company
One company and one scout platoon, 4th Royal Northumberland Fusiliers
(Motor-cycle)[13]
They were to cross
the Arras–Doullens road at two o'clock in
the afternoon. The infantry had an eight-mile march to reach their
forming-up places; there was much congestion and refugee traffic on
--90--
the roads leading north from Arras and
some of the troops were
late in arriving. There was little time to study orders and none for
reconnaissance.
Maroeuil was being shelled when the
right-hand column moved off at
half past two, and rifle fire was coming from a nearby wood. They had
to fight Duisans and French tanks moving forward on the right reported
enemy tanks advancing further west—these were part of the German
7th Armoured Division (25th Armoured Regiment).[14] Two companies of
the
8th Durham Light Infantry and two troops of the 260th Anti-Tank Battery
were left to hold Duisans and to deal with the prisoners captured, and
the column pushed on towards Walrus. Here again the enemy was found in
possession, but the village was cleared and some prisoners taken.
Berneville was then captured and an advanced guard of the 8th Durham
Light Infantry with some of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment pushed on
towards the Doullens road.[15] But here they met the leading units of
the German 7th Infantry Regiment and troops of their S.S. 'T' (
Totenkopf
)
Division which had been concentrating in the area on the previous night
and were now resuming their advance.[16] They were pinned down by heavy
machine-gun and mortar fire, while enemy aircraft made a twenty-minute
attack on the main body. Having lost heavily, the advanced guard
withdrew to Walrus. Enemy tanks then attacked both Walrus and Duisans,
and though they were held off they established themselves astride the
road between the two villages. Our right column could do no more.
The left column also had fighting all the way, with both tanks
and
infantry. They had occupied in turn Dainville, Achicourt, Agny and
Beaurains, and a small advanced party had reached Wancourt. But they
were too weak a force to hold all the ground they had covered against
the far larger forces which the enemy had in the area. The infantry
held Agny and Beaurains while the 4th Royal Tank Regiment fought off
the German armour and occupied ground south of Beaurains.[17] They had
fought the German 6th Infantry Regiment[18] (the right flank of the 7th
Armoured Division) all afternoon, and they had heavy losses in both men
and tanks. Like the right column the left had shot its bolt, and there
were no fresh troops to follow up their success, or even to make good
the ground won. As the evening closed, both columns were ordered to
withdraw. Some elements of the French cavalry, acting under French
orders, remained in the positions they had reached in the Warlus area,
but in the night they were surrounded and only a few tanks succeeded in
breaking out.
The infantry of the right column who
held Warlus were only
extricated with the help of six French tanks which arrived in the nick
of time with two armoured troop-carriers. In these they broke through
--91--
the German hold on the Warlus–Duisans
road, while the troops
who had held Duisans withdrew after darkness had fallen, with the help
of the carriers of the 9th Durham Light Infantry and anti-tank guns of
the brigade reserve at Maroeuil. The infantry of the left column were
heavily bombed from the air in Beaurains and Agny, and were attacked by
German tanks when they moved out. Most of them got away, but one party
missed their road and eventually reached Boulogne!
In
so short an account of a day's confused fighting, it is
impossible to conjure up the picture of what it meant to the men of the
Royal Tank Regiment and the infantry and gunners who attacked together
for the first time in the war. All fought with courage and enterprise,
and in such open and dispersed actions there was abundant need of
personal initiative and self-reliance. Among the reports mad
subsequently by those who took part is one from a subaltern of the
Royal Tank Regiment which lifts a corner of the veil of anonymity which
must cover actions described so briefly.
Report on
engagement with German forces west and south-west of Arras on 21st May
1940.
To:
Officer Commanding,
7th Royal Tank Regiment.
Sir,—Concerning
the above engagement I have the honour to make the following
report.
On 21st May, at
approx. 1145
hours, I left Petit Vimy in B Coy light tank 'Guinivere', TB476, as
reconnaissance element of B Coy Mk I force under Captain M. W. Fisher.
While proceeding
along the road
Neuville–Maroeuil, anti-tank shells from our left struck the road
about ten to twenty yards ahead. It was impossible to discover the
guns, so I went on to a position of shelter and reported by radio. No
reply was obtained.
About twenty or
thirty minutes
later I observed a force, about a company strong, of tanks to the west
of Dainville, about one mile away. These machines may have been French,
but retired when we turned to approach them.
The level-crossing
near Dainville
was close, so I was compelled to break through it, and proceeded about
half a mile at high speed. Seeing two men attempting to hide in a
cornfield I pursued them and opened fire with the 3030 Vickers. One
man—an N.C.O. in German uniform—surrendered and the other
was apparently killed. In put the prisoner in the rear of the tank,
covering him with my revolver while we went down the road. Three
wrecked motor-cars were passed and one dead civilian. A mile further on
we ran into a village occupied by German forces who opened fire with
rifles. I turned round and came back to report to Captain Fisher. I
continued
--92--
into Dainville and handed
over the prisoner to captain of the Durham Light Infantry for
conveyance to Provost personnel …
I
then followed two Mk II tanks of 6 sec. B Coy intending
to pass them and catch up with the Mk I vehicles. Odd groups of the
enemy were seen and engaged, but near a main road west of Achicourt
(½–1 mile) we came under anti-tank fire and sustained
three direct hits. The effect was that of hitting a large stone at
speed, and the track on the right-hand side was seen a yard or two in
front of the tank. Two more shots followed, and then the guns were
silenced by our fire, and that of the I tanks, which went on without
seeing us.
We were
subjected to intense rifle fire for some minutes,
and then left alone, apparently in the belief that we were killed.
After five or ten minutes about thirty to fifty Germans were
congregated in groups on the road and to the right of us. We estimated
the range of each group, and then opened fire. Many of the enemy fell,
but some doubtless were unhurt. Later an abandoned anti-tank gun, about
800 yards to our right front, was re-manned, but was seen to be
deserted
after we fired upon it.
In
the intervals of firing we attempted to report by radio,
but could obtain no reply, although the receiver was working and
radiation was shown on the ammeter. The aerial had been damaged by
rifle bullets.
Soon
afterwards more tanks appeared, both Mk I and Mk II, and the firing
died down. Infantry also appeared.
I
then got out to inspect the damage. About five track
plates and pins were damaged, there was a hole about two inches in
diameter in the right-hand sprocket which had two teeth missing, and
radiator ,which could not be opened, was leaking. The engine
would run, but smelt strongly of burning. I mad several attempts to get
more track plates while my crew, Troopers Tansley and Mackay M., worked
at the tank often under fairly heavy shell fire. At times this was so
severe that work had to be suspended. Enemy aircraft also caused
interference.
During
this time it was reported to me that Sgt Temple's
tank (Mk II) was out of action in front of us and the sergeant was
believed killed. As soon as the shelling and rifle fire permitted I
went out with an R.A.M.C. officer, and found the tank with its right
track off and Sgt Temple and another man, who was unrecognisable by me,
dead outside the tank. The tank was abandoned with a bomb inside it,
which duly exploded.
At
dusk most of the infantry had withdrawn and since it was
obvious that a counter-attack was coming and that in the dark I could
do no useful work against it I prepared to abandon the tank. I set fire
to three German motor-cycles (one a combination from which I removed a
map, later given to Captain Holden) and the three anti-tank guns. These
were nearly all metal so did not burn well. They appeared similar to a
very large Boys rifle in mechanism, firing a shell of about ¾ to
1 lb. judging from the empty cases.
--93--
All moveable kit, including
guns, wireless, pyrenes, etc.,
was piled on an abandoned Bren carrier which we managed to start, and
when it was obvious no help was coming, the tank was fired. It was soon
blazing fiercely.
Being
informed that Neuville-Vitasse was in enemy hands I rallied with Major
Fernie of the 4th Bn outside Achicourt.
The
German counter-attack was launched as soon as darkness
was complete. Hot machine-gun fire was opened and a heavy tank
(possibly a captured one of French design) came down the road from
Neuville, firing its gun at random … I followed in the carrier,
which however broke down and had to be abandoned. This too was set on
fire, but I have reason to believe did not burn.
I had now with me Trooper Nichol, driver of
Lieut. Nugent's
tank. His tank, like another Mk II I saw, had caught fire and the crew
had separated.
An
infantry made up my party to five, so securing two Bren
guns, and a water bottle and rations each, we made our way into the
country, halting at a ruined aerodrome about 0230 hours on the 22nd.
One the following morning I led my party to five,
so
securing two Bren guns, and a water bottle and rations each, we made
our way into the country, halting at a ruined aerodrome about 0230
hours on the 22nd.
On
the following morning I led my party into Arras. We reported to Area
Headquarters and were later sent back to Vimy.
I have the honour to
be, sir,
Your obedient servant,
T. H
EPPLE
[19]
It is but
one soldier's account of how he did his duty on this one
day. As such it must stand for the many others who made no report.
The general aim of this action was to ease the enemy's
pressure on
Arras and to delay his encircling movement round the rear of the
British Expeditionary Force; the immediate objective of its first phase
was to clear of enemy forces the ground between Arras and the Cojeul
river. In its general purpose the action had a considerable measure of
success. Busy defending himself, the enemy could make no concerted
attack on Arras that day, and so vigorous was the British action that
Rommel's situation maps show our attack as coming from
five
British
divisions round Arras.[2] Moreover, as will be seen, it delayed the
advance of all the leading German divisions.
On the
other hand, its immediate object was bound to fail unless
the initial penetrations of the attacking columns could be followed up
by a force that was strong enough to occupy and hold so wide a stretch
of country. Yet even in its immediate purpose it may be counted at
least a limited success. For it destroyed many of the enemy's men and
vehicles and took many prisoners of war. The day's entry in
the
War Diary of the German 7th Armoured Division admits to have lost, that
day, nine medium and several light tanks; and in personnel, 378
killed, wounded and missing.[21] Either the diary understated the
missing, which are given as 173, or a considerable
--94--
number of our prisoners must have come
from other German divisions
which were involved, for nearly 400 prisoners were taken during the
attack. If the German killed and wounded are similarly understated in
Rommel's War Diary, the true sum of the damage inflicted on the enemy
was substantial.
That night the tanks of the German
7th Armoured Division harboured
to the south of Dainville. Some of their infantry were near the south
bank of the Scarpe, but none were across the river, and the remainder
spent the night in the Berneville area.[22] The plan of the German Army
Group Commander had been serious interfered with. Originally he had
intended to give the armoured divisions a day's rest after their
spectacular advance on May the 20th, and early in the day the forward
divisions did not know whether, having reached the coast, they were to
turn north towards the Channel ports or south towards Paris and the
heart of France. But by the middle of the morning Rundstedt ordered
them to swing to the north for the encirclement of the Allied northern
armies. With this in view, the 5th and 7th Armoured Divisions, trying
to take Arras, were to be relieved of that ask by the 20th Motorised
Division and the 11th Motorised Brigade with the 12th Infantry Division
supporting them. The 5th and 7th Armoured Divisions were to move round
to the west of Arras and cross to the north of the Scarpe. The S.S.
Totenkopf
Division was to follow suit on the left of the 7th and the German line
of battle was to be continued westwards by the 6th and 8th Armoured
Divisions who were to take station along the road to St Pol and farther
westwards.[23]
Then came new of the British
'counter-attack'. To Rommel it seemed
an attack by 'very strong enemy tank forces', a 'very heavy battle
against hundreds of enemy tanks and following infantry'. The 1st
Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment', he says in the War Dairy,
suffered particularly heavy casualties … Our own anti-tank guns
were not effective enough even at close range against the heavy British
tanks. The defensive front they [that is, the 6th Infantry Regiment]
had formed was penetrated by the enemy, the guns destroyed by fire or
over-run and their crews mostly annihilated.' He claims that the
attack was finally wrecked by 'defensive fire, particularly of all
troops of the 78th Artillery Regiment, the 86th Light Anti-Aircraft
Battery … the 3rd Troop of the 59th Anti-Aircraft Regiment
… an 8·8-cm troop of the 23rd Anti-Aircraft Regiment and
parts of the 42nd Anti-Tank Battalion'.
1
[24]
Indeed, nothing is more
striking in his situation maps for that day than the artillery shown in
position, deployed well up with advance formations. Our troops met a
gun-line which stretched to the west from Wailly, and there was much in
Rommel's claim that this was decisive factor in
--95--
the battle. No comparable support could be
provided by the artillery with our own attacking formations.
If
our offensive made such an impression on Rommel's mind, it is
not surprising that its results were felt farther afield. The original
orders of the 6th Armoured Division to move into position for the
resumption of the advance to the north were superseded. Instead, they
were ordered to take up defensive positions west of Arras, which can be
identified on the situation map following page 101. Only after the
day's operations were broken off were the majority of their units
regrouped on the St Pol road ready to start northwards on the 22nd, and
even then a strong column was retained on the Arras–Doullens road
as a flank guard against the renewal of our attack.[25] There were
other modifications of the orders to the 8th, 1st and 2nd Armoured
Divisions, and when XIX Corps started advancing northwards 'strong
elements [which included the 1st and 2nd Armoured Divisions] had to be
left in the bridgeheads and the need for these was felt very much,
during th later attack on Boulogne'.
2
And the XIX Corps Diary
records that the British counter-attack had 'apparently created
nervousness throughout the entire [Kleist] Group area'.[26]
Our
own casualties were heavy, as casualties are bound to be when
a small force attacks a stronger. Inexperience in the joint use of
tanks and infantry no doubt increased them, for there had been no
opportunity for careful preparation, and there were time during the
action when tanks and infantry were out of touch. The enemy's smaller
guns were ineffective against our tanks but lighter vehicles and
infantry suffered much from the forward deployment of their artillery.
Both commanding officers of our tank battalions were killed because the
light tanks they used were vulnerable to German anti-tank guns. The
Northumberland Fusiliers records that their wireless communications
worked perfectly all day, but the tank battalions who had had
insufficient time for recharging and 'netting', found their
'practically useless' and had to rely on liaison officers to convey
orders, an expensive and inadequate substitute for the continuous
contact which wireless makes possible.
During the
day the 150th Brigade made a raid across the Scarpe and
discomfited the enemy they encountered: and the 13th Brigade of the 5th
Division established a bridgehead further east in penetration for the
second phase of the operation. But when General Franklyn realised that
the ground taken on the first day could not be held and that the enemy
was continuing to work round his right flank in considerable strength,
he decided that the operation must be abandoned in order to stave off
the threatened envelopment of Arras and his whole force.[27]
On
the other hand the German High Command issued an order
--96--
to Army Group B stating that 'the question
of an attack by Army
Group A in a northerly direction will only arise when the infantry
divisions have gained possession of the high ground north-west of
Arras'
3
[28]
and stressing the importance of an attack by Army Group
B against the southern wing of our main Escaut front, the other jaw of
a pincer movement.
The close and effective
collaboration between German land and air
forces which marked the whole campaign was very clearly exemplified on
this day. As noted above, when the former found our attacking troops
difficult to hold at Berneville, Beaurains and Agny they called on the
Luftwaffe
for help,
and bombing attacks on these places were delivered just where and when
they were needed.
It was very different on the
British side. There was no air
formation in France on which General Franklyn could call for help at
short notice in support of our troops in action. Targets for
the
Blenheim attacks in this area during the day were selected, no in
France but by the Air Ministry in consultation with the War Office, for
by now rapid communication with commanders in the field was impossible.
Fifty-seven Blenheims of No. 2 Group, stationed in England, were
employed in four separate attacks based on the results of
reconnaissance sorties also flown from England.[29] The targets
reported (mostly between Arras and the coast) could seldom by
identified by the time the Blenheims reached the area, but enemy
columns were bombed—when they could be distinguished from refugee
traffic crawling away from the German advance. And even in the matter
of reconnaissance the limited value of intermittent reports to the Air
Ministry was clearly shown on this day by the fact that General
Franklyn received no indication of the fact that six armoured divisions
were moving that morning through the country south of Arras where the
British force was directed to operate. From 7.30 in the morning a
number of reconnaissance sorties had been flown over the area, yet an
early report that infantry in open order were moving across the
Arras–Cambrai road seems to have been the only air report of
enemy movement in the counter-attack zone.
A new
'Back Component' was forming in Kent from the returned
squadrons of the Air Component and the organisation of air
reconnaissance was being made their task.[30]
Air
Vice-Marshal C. H. B. Blount, commanding the Air Component of
the British Expeditionary Force, had now only one squadron and one
flight of Lysanders left in France; the rest of the Air Component was
in England. Moreover, he was now effectively cut off from the commander
of the British Air Forces in France though nominally still under his
command.
Air Marshal Barratt's only effective
control was now over the
--97--
Advanced Air Striking Force of three
fighter squadrons and six
bomber squadrons, stationed well south of the German breakthrough.
Control of the bomber squadrons stationed in England was being
exercised by the Air Ministry without reference to him, as was
mentioned above in describing the day's bombing operations. For rest,
Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands all operated under the Air
Ministry in England. When by May the 24th these moves were completed
the locations of the Back Component and the Advance Air Striking Force
would be as shown on the adjoining sketch map.
As
the fighting drew daily nearer to the coast, there were obvious
advantages in thus concentrating our air forces in England, where their
bases were in less immediate danger and provision for
servicing
was far better than it could now be in France. Damaged machine which
would have become useless there could be repaired and made serviceable
again. This alone was an important consideration as one example will
show. The Hurricanes of the Air Component when ordered home (including
sixty0nine replacements) had mustered in all 261 aircraft. Seventy-four
of these were recorded as shot down in combat; of the rest a
considerable number would normally have been repairable, but in the
circumstances prevailing in France 121 damaged in battle became
complete losses. Only sixty-six flew back to England.[31]
But
there were counterbalancing disadvantages at a time when it
was urgently desirable to make the power of the air arm felt on the
field of battle. The Allied armies in the north were almost surrounded
and in dire peril. Attacked on all sides and from the air, they asked
that the Royal Air Force should devote all its strength in an effort to
hold the enemy.
Belgium also appealed for help in
the north. Lord Gort seconded
her requests and Air Marshal Barratt support with all his power appeals
from the French which grew daily more urgent.[32] But the close
collaboration which all commanders in France sought to obtain was
hardly possible under existing arrangements. The Air Ministry in
England
could not possibly satisfy all or delivery attacks 'just where and when
they were needed'. With all, or nearly all, of the Royal Air Force now
based in England, they could indeed only plan operations with a broad
overall view of reported needs. To that end they could maintain
long-distance touch with Lord Gort in the north and Air Marshal Barratt
in the south, and, through the mission at French and Belgian
Headquarters, with Allied Commands. They could combine their
intelligence with that of the War Office and agree on a general plan of
operations. But they could not do all this so quickly that operations
could be related to the swift movements of the enemy, they could not
ensure a sensitive reaction to increased danger at a threatened point.
The Royal Air Force at this date was neither
--98--
.
--99--
organised nor equipped, nor indeed was it
trained, except in some
small 'army cooperation' elements, for close collaboration in a moving
battle. But, even if it had been, such collaboration in a battle in
France could hardly be controlled effectively from the Air Ministry in
England.
On the other hand, night attacks on the
enemy's concentrations and
communications were more easily conducted from England. One
hundred and thirty-seven sorties were mad on a wide range of targets on
the night of the 21st.22nd, including twelve by the Advanced Air
Striking Force, and only six aircraft failed to return.[33]
The
British counter-attack' at Arras had started in the afternoon,
but units of Army Group B began their attacks on our main Escaut front
early in the morning and these were maintained throughout the day. In
the south the 48th Division had to meet several attempts to break their
line, and the 2nd Royal Warwickshire, 8th Worcestershire and 5th
Gloucestershire were all heavily involved. The 1st Oxfordshire and
Buckinghamshire Light Infantry were brought forward and successfully
counter-attacked to regain positions temporarily lost. On the 2nd
Division's front the 8th Royal Warwickshire (temporarily under command
and in the front line) also withstood a heavy attack which drove in
their forward positions, and followed up with a counter-attack in which
the commanding officer and second in command were both killed, without
the position being retaken. At this point the enemy established a small
bridgehead about three miles south of Tournai. The 1st Royal Scots,
whose flank was threatened by this penetration, counter-attacked twice
yet failed to dislodge the enemy. Meanwhile, on their left, the 2nd
Royal Norfolk successfully repulsed an attack.[34] (For dispositions
see pages 17 and 122.)
The 42nd Division covering
Tournai were attacked in the morning.
Forward companies of the 1st Border Regiment were cut off, but the
1st/6th Lancashire Fusiliers counter-attacked and drive the enemy back
across the river. In the 1st Division's sector the Germans, preceded by
soldiers disguised as civilians or as British officers, penetrated at a
number of points on a 2,000-yard front after strong artillery
preparation. The 1st King's Shropshire Light Infantry counter-attacked
successfully at one point, and the 2nd North Staffordshire stopped
another advance. The 3rd Grenadiers made two determined counter-attacks
against a strong position which the enemy had won, losing so heavily
that they could only form two companies at the end of the day. But the
enemy, too, had suffered heavily from these counter-attacks, and when
Grenadier patrols went forward again they found that he had retired
across the river and our position was restored.[35] There was some
activity on the 3rd Division's front, but pressure was less severe and
all attempts to cross the river there were frustrated.
--100--
On the 4th Division's front the enemy got
over the river early in
the morning, but were driven back again by the 2nd Bedfordshire and
Hertfordshire, while the 2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry
successfully prevented an attempted crossing after a heavy artillery
bombardment.[36] On most of the front the troops had to endure severe
and accurate artillery fire. The enemy's observation planes flew
unhindered that day and the German gunners must have been kept well
informed of our positions.
But the only material
foothold gained by the Germans on the west
bank of the Escaut was in the north, where the line held lay back from
the river and the enemy were established already on the west bank.
Starting from this vantage point they penetrated the front of the 44th
Division for some distance in the early morning mist before their
presence was detected. Bock's War Diary shows that this, in his view,
was the key point in the Escaut front. Here, at the junction of the
British and Belgian Armies, he determined to concentrate on an effort
to break through to the sea-coast. The High Command's intention on the
other hand was that he should force the southern flank in support of
the break-through by Army Group A, but Bock maintained that the general
aim to cut off and annihilate the Allied armies in the north would be
realised by 'a break-through in the direction of Courtrai, rather than
by running up against the Lille fortifications'.
4
[37]
The German penetration of the 44th Division's front reached
Petegem (two miles south-west of Audenarde and a mile from the river),
which was the centre of severe and confused fighting. German troops got
there during the night of the 20th/21st. The 2nd Buffs counter-attacked
at three o'clock in the morning, but failed to eject them. The 1st/5th
Queen's were more successful, and by half-past seven Petegem was clear
again. But in the afternoon the enemy returned to the attack. Two
companies of the 1st/6th Queen's were isolated, and Battalion
Headquarters and a third company held a nearby chateau grounds; what
remained of the 2nd Buffs, the 1st/5th and 1st/6th Queen's withdrew to
positions in the rear. The Queen's could only muster one composite
company, and they were attached of the 5th Royal Sussex to stop further
penetration. In the adjoining sector the enemy's advance had isolated a
company of the 1st Royal West Kent, but they were freed in a
counter-attack by other companies of the battalion which then went on
finally to recapture Petegem and to clear it of the enemy.[38] Only
between Petegem and the Escaut did the Germans still retain a
bridgehead on the western bank as the result of this long day's
fighting. They had neither broken our main front nor captured Arras.
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